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Abstract 
Legal doctrine dictates that the triers of fact in court cases (i.e. the jury, or a judge in a 
judge-alone trial) can reliably assess the trustworthiness of a witness by interpreting, among other 
things, nonverbal demeanour evidence. This faith is misplaced. No matter how learned the triers of 
fact, and irrespective of their training (O’Sullivan & Ekman, 2004), most people operate at about 
chance level in detecting deception (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Gemma, Schertler & Bull, 2019; 
Morgan, Rabinowitz, Hilts, Weller & Coric, 2013; Wright, Berry & Bird, 2012; Vrij & Turgeon, 
2018) and further, jurors’ initial impressions have been found to carry disproportionate weight 
(Porter & ten Brinke, 2009). This venerated belief can, and does, lead to unsafe and dangerous 
legal decisions (Baker, Porter, ten Brinke & Mundy, 2016; Denault & Dunbar, 2017; Korva, Porter, 
O’Conner, Shaw & ten Brinke, 2013; Porter & ten Brinke, 2009, 2010; Wilson & Rule, 2019). 
Judicial directions to the triers of fact about witness credibility have a long history (see 
Alexander v The Queen, 1981; Domican v R, 1992; Longman v The Queen, 1989).  However, there 
is simply no evidence that such directions have any meaningful effect on the decisions of jurors 
(Spivak, Ogloff & Clough, 2011). This fallibility has prompted interest in providing education to 
jury members. Nonetheless, although there have been numerous attempts to train jurors in 
techniques to assess deception such training has no import with respect to decision-making in real 
courtrooms. Primarily, training has no place in a court of law because training involves, by 
definition, feedback (Driskell, 2012), which cannot be given in an actual trial. In an actual trial, the 
only scientific information that can assist the triers of fact in assessing witness demeanour is that 
which can be adduced by way of expert evidence. Adducing evidence does not and cannot, as a 
matter of law and practice, involve feedback. 
The current program of research comprises two studies that aim to advance work in this 
area by testing specific tenets of Dangerous Decisions Theory (DDT; Porter & ten Brinke, 2009) 
which posits that initial judgments of trustworthiness based on nonverbal behaviour form rapidly 
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and are resistant to change, even in the face of conflicting evidence (Baker, et al, 2016; Porter ten 
Brinke 2009; 2010). The first study investigates the pervasiveness of initial, baseline perceptions 
of nonverbal deceptive behaviour, and examines whether or not expert evidence and/or judicial 
directives on reliable/unreliable indicators of deception can improve the reliability of jurors’ initial 
perceptions. 
In an actual trial it is not uncommon for members of a jury to consider evidence adduced 
by an expert at a later stage in proceedings, requiring that triers of fact retain the testimony proffered 
by the expert. This delay introduces decay and interference effects that can undermine the retention 
of information. However, the effect of this has not previously been investigated in this context. A 
unique aspect of the current research therefore, is examining the impact of delay on jurors’ 
perceptions of trustworthiness/deception.  Specifically, the second study seeks to investigate the 
effect of a delay between the presentation of expert evidence and/or judicial directions on juror 
decision-making regarding perceptions of deception indicia. This delayed consideration of advice 
could be expected to occur in a trial where the expert evidence or judicial instruction presented 
earlier in a trial has to be relied upon later when applied to other evidence such as a factual witness. 
In this thesis, findings are reported that suggest that jurors’ perceptions of nonverbal indicia 
may be enhanced with instructions on reliable/unreliable cues of deception and that these effects 
may be both immediate and in the long-term with the greatest gains in accuracy found for advice 
adduced by an expert witness.  A number of implications for theory and forensic practice were 
identified with logical and important steps worthy of future investigation highlighted.  The 
contribution of this program of research, from both a theoretical and applied perspective, lies in the 
mixed support for DDT that attests initial judgements are resistant to change even in the face of 
conflicting evidence.  In doing so, this thesis presents a strong argument for enhancing the 
professional practice of forensic psychology in educating triers of fact on behavioural, nonverbal 
diagnostics of deception.  
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“Lies, my dear boy, can easily be recognized.  There are two kind of them: those with short 
legs, and those with long noses.  Your kind have long noses.” 
Collodi, C. (1883). Le avventure di Pinocchio (The Adventures of Pinocchio). 
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Chapter 1. Thesis Overview 
The current program of research comprises two studies that investigate whether jurors’ 
perceptions of nonverbal cues of deception could be enhanced with education through the provision 
of advice, whether the source of that advice is relevant, and whether or not any enhancement of 
jurors’ perceptions of deception hold over time. 
The thesis begins with an overview of the literature on detecting deception.  Firstly, terms 
are defined and the reader is orientated to the problems associated with interpreting demeanour 
evidence when assessing witness credibility, and why the problem is an important one.  In chapter 
three, the rationale and contribution of research is set out with a strong argument made for the value 
of scientific replication.  The background to the thesis concludes at chapter four where the aims 
and hypotheses for Study one are presented.  A general method is detailed at chapter five 
eliminating, where possible, duplication and repetition between studies.  The results for Study one 
are presented in chapter six with a discussion of the findings thereafter.  Study two is introduced at 
chapter eight with the aim and hypothesis outlined in chapter nine with results, thereafter.  An 
analysis of the findings follow in the discussion at chapter eleven.  The thesis concludes with a 
general, overarching discussion at chapter twelve.  Here, the findings of both studies are interpreted 
together with implications for theory and forensic practice considered.  Lastly, the strengths and 
limitations of the thesis are noted along with areas worthy of future research. 
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Chapter 2. Introduction 
2.1 What is Deception? 
At first glance deception might be described as the act of lying: the telling of an untruth or 
an intentionally false statement ("Lie [Def. 2] ", n.d.).  This definition however, overlooks a number 
of complexities.  To tell a lie implies that incorrect, misinformation has been exchanged but not all 
exchanges of inaccurate information imply a lie or the intent to deceive.  For example, information 
may be inaccurate and unreliable because of a false belief or false memory (Lanley & Loftus, 2013; 
Loftus & Pickrell, 1995; Schacter & Loftus, 2013; Vrij, Granhag, & Porter, 2010).  Consider a 
witness’s testimony in court: on the one hand testimony may be inaccurate because the witness is 
lying with the intent to deceive, or because their reconstruction of events are wrong.  Although the 
information is inaccurate and unreliable in both circumstances, reconstruction is a normal part of 
memory process (Tulving & Thomson, 1979), that due to post-event contamination may result in 
a false belief (Loftus, 1975; Loftus & Hoffman, 1989).  Although false beliefs, false memories and 
misremembering may undermine the accuracy of information exchanged between one or more 
parties, they do not, by that fact alone, involve deceit.   
The terms lying and deception will be used interchangeably throughout as related concepts 
pertaining to the antithetical, truthfulness.  The terminology adopted is consistent with that 
employed by seminal authors in the field (DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij, 2000; Frank & Svetieva, 2013; 
Levine, 2014a; Knapp et al., 2016; also see Kalbfleisch & Docan-Morgan, 2019 for an overview).  
The Oxford Online English Dictionary defines deception as “the action of deceiving someone” 
with deceit characterised as the “action or practice of deceiving someone by concealing or 
misrepresenting the truth” ("Deceit [Def. 1] ", nd; "Deception [Def. 1] ", nd).  This definition 
encapsulates the act of making a false statement (a lie) but also captures the act of concealment.  
When considering the role of deception, the act of concealment is important – especially so when 
withholding, concealing, or refusing information has advantage, either directly or indirectly. 
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For the purposes of the current research deception is defined as the intention to mislead. 
This stance is consistent with prevailing doctrine on deception and reflects sentiments espoused by 
key contributors such as DePaulo and her colleagues (2003) who define deception as “a deliberate 
attempt to mislead others” (p.74) and Vrij (2008) who attests deception as “a successful or 
unsuccessful deliberate attempt, without forewarning, to create in another a belief which the 
communicator considers to be untrue” (p.14). 
Detection of deception has received considerable attention with respect to potentially 
assisting police investigations (see Ioannou & Hammond, 2015; Vrij & Granhag, 2007; Vrij & 
Semin, 1996; Vrij & Semin, 2004), and more recently, national security operations in trying to 
assess intent of suspects (Alison, Alison, Noone, Elntib, Waring & Christiansen, 2014; Clemens, 
Granhag & Strömwall, 2013; Granhag & Mac Giolla, 2014; Levine, 2014b, 2015; Weinberger, 
2010).  Yet, little consideration has been given to detection of deception within curial proceedings 
(for recent commentary see Denault & Dunbar, 2019; Denault & Jupe, 2018; Denault, Jupe, Dodier 
& Rochat, 2018; Leach et al., 2016).  In a trial by jury, the role of the tribunal is to reach a verdict 
by considering the evidence introduced at trial and the directions of the presiding judge.  As the 
triers of fact, the aim of the jury is to uncover the truth through establishing the facts of the case.  
However, when contests of credibility are at play this task becomes increasingly difficult, and the 
detection of deception becomes of great import. 
In considering oral evidence adduced through witness testimony (witnesses of fact or 
opinion), the jury must determine the credibility of the witness and the weight to be placed on the 
testimony presented.  In evaluating witness credibility one area jurors must consider is the 
truthfulness of a witness: as judges of fact, they must decide whether a witness has told the truth or 
testified falsely.  In doing so, jurors evaluate, among other things (i.e. accuracy and bias) witness 
demeanour: relying on the behaviour and appearance of a witness to detect deception.  Although 
witness credibility can be considered to involve a number of factors (for example the reliability, 
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accuracy, or expertise of a witness), for the purposes of the current research, credibility is 
understood in terms of the truthfulness, trustworthiness and believability of a witness. 
2.2 What is the Problem? 
2.2.1 Looks Can be Deceiving: Relying on witness demeanour to determine witness 
credibility  
In their role as triers of fact, jurors’ decision-making is largely informed by evidence 
adduced through the testimony of experts and witnesses of fact.  A difficulty posed however, is in 
evaluating conflicting testimony and then considering its impact on the truthfulness of a witness 
(Denault & Dunbar, 2019; Porter, ten Brinke, & Gustaw, 2010).  Legal doctrine assumes that triers 
of fact evaluate demeanour by observing, among other things, nonverbal behaviour in assessing 
the veracity of a witness (Morales v Artuz, 2002; Qureshi, 2014).  The Western Australian (WA) 
and New South Wales (NSW) Bench Books posit that members of the jury “assess a persons’ 
credibility or trustworthiness on their perceptions of the person’s demeanour” (Equality before the 
Law Bench Book, WA, 2009, p. 300; Equality before the Law Bench Book, NSW, 2014, p. 313). 
Similar sentiments are echoed in the Victorian Bench Book which advocates for “the need to 
challenge a witness’ credibility or examine his or her demeanour” if a fair trial is to be ensured 
(Open Courts Bench Book, Vic, 2014 at 4.3.3). 
In R v. François (1994) McLachlin J. of the Canadian Supreme Court observed: “the jury 
must decide whether it believes the witness’s story in whole or in part.  That determination turns… 
on the demeanour of the witness and the common sense of the jury”.  This observation implies that 
the truthfulness of a witness rests in the interpretation and evaluation of witness demeanour.  
Similarly, in 2012, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled in R v. S that an important factor in trial 
fairness is the deceit indicated by facial cues of witnesses, and that observations of the witnesses’ 
face while testifying is “too deeply rooted in the criminal justice system to be set aside” (para, 27). 
As Coyle and Thomson (2014) note, assessing the demeanour of a witness means, in practice 
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“attending to verbal and nonverbal indicia of truthfulness… [and] where competing versions of 
events are given, the assessment of such indicia are of great import” (p. 478). 
The task of assessing witness credibility is deemed the “bread and butter” of jurors (Porter 
& ten Brinke, 2009, p. 120), most likely because it is presumed “common sense” (Vrij & Turgeon, 
2018, p. 232).  So much so that assessments of credibility are a function reserved for the sole 
province for the jury whereby adducing evidence on witness credibility is prohibited by the 
credibility rule (Evidence Act 2008, Vic, s.102).  This position was espoused in R v. Marquard 
(1993), in which the Canadian Supreme Court unambiguously noted “that the ultimate conclusions 
as to the credibility or truthfulness of a particular witness is for the trier of fact, and is not the proper 
subject of expert opinion” (at 228).  Although originating from British common law roots, 
Canadian case law may be used as an authority for Australian cases (Lefler, 2002).  Such a direction 
as that stated in R v Marquard (1993) assumes that a common sense approach is reliable.  However, 
this approach ignores the fact that assessing the truthfulness of a witness is a highly complex and 
unreliable task and hence, verdict deliberations may be fatally flawed if based on jurors’ subjective, 
intuitive interpretations of nonverbal behaviour that are invalid and unreliable (Baker et al., 2016; 
Bennett, 2015; DePaulo, et al, 2003; Porter & ten Brinke, 2010; Sporer & Schwandt, 2007; Snook, 
McCardle, Fahmy, & House, 2017; Vrij, Hartwig & Granhag, 2019; Vrij & Turgeon, 2018). 
Demeanour evidence refers, in part, to a witness’s  behavioural cues observed while 
testifying, including facial expressions, eye contact, attitude, body language, pauses in speech, 
hesitation, sincerity, use of gestures, candour, tone of voice, dress, grooming, and level of 
confidence (Ogden, 2000).  McKimmie, Masser and Bongiorno (2014) studied the effect of witness 
demeanour on mock jurors’ perceptions by investigating behavioural stereotypes of deception on 
convincing and unconvincing witness testimony.  They found that jurors were less influenced by 
convincing testimony when a witness displayed behavioural stereotypes of deception than when a 
witness displayed behavioural stereotypes of trustworthiness (McKimmie et al., 2014).  This 
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finding suggests that jurors give more weight to the demeanour of a witness than the strength of 
their testimony.  However, the study confounded the use of reliable and unreliable indicia of 
deception: when testifying, witnesses displayed both accurate stereotypes of deception (i.e. high 
pitched voice), and inaccurate stereotypes of deception (i.e. gaze aversion).  As a result, McKimmie 
et al., (2014) conducted a follow-up study to test whether the evaluation of witness testimony was 
influenced by the presence of reliable cues, unreliable cues or both.  It is of some note that mock 
jurors were primarily influenced by unreliable, inaccurate behavioural stereotypes of deception 
such as gaze aversion.  And thus, paradoxically, they concluded that instructing jurors to pay 
attention to witness demeanour may undermine assessments of witness credibility (McKimmie et 
al., 2014). 
The potential for error is unequivocal when unreliable indicia of deception/truthfulness 
guide legal decision-making (Baker et al., 2016; Kramer & Van Volkom, 2018; Minzner, 2008).  
An egregious example of this is found in the Supreme Court of Queensland (2006) Equal Treatment 
Bench Book wherein it is averred: “An impressive witness according to Anglo-Australian culture 
will look his or her questioner in the eye and answer questions confidently and clearly” (p.75).  
This statement suggests that eye contact, confidence and speaking unclearly are reliable markers 
of truthfulness.  They are not (DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij, 2008). 
The problem of relying on demeanour evidence to infer witness credibility is that the weight 
attributed to witness demeanour ignores the literature consensus that shows triers of fact typically 
perform no better than chance in accurately discriminating truth-telling from lying (O’Sullivan & 
Ekman, 2004), however; they think they do (Porter & ten Brinke, 2009).  On the contrary, triers of 
fact fall prey to unreliable indicia of deception when making a judgement.  These errors in thinking 
also hold for members of the judiciary (Denault & Dunbar, 2017, 2019; Granhag & Strömwall, 
2004; Vrij & Mann, 2004).  Not only do the adjudicature hold the same misplaced beliefs as 
laypersons (Burns, 2016) but, at times, their limited scientific knowledge renders them vulnerable 
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to the dangers of pseudoscience (Denault, et al., 2019; Denault & Jupe, 2018).  Especially 
concerning is when judicial members receive training in nonverbal indicators of deception that 
lacks any basis in empirical evidence (Denault, in press; Denault & Dunbar, 2017; Denault & Jupe, 
2019).  All this points to the fact that judicial decision-making processes are not immune from basic 
human biases (Baker et al., 2016; Bennett, 2015; Burns, 2016; Kramer & Van Volkom, 2018; 
Porter & ten Brinke, 2009). 
2.2.2  Accuracy in Detecting Deception: Fact or fiction? 
To reiterate, people are poor at detecting lies with most people’s ability to detect deception 
only slightly better than chance (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Colwell, James-Kangal, Hiscock-
Anisman & Plelan, 2015; Hauch, Sporer, Michael & Meissner, 2016; Hartwig & Bond, 2014; 
Morgan, et al, 2013; Wright, Berry & Bird, 2012; Vrij, 2008).  A meta-analysis of 206 studies on 
veracity judgements found that the average rate of performance in detecting deception was 54% 
(Bond & DePaulo, 2006).  When comparing ability to correctly discriminate lies from truth, Bond 
and DePaulo (2006) found only 47% of people correctly identified lies, and 61% accurately 
detected statements that were truthful.  Furthermore, their meta-analysis revealed that detection 
accuracy was poorer when based on nonverbal indicia when compared to verbal indicia (Bond & 
DePaulo, 2006). 
Two schools of thought seek to explain this poor performance. First, lie-detection is 
erroneous because people tend to rely on invalid cues when judging deception (Levine & 
McCornack, 2014; Vrij et al., 2019).  Second, valid and reliable indicia of deception are weak, 
making detection of deception difficult and unreliable (Hartwig & Bond, 2011; Strömwall, 
Granhag, & Hartwig, 2004; Masip, 2017; Vrij et al., 2010; Vrij & Turgeon, 2018).  Nonetheless, 
these two perspectives are not mutually exclusive.  There is some preliminary evidence to suggest 
that both explanations have validity.  That is, people pay attention to both incorrect and correct 
cues but the subtle differences between lying and truth-telling render valid cues hard to detect 
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(McKimmie et al., 2014; Vrij et al., 2010).  Accordingly, objective truthfulness is often easily 
missed, misinterpreted or overlooked due to subtle differences and/or wrong techniques (Coyle & 
Thomson, 2014). 
Contrary to common knowledge, professionals experienced in trying to detect deception 
are no better at discriminating truth-tellers from liars (Bond & DePaulo, 2006).  Based on the 
premise that experience in dealing with liars positively influences skills in detection, trained 
professionals are often presumed to be better at detecting deception than laypersons (Vrij & Mann, 
2001).  A considerable body of work has investigated demeanour-based detection accuracy among 
police investigators, custom and immigration officials, security and intelligence personnel, 
psychologists and judges (Akehurst, Kohnken, Vrij & Bull, 1996; Bogaard & Meijer, 2018; 
Delmas, et al, 2019; DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer & Epstein, 1996; DePaulo & Pfeifer, 1986; 
Elkman & O’Sullivan, 1991; Mann & Bull, 2004; Mann & Vrij, 2006; Mann, Vrij & Bull, 2006; 
Masip & Herrero, 2015b; Wright & Wheatcroft, 2017; Wright, Wagstaff & Wheatcroft, 2015).   
While some individual evidence suggests that police, federal judges and forensic psychologists 
perform significantly better than chance (Ekman, O'Sullivan, & Frank, 1999) group data indicates 
differently (Sternglanz, Morris, Morrow, & Braverman, 2019).  In a meta-analysis, Aamodt and 
Custer (2006) found no relationship between detection accuracy and experience (k = 13, d = -0.16), 
or between detection accuracy and education (k = 3, d = 0.06).  In fact, their results indicated that 
the ability to detect deception did not differ between professionals (55.5%) and laypersons (54.2%).  
This finding is consistent with a larger meta-analysis conducted by Bond and DePaulo (2006) that 
showed experts did not outperform laypersons in differentiating liars from truth-tellers (k = 20, d 
= -0.03). 
A common error among professionals is their tendency to overestimate their ability to 
detect deceit (Vrij et al., 2010).  In a review of 24 studies on lie-detection abilities among 
professionals (predominantly police) Vrij (2008) found a total average accuracy rate of 55.9%.  In 
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seven of eight comparative studies Vrij’s (2008) analysis found no differences in detection 
accuracy between police and laypersons.  Indeed, one study revealed laypersons outperformed 
police in detecting lies (Vrij, 2008).  At the time of Vrij’s (2008) review no one study found police 
to be superior to laypersons in discriminating deception from truth-telling.  Similarly, O'Sullivan 
and Ekman (2004) believed some professional groups would outperform others in detecting 
deception.  Nonetheless, they found that most professions – police officers, agents from the Central 
Intelligence Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation, lawyers, university students, 
psychotherapists, judges and forensic psychologists – performed little better than chance.  Only 
one group, the United States Secret Service, did significantly better than chance in detecting 
deception with more than half obtaining accuracy scores of 70% or more.  This difference, they 
claimed, can be explained by the absence of confirmatory bias that otherwise influences veracity 
judgements made by police; suspects are presumed to lie so investigators seek evidence to confirm 
their belief that the suspect is ‘guilty’. 
A number of cognitive heuristics contribute to systematic errors and biases in veracity 
judgements (for an exhaustive account see Vrij, 2008).  Most notably, truth-bias and confirmatory 
biases are among the most consistently reported (Kramer & Van Volkom, 2018; Colwell, 2005; 
Vrij et al., 2010).  Truth-bias refers to the tendency to assess statements as truthful rather than 
deceptive and in part, is responsible for increased accuracy in detecting truth over lies (Bond & 
DePaulo, 2006; Levine, Park & McCornack, 1999; Zuckerman, DePaulo, & Rosenthal, 1981).  This 
decision-making error was illustrated in the review by Bond and DePaulo (2006) which found 56% 
of statements were judged as honest and 44% were judged as deceptive despite an equal number 
of honest and deceptive accounts.  The tendency to be credulous is attributed to the availability 
heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981); people are more inclined to assume someone is telling the 
truth because truthful encounters are experienced more routinely than deceptive ones (Vrij, 2008).  
Interestingly, this bias is reversed, or at least diminished among professions with experience in 
trying to detect deception (Masip, Alonso, Herrero & Garrido, 2016; Meissner, 2002).  Accordingly 
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it can be said that our experiences influence our expectations and our expectations shape the way 
we interpret information. 
Commonly referred to as confirmatory bias, errors occur when appropriate corrections are 
not made to one’s initial position despite the emergence of conflicting evidence (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981; Vrij, 2008).  This cognitive heuristic has been shown to affect decision-making 
ability among triers of fact with evidence to suggest that jurors discount new information (i.e. 
evidence or judicial direction) because of a predisposition to adhere to their initial hypotheses 
(Baker at al., 2016; Festinger, 1957; Korva et al., 2013; Porter & ten Brinke, 2009).  The 
consequence of confirmatory bias is that jurors’ initial impressions formed early in a trial due to 
misconceptions about what constitutes indicators of truthfulness and deception may be fatal to a 
proper reception of all the evidence later in the trial (Baker et al., 2016; Porter & ten Brinke, 2009). 
Judgements of deception are strongly associated with stereotypes that are both unreliable 
and pervasive across cultures (Villar, Arciuli, & Paterson, 2013; Vrij et al., 2019).  In an 
international study coordinated by the Global Deception Research Team (2006) stereotypes about 
liars were examined across 75 different countries and 43 different languages. Despite being an 
unreliable indicator, gaze aversion was identified as the most dominant stereotype of deception 
across all cultures accounting for 71.5% of beliefs reported (DePaulo et al., 2003; Global Deception 
Research Team, 2006).  This finding is attributed to deception stereotypes based on false beliefs 
learned through observation and/or experience (Global Deception Research Team, 2006; Hurley, 
Griffin, & Stefanone, 2014; Villar et al., 2013; Vrij et al., 2010).  Moreover, the uniformity of these 
stereotypes suggest some partial support that false beliefs are widespread and shared among both 
laypersons and erudite professionals (Vrij et al., 2010, 2019). 
The most popular beliefs about how deceptive people behave are associated, sometimes 
incorrectly, with the view that lying is “bad” (Vrij et al., 2010).  Based on this premise, deceivers 
are expected to behave nervously with increased fidgeting, grooming gestures, and overall 
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restlessness perceived as indicators of anxiety (Greely & Illes, 2007; Vrij & Turgeon, 2018).  
Similarly, lying is presumed to be associated with feelings of shame with avoided eye contact and 
reduced engagement indicating withdrawal and distancing (DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij et al., 2010) 
yet these along with the overwhelming majority of deception stereotypes are flawed (DePaulo et 
al., 2003; Global Deception Research Team, 2006).  According to DePaulo and colleagues (2003), 
a large number of behaviours are stereotypically attributed to deception with only a few found to 
be correlated with deceit.  In their 2003 study, they showed that 78% (118 of 158) of all nonverbal 
cues examined in the literature had no relationship with deceit (DePaulo et al., 2003). 
Although the interpretation of behavioural indicia is highly subjective, and is typically 
misinformed by false beliefs about how liars look and behave (Strömwall et al., 2004; Vrij et al., 
2010), nonverbal behaviour has been shown to shape impressions of people, including personality 
traits, gender roles, sexual orientation, romantic involvement, relationship potential, status, and 
competence (Vrij et al., 2010).  In fact, the effects of facial appearance alone on decision-making 
are pervasive (Bull, 2006; Berry & Zebrowitz-McArthur, 1988).  Impressions of physical 
attractiveness have been shown to influence mock juror deliberations with attractive defendants 
less likely to be convicted, punished or held criminally responsible than unattractive defendants, 
and attractive defendants are perceived as happier, more likeable and trustworthy than unattractive 
defendants (Abel & Watters, 2005; Abwender & Hough, 2001; Darby & Jeffers, 1988; Patry, 2008; 
Wuensch & Moore, 2004).  Equally, baby-faced defendants are less likely to receive harsher 
judicial penalties than people with mature faces (Zebrowitz & McDonald, 1991).  And these 
assessments form rapidly and effortlessly. 
In a series of studies conducted by Willis and Todorov (2006) initial impressions based on 
facial appearance were explored.  They examined three exposure intervals: 100ms, 500ms and 
1,000ms for trustworthiness, likeability, competence, aggressiveness and attractiveness. Based on 
a sample of 245 randomly assigned students they found that minimal exposure time (100ms) was 
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sufficient for impressions based on facial appearance and that these impressions remained virtually 
unchanged overtime.  In addition, they demonstrated that confidence in initial judgements 
increased with time (Willis & Todorov, 2006, p. 596-597).  Contrary to expectation, their strongest 
findings were for judgements of trustworthiness over attractiveness.  Specifically, impressions of 
trustworthiness formed the quickest and an individual’s confidence in their initial judgement of 
trustworthiness was boosted with time (Willis & Todorov, 2006). 
In summary, unguided judgements of trustworthiness based on demeanour evidence such 
as nonverbal behaviour and facial characteristics are unreliable.  People are poor at discriminating 
truthtellers from liars and drawing on professional experience and stereotypes of deceptive 
behaviour as the means to assess credibility is flawed.  This is important because in a trial by jury 
the demeanour of a witness is attributed significant weight in aiding the jury in its determination 
of witness credibility.  In addition, assessments of credibility may be further compounded by initial 
impressions that form rapidly and are perceived with greater confidence over time.  This is 
exacerbated when judgements of trustworthiness are based on nonverbal behaviour as these 
impressions are unlikely to change, even in the face of conflicting evidence (Porter & ten Brinke, 
2009). 
2.3 Why is this Important? 
2.3.1 Dangerous Decision Theory: First impressions matter 
Dangerous Decision Theory (DDT) is a theory which seeks to explain how psychological 
processes contribute to flawed judgements of deception that can, and do, lead to unsafe judicial 
outcomes (Baker et al., 2016; Porter & ten Brinke, 2009, 2010).  It proposes that nonverbal 
behaviour exhibited by a defendant’s face plays a critical role in initiating a serious of unsafe 
decisions concerning credibility and ultimately culpability – judgements of witness trustworthiness 
occur rapidly and are subjectively internalised as intuition (Baker et al., 2016).  However, just 
because judgements of trustworthiness are automatic does not mean that they are necessarily 
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accurate.  The first component of the theory thus predicts that intuitive assessments of 
trustworthiness based on nonverbal behaviour may be unreliable. 
Porter and ten Brinke (2009) support this argument by citing prior research that examines 
the accuracy of initial judgments based on the faces of two groups differing in trustworthiness 
(Porter, England, Juodis, ten Brinke, & Wilson, 2008).  The two target groups comprised Nobel 
Peace Prize winners and humanitarians and criminals from America’s most wanted list. Participants 
viewed a total of 34 faces for either 1/10th of a second or 30 seconds and were asked assess the 
trustworthiness of each face.  While the mean judgement accuracy did not differ by exposure, initial 
judgements of untrustworthiness were less accurate (mean of 48.8%) than trustworthy judgements 
(Porter et al., 2008).  Following ratings of trustworthiness, participants were advised of the two 
target groups and asked to predict group membership.  Judgement accuracy for group membership 
was found to be just above chance.  Based on these findings Porter and colleagues (2008) concluded 
that while intuitive evaluations contribute to judgements of trustworthiness on a small scale, 
judgement errors are common. 
In addition to judgement errors that bias decision-maker’s assessment of witness 
truthfulness, DDT proposes that these same biases may also affect the interpretation and integration 
of information presented at trial.  Indeed, in a courtroom environment assessments of evidence by 
jurors and/or judges may be inherently flawed if the interpretation of evidence adduced is biased 
by initial, ill-informed assessments of trustworthiness (Baker et al., 2016; Porter & ten Brinke, 
2009).  Porter, ten Brinke and Gustaw (2010) provide preliminary evidence to support this.  They 
examined participant’s ability to assimilate evidence on an individual’s alleged involvement in a 
crime along with their initial impression of the accused.  With a sample of 80 student participants, 
the study used a 2 (severity) x 2 (trustworthiness) mixed design where two crime types (severe and 
non-severe) and two impressions (trustworthy and untrustworthy) were tested.  Participants were 
randomly assigned to either the severe-crime condition (a violent murder and a sexually motivated 
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murder) or the non-severe crime scenario (a car theft and a fraud).  Presentation of crime vignettes 
and defendant photographs were counterbalanced so that each vignette was equally associated with 
trustworthy and untrustworthy images.  The images evaluated were adopted from an earlier, pilot 
study that had participants rate 20 photographs of Caucasian males depicting neutral expressions.  
Trustworthiness had been determined by a previous sample of respondents on a one (not at all) to 
seven (highly) scale for each image.  After rating photographs of the accused, completing a 
distractor task, and reading the crime vignette, participants were presented with evidence associated 
with the crime.  Participants were exposed to five neutral pieces of evidence, five increasingly 
incriminating pieces of evidence and one exonerating piece of evidence.  Participants were 
instructed to indicate their verdict (guilty/not guilty) and confidence in their decision after each 
piece of evidence was presented.  This procedure was then repeated for the counterbalanced 
scenario. 
Porter and en Brinke (2010) concluded support for DDT as a model for biased legal 
decision making on the basis that less evidence was necessary to convict an untrustworthy looking 
defendant for the same crime than was required for a person perceived as trustworthy.  Further, 
they demonstrated that guilty verdicts were reached on fewer pieces of neutral evidence than was 
required for the same crime when the person was perceived to be trustworthy.  However, the effects 
of exonerating (conflicting) evidence on decisions of guilt were not significant.  While the 
researchers drew attention to their “pattern of means” in support of the premise that potential jurors 
are unlikely to accept the innocence of defendant judged as untrustworthy, even in the face of 
influential exonerating evidence, this proposition cannot be concluded with confidence (Porter & 
ten Brinke, 2010, p. 487). 
This distinction is an important one given that a central tenant of DDT is that once 
impressions are formed they are unlikely to change, even in the face of conflicting evidence (Baker, 
et al., 2016; Porter & ten Brinke, 2009).  Drawing on the principle of cognitive dissonance and the 
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imperviousness of cognitive heuristics to intervention (Coyle & Thomson, 2014), the theory 
predicts that human biases are responsible for negatively impacting evaluations of truthfulness but 
also the consideration of evidence, especially so in forensic settings.  This bias is exacerbated by 
courtroom practices “despite the lack of validity associated with [juror’s] intuitive assessments of 
trustworthiness… they are encouraged by judges” (Porter & ten Brinke, 2009, p. 62). 
2.3.2 Judicial Directions: A case of the blind leading the blind and the need to safeguard 
legal decision-making. 
Written directives to the jury are the favoured method by which judges inform jurors about 
the law in each case, and how the law should be applied to the facts presented.  Judicial directions 
to the tribunal of fact on the issue of witness credibility have a long history.  So much so that judges 
have been known to disregard the utility of psychological knowledge on the basis that human 
behaviour is considered to be a matter of ‘common sense’ and within the common experience of 
the jury. In R v. Marquard (1993), the court concluded that determining the truthfulness of a witness 
is common sense: “Credibility is a matter within the competence of laypeople.  Ordinary people 
draw conclusions about whether someone is lying or telling the truth on a daily basis” (p. 248).  
Although common sense is an inevitable feature of judicial decision-making, judicial use of 
common sense as to the reasonableness and normality of behaviour can present an avenue through 
which faulty thinking, error and discrimination influence the law (Burns, 2016).  Bagaric and 
McConvill (2005) argue that empirical evidence that assists the court in establishing truth ought to 
be admissible, and that exclusionary rules (i.e. the credibility rule and common knowledge 
principles) should be abolished in favour of a ‘relevancy’ test (Frye v. The United States, 1923). 
To ascertain the truth, Bagaric and McConvill (2005) suggest that this approach would be a safer, 
more reliable one than relying on “‘common sense’, judicial hunches or other non-rational 
sentiment” (p.13).  .   
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Notwithstanding this, Australian courts are divided on their stance regarding the 
admissibility of expert psychological opinion that talks to common sense and the issue of 
credibility.  With the development of a Uniform Evidence Law (s. 80) that saw the recent 
abolishment of the Common Knowledge Rule in Victoria,  the ACT and some states of the 
Commonwealth (Evidence Act of the Australian Capital Territory, 2011; Evidence Act of New 
South Wales, 1995; Evidence Act of Tasmania, 2001) the courts are less likely to reject opinion 
evidence when the facts in consideration need the help of an expert (Australian Law Reform 
Commission, New South Wales Law Reform Commission, & Victorian Law Reform Commission, 
2006).  Judges have routinely commented on areas within the ambit of psychological knowledge 
such as memory, eyewitness identification, witness demeanour and the credibility of child 
witnesses without the benefit of expert evidence on these topics (Coyle & Field, 2013).  It is not 
surprising then, that judicial directions on these matters have been inaccurate.  This misplaced 
advice presents an inherent legal problem given that juries are required to follow the ‘directions’ 
set forth by a trial judge (Coyle & Field, 2013, p.99; and for a dedicated analysis of illustrative 
cases of “judicial expert evidence” and the resultant issues see p.94-103).  This problem is of 
significant import when it comes to matters of witness demeanour, particularly when judicial 
directions that fall within the domain of expert psychological knowledge are concerned, and expert 
evidence has not been adduced due to outmoded legal doctrines. 
The efficacy of judicial directions has been the subject of review by the Victorian Law 
Reform Commission (2009).  This review promoted reform in the way directions were determined 
and communicated that saw the enactment of the Jury Directions Act (Vic, 2013, 2015) and now 
Jury Directions and Other Acts Amendment Act (Vic, 2017).  While the Act provides guidance on 
what matters of law and evidence should be directed to a jury and when, the extent to which the 
triers of fact comprehend judicial directions has been largely overlooked. 
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One study conducted in the United Kingdom (UK) by Thomas (2010), has investigated 
jurors’ understanding of judicial instructions.  A significant strength of the study was its sampling 
technique: 797 actual jurors who had been called for jury service but were later relinquished of 
their role were sampled from across the UK.  The study tested jurors’ perceived ability and actual 
ability in understanding judicial directions.  The research also examined whether or not jurors’ 
understanding of directions improved when provided in writing.  On perceived ability, jurors were 
asked how easy or difficult they felt it was to understand a judge’s oral instruction.  On actual 
ability, jurors were asked to identify two legal questions that they were explicitly directed to answer 
by the judge. 
Thomas (2010) found that while the majority of jurors believed that they could easily 
understand directions from a judge, less than a third of jurors actually understood the judicial 
direction given.  This finding is consistent with extant research confirming juror’s inability to 
understand judicial instruction (see Charrow & Charrow, 1979; Dumas, 2000; Lieberman & Sales, 
1997; Mueller-Johnson, Dhami & Lundrigan, 2018; Steele & Thornburg, 1988).   In contrast, when 
judicial directions were provided in writing, jurors’ comprehension was greater (48%) than those 
who only heard the instruction (31%).  Indeed, while the written and oral direction contained the 
same content, Thomas’s (2010) procedure suggests that the written summaries were distributed to 
each juror at the start of the judge’s legal directions.  It is not clear therefore, whether jurors who 
received the written direction were, by way of design, exposed to both the written and oral 
instruction at the same time.  At issue is the generalisability of their finding: if jurors were able to 
read the written summary along with listening to the oral instruction the combined effect of 
presentation modality on comprehension ought to be considered. 
In recent times, the legal fraternity has started to recognise limits with respect to the 
assessment of witness demeanour.  Numerous judgements, both local and international, caution 
against attributing undue weight to witness demeanour (for local authorities see Abalos v. Australia. 
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Postal Commission, (1990); Baira v. RHG Mortgage Corporation Limited, (2012); CSR Ltd v. 
Della Maddalena, (2006); Devries v. Australian National Railways Commission, (1993), Fox v. 
Percy, (2003); Jones v. Hyde, (1989); Martin v. Option Investments Pty. Ltd., (1982); Mcintyre 
Nominees P/L v. Tradeworks Transport P/L, (2014); Nominal Defendant v. McLennan, (2012); 
Paterson v. Paterson, (1954); SAS Realty Developments Pty Ltd v. Kerr, (2013); State Rail 
Authority (NSW) v. Earthline Constructions Pty Ltd (in liq), (1999); Suvaal v. Cessnock City 
Council, (2003) Voulis v. Kozary, (1975).  In fact, The House of Lords ruled: "The problem in truth 
only arises in cases where the judge has found crucial facts on his impression of the witnesses” 
(Powell v. Streatham Manor Nursing, (1935) observed in Warren v. Combs, (1979, at 10). 
This position is reflected in the leading Australian legal authority Fox v. Percy (2003) 
wherein the High Court of Australia warned against the fallibility of courts in overstating witness 
credibility in the face of objective evidence.  Specifically, the ruling draws attention to the “dangers 
of too readily drawing conclusions about truthfulness and reliability solely or mainly from the 
appearance of witnesses”.  Therein, Kirby J. cited, with approbation, the words of Lord Justice 
Atkins who in 1924 in Société d'Avances Commerciales (Société Anonyme Egyptienne) v. 
Merchants' Marine Insurance Co (The "Palitana") remarked: "... I think that an ounce of intrinsic 
merit or demerit in the evidence, that is to say, the value of the comparison of evidence with known 
facts, is worth pounds of demeanour" (at 32, emphasis added). Kirby J. also made the pungent 
observation that “judges have become more aware of scientific research that has cast doubt on the 
ability of judges (or anyone else) to tell truth from falsehood accurately on the basis of such 
appearances” (at 31). 
The provision for reliable, psychological evidence on human behaviour would protect 
against jurors relying on misplaced common sense when assessing witness demeanour, but also, 
would mitigate the need for members of the judiciary to proffer psychology from the bench (Coyle 
& Field, 2013).  The decision set out in Aytugrul v. The Queen (2012) “leaves the door open” for 
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psychological evidence to be adduced to assist the tribunal of fact (Coyle & Thomson, 2014, p.478). 
And, if applied, could be used to “dispel myths and misapprehensions that otherwise might play an 
unacknowledged role in juror deliberations” (Freckelton, 1993, p. 129).  Bagaric and McConvill 
(2005) support the principles articulated in Aytugrul v. The Queen declaring:  
Rules of evidence [need] to be based not on the intuition of lawyers, but rather on the 
knowledge of experts in the area.  We should be listening to behavioural scientists, not 
more lawyers – they are the ones that got us into this hole in the first place (p.12). 
Although judicial directions to the triers of fact have a long history regarding witness 
credibility (i.e. Alexander v The Queen, 1981; Domican v R, 1992; Longman v The Queen, 1989), 
there is simply no evidence that such directions have any meaningful effect on improving the 
accuracy of the decisions of jurors.  In fact, the efficacy of judicial directions on juror decision-
making has been the subject of lengthy empirical debate (Blankenship, Luginbuhl, Cullen, & 
Redick, 1997; Baguley, McKimmie & Masser, 2017; English & Sales, 1997; Luginbuhl, 1992; 
Ogloff, Nadjovski-Terziovski, Spivak & Clough, 2011; Ogloff & Rose, 2005; Rose & Ogloff, 
2001; Severance & Loftus, 1982; Spivak, Ogloff, & Clough, 2018).  This limitation has prompted 
interest in providing education to jury members in the form of expert evidence and/or judicial 
evidentiary instructions (e.g. Coyle & Thomson, 2014; Goodman-Delahunty, Cossins & O’Brien, 
2011; Ribbers & Hennebery, 2018).  Although there have been numerous attempts to train venire 
jurors in techniques to assess deception, these models reflect little resemblance to the constraints 
within which a trial operates.  This will be demonstrated in the next section where a brief overview 
of the key approaches to detecting deception and a critique of training in detecting deception is 
provided. 
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2.3.3 Techniques in Detecting Deception 
The array of methods aimed to detect deception includes both specialised and non-
specialised techniques (Vrij, 2008).  Collateral information aside, these methods encompass three 
key approaches: psychophysiological measures, verbal-based methods and nonverbal methods. 
Psychophysiological measures:  These measures include the  polygraph, ‘lie-detector test’, 
and the evolution of functional neuroimaging.  At its core, these measures assume different 
psychophysiological responses when a person is lying and when a person is telling the truth (Raskin 
& Kircher, 2014).  Physiological measures such as the polygraph presume heightened biological 
arousal in response to the threat of detection (US National Academy of Science 2003).  This 
premise is informed by the theory of emotional arousal that posits increases in stress, fear and guilt 
indicate markers of deception, such as an increase in breathing rate, perspiration, heart rate and 
blood pressure (Ekman & Friesen, 1969; Greely & Illes, 2007; Zuckerman et al., 1981).  
Neuropsychological perspectives however, are based on the assumption that deceptive behaviour 
is associated with changes in executive functioning (Vrij & Gannis, 2014).  Theoretically, these 
changes are a consequence of deception, as a process, placing increased taxing loads on cognitive 
functioning (Buller & Burgoon, 1996; DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij, 2008; Vrij & Gannis, 2014).  
Although still in their infancy, functional neuroimaging techniques aim to discriminate deceptive 
from genuine behaviour by assessing differences in brain activity (Granhag, Vrij, & Verschuere, 
2015; Johnson, 2014). 
Nevertheless, psychophysiological techniques for detecting deception have been found 
unsuitable for use in courts both in Australia and internationally (Bizzi, et al, 2009; Greely & Illes, 
2007; Hahm, et al, 2009).  Specifically, polygraph evidence is not considered of evidentiary utility 
in Australian courts. In R v. Murray (1981) the District Court of New South Wales deemed 
polygraph evidence inadmissible on the grounds that, among other things, the technique is “devoid 
of any scientific basis … with no probative value” and that it is “within the province of the jury to 
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determine on the facts, presented to them by witnesses who perceived them by the exercise of their 
physical senses”.  This position was cemented by the recent West Australian Supreme Court 
authority, Mallard v The Queen (2003), a renowned case in Australian law that in 2005 saw the 
High Court of Australia overturn the conviction against Mallard acknowledging that the 
inadmissibility of polygraph evidence had been robustly dealt with by the Supreme Court of 
Western Australia (Freckelton, 2004; Mallard v The Queen, 2005).  Apart from these decisions, 
the application of specialised technology for the detection of deception cannot as a matter of law 
and practice be adopted in Australian courts.  Apart from the practical absurdity of using 
psychophysiological methods in a courtroom setting, technology or opinion evidence that talks to 
the identification of guilt usurps the role of the jury.  These very issues were expressed in the High 
Court of Australia: 
The trial judge was right to approach with caution any attempt to call evidence which could 
have the effect of usurping the jury's function in reaching their ultimate conclusion as to 
whether a witness was telling the truth or not. … the assessment of credibility is a matter 
for the tribunal of fact (here the jury).  In the present state of science it may not be usurped 
by technology.  Nor may it be assumed by witnesses, including expert witnesses, offering 
their opinion on the accuracy, consistency and believability of the testimony in question, 
however derived (Farrell v. The Queen, 1998 at 27). 
Verbal-based techniques:  Verbal lie-detection tools have become increasing popular in 
assessing the veracity of statements (for example, witness statements and police interview 
recordings).  Verbal lie-detection methods are based on the underlying assumption that it is more 
demanding to make a convincing impression when lying than when telling the truth (Buller & 
Burgoon, 1996; Driskell & Driskell, 2019).  The concepts of cognitive load and impression 
management whereby the process of inventing a story that is believable – such as a false alibi – 
requires greater thought and awareness than being able to rely on actual experience (Zuckerman, 
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Depaulo & Rosenthal, 1981; and see Levine et al., 2018; Vrij, et al., 2017; Vrij et al., 2008; Vrij & 
Gannis, 2014; and Vrij et al., 2011 for detailed explanations of the cognitive load approach 
pertaining to verbal deception detection).  The most common approaches used in detecting verbal 
deception that have been established in the literature include Statement Validity Analysis (SVA), 
Reality Monitoring (RM), and Scientific Content Analysis (SCAN).  According to Vrij (2008, 
2015), the validity and utility of verbal methods do not satisfy the legal thresholds of admissibility 
articulated in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (1993).  Although the guidelines set out in 
Daubert are not formalised as a standard of proof in Australia, the principles are expressed in 
Australian case law: Makita Pty Ltd v. Sprowles (2001).  Nonetheless, Vrij’s (2008, 2015) blanket 
rejection of verbal methods overplays the argument, at least against Criteria Based Content 
Analysis, a component of SVA that has shown some considerable promise in accurately detecting 
deception. 
Nonverbal methods:  Unlike psychophysiological methods and the analysis of verbal 
content, nonverbal behaviours can be discerned without the aid of equipment and/or specialised 
techniques (Vrij et al., 2010).  Nonverbal indicia of deception encompass vocal, paraverbal cues 
and physical behaviours (Sporer & Schwandt, 2006; Vrij, 2008).  Ultimately, nonverbal indicia are 
responsible for guiding overall impressions of demeanour (Bogaard & Meijer, 2018; McKimmie 
et al., 2014).  When nonverbal and verbal content are conflicting, that is a person’s behaviour 
contradicts what they are saying or vice a versa, assessments of truthfulness tend to rely on 
nonverbal indicia (Levine & McCornack, 2014; Masip & Herrero, 2015b; Vrij et al., 2010).  Indeed, 
the identification and interpretation of behavioural indicators are highly subjective and are, 
typically, mislead by false beliefs about how liars behave (Strömwall et al., 2004; Vrij et al., 2010).  
As noted, common misconceptions among jurors include beliefs that shifting one’s posture, 
averting one’s gaze, scratching, touching or self-grooming, repeated blinking, relaying longer 
stories and increased rates of speaking are correlated with deception but, these have been shown to 
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be unreliable indicators of deception (Akehurst et al., 1996; DePaulo et al., 2003; Duke, 2007; 
Mann & Vrij, 2006; Mann, Vrij, & Bull, 2004; Strömwall et al., 2004; Vrij et al., 2010). 
The literature reports that the most reliable nonverbal indicia of deception include: change 
in vocal pitch with liars found to speak in a higher pitched voice than truth-tellers; reduced body 
movements and gesticulations (‘illustrators’) with liars making fewer hand, arm, and feet 
movements than truth-tellers; speech latency with longer pauses characteristic of deceit compared 
to truthfulness; and responses containing fewer details, less contextual information, indirect 
answers and fewer spontaneous corrections common to deceptive statements over truthful ones 
(DePaulo et al., 2003; Hartwig & Bond, 2011, 2014; Levine, 2018; Sporer & Shwandt, 2006, 2007; 
Strömwall et al., 2004; Villar et al., 2013; Vrij, 2008; Vrij et al., 2019; Zuckerman et al., 1981). 
Nevertheless, where behavioural markers of deception have been shown to be valid, the average 
observed effect size for detection accuracy is small (d = .25) (Levine, 2018; Vrij et al., 2019). 
According to Hartwig and Bond (2014) relying on cues in isolation to one another may 
provide some explanation.  That is, overall displays of behaviour consist of multiple cues and 
therefore “signals of deception are manifested in constellations rather than single cues” (Hartwig 
& Bond, 2014, p. 667).  In their recent meta-analysis, Hartwig and Bond (2014) examined this idea 
to see whether multi-cue analyses of deception could improve detection.  They found that deception 
can be better predicted from multiple cues than a single cue, but that the strongest cue contributes 
to the bulk of detection while other cues contribute less (Hartwig & Bond, 2014). 
Concerning the validity of behavioural correlates of deception, key criticisms amount to 
issues of specificity and variability (Levine, 2018).  Further, the need to establish individual 
baseline performance to discriminate usual from unusual behaviour undermines the generalisability 
of behavioural indicia of lying (Porter, 2007, 2010).  Although the research concludes some indicia 
are more reliable than others, the fact remains that techniques relying on verbal, paraverbal or 
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behavioural indicators do not allow for intra and inter-variability with people acting differently in 
different settings and at different times (Levine, 2018; Levine, 2015; Vrij, 2008; Vrij et al., 2019). 
2.3.4 Training in Detecting Deception: Does practice make perfect? 
Traditionally, researchers maintained that training enhanced the ability to detect lies. 
However, the results were unimpressive with less than 5% gains observed in overall detection 
accuracy following training (Frank & Feeley, 2003; Hauch, et al, 2016; Sternglanz et al., 2019; 
Vrij, 2008; Vrij, et al., 2019; Vrij, Mann, & Leal, 2013).  These discouraging findings inspired 
research interest to refine training models to improve performance (Dunbar et al., 2018; Levine, 
Feeley, McCornack, et al., 2005; Miller, et al., in press).   In a short space of time, the body of 
research on training in detecting deception has grown considerably with recent meta-analyses 
having quantified small to medium effects on the overall impact of training on detection accuracy 
(Driskell, 2012; Frank & Feeley, 2003; Hauch et al., 2016). 
The largest, most recent review, was conducted by Hauch and colleagues (2016) who 
demonstrated a small, pooled effect, of 30 studies (published and unpublished) that implemented 
control-group designs.  Conversely, Driskell (2012) and Frank and Feely’s (2003) work identified 
moderate training effects for detection accuracy across 16 and 11 studies respectively.  Albeit that 
the moderate effect sizes may be inflated, both meta-analyses neglected a number of applicable 
studies that were available at the time of analysis and the same control groups were used repeatedly 
by both authors resulting in problematic dependent effect sizes (Hauch et al., 2016).  
Notwithstanding these methodological and statistical issues, some of the variability in results may 
be explained by differences in research design, training content delivered (e.g. Levine et al., 2005), 
and training approaches used. 
With respect to experimental design, to satisfy inclusion into Hauch et al.’s (2016) meta-
analysis the study had to include a control-group.  However, the vast majority of these only 
involved a post-test design thereby assuming equality between experimental and control groups 
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before training (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002). In the absence of a pre-test – and only six 
studies included this – baseline comparisons between groups could not be determined.  This 
approach is common to deception research and is further confounded when quasi-experimental 
designs are employed.  By way of example, consider research conducted by Shaw, Porter, and ten 
Brinke (2013) who trained forensic specialists (experimental group) in nonverbal deception indicia 
only to use non-forensic specialists – namely university students – as their control.  As such, 
participant allocation to the experimental and control groups were not random but rather, pre-
determined by the differing participant characteristics.  And further, differences in performance 
could not be attributed to the intervention because group differences prior to training were not 
considered. 
Training content:  Hauch and colleagues (2016) concluded that verbal-based training 
content resulted in larger effects than relying on combined, multichannel methods (i.e. nonverbal 
and/or paraverbal).  As a consequence, they advocate for the use of verbal methods in developing 
future models in detecting deception to the exclusion of combined approaches (Hauch et al., 2016).  
While the results for verbal techniques are promising, the use of statement-based analysis in court 
ignores the practicalities of a trial.  It is simply impractical to expect jurors to further analyse 
testimony against the presence/absence of 19 content-based criteria.  These criteria, developed by 
Steller and Köhnken (1989), are referred to as Criteria-Based Content Analysis (CBCA).   
Originally, the tool was designed to assess the testimonies of victims of child sexual abuse but has 
since been empirically validated for use with adult populations (Amadoa, Arcea, Farina & Vilarino, 
2016).  The technique is one of the most extensively used for evaluating the veracity of a witness’s 
testimony, and has been admitted as evidence in a number of courts world-wide (Vrij, 2008).  The 
tool evaluates written statements against 19 factors that are grouped in two: cognitive factors 
(criteria 1 through 13), and motivational factors (criteria 14 to 18).  The technique contends that 
memories of truthful experiences differ in content and quality to fictitious accounts (Amadoa et al., 
2016), because lying is more cognitively demanding than telling the truth (Vrij, 2008).  Despite its 
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efficacy, asking jurors to critically evaluate 19 criteria would not be feasible in a trial setting.  Not 
only would jurors require specialist training to use the technique, but such training would likely be 
a financial burden to the courts, and logistically prohibitive. 
A common deficiency among studies investigating the use of combined methods in 
detecting deception is the use of unreliable techniques and unreliable indicia.  This oversight is 
problematic for a number of reasons.  Most notably, these studies are cited as the body of evidence 
against the use of nonverbal indicia of deception.  The seminal study cited to corroborate claims 
that nonverbal indicia results in poor deception detection was that conducted by Kassin and Fong 
(1999).  Their findings indicated a significant negative relationship between training and detection 
accuracy.  However, little commentary has dealt with the fact that the training approach adopted 
was the popular but unreliable Reid Technique (Docan-Morgan, 2007; Mann et al., 2004; Masip & 
Herrero, 2015a).  Kassin and Fong (1999) reflect that “the Reid technique may not be effective – 
and indeed, may be counterproductive – as a method of distinguishing truth and deception” (p. 
512). 
It is not surprising that nonverbal indicators are criticised as poor discriminators between 
truth-tellers and liars when invalid cues are tested in training models (i.e. Geiselman, 2013).  
Driskell (2012) sums this up best: “Clearly if training is designed to draw attention to behavioral 
patterns reflecting deception, then it is important that those cues trained are in fact reliable 
indicators of deception” (p.725).  This position tends to be overlooked when claims are made that 
nonverbal approaches are unreliable in detecting deception.  Then, there are studies that claim the 
provision of ‘empirically validated’ indicia resulting in positive benefits but don’t report them (i.e. 
Matsumoto, Skinner, & Frank, 2012; Porter, Juodis, ten Brinke, Klein, & Wilson, 2010; Shaw et 
al., 2013).  This means that the validity of training content used cannot be compared or evaluated. 
Type of training:  Feedback is a core component of training.  Theoretically, feedback 
serves to positively or negatively reinforce behaviour (Driskell, 2012).  Training models that 
INSTRUCTING JURORS ON NONVERBAL CUES OF DECEPTION  44 
incorporate the provision of information, the opportunity for practice and feedback are considered 
superior to information-only interventions by some (Driskell, 2012; Levine et al., 2005; Porter et 
al., 2010; Powell, 2008; Powell, Fisher, Wright, Brewer, & Williams, 2005; Powell, Wright, & 
Clark, 2010), but not by others (Hauch et al., 2016).  Both bogus feedback and accurate feedback 
have been investigated.  Hauch and her colleagues (2016) suggest that neither type of feedback has 
any effect on detection accuracy and Levine and his colleagues (2005) found that although training 
enhances awareness, it does not provide the depth of knowledge required.   In the field of forensic 
interviewing, practice and feedback are argued as necessary agents of change for effective training 
(Powell, 2008; Powell et al., 2005).  Indeed, it is concluded that the absence of practice and 
individualised feedback may contribute to poor performance despite training (Powell et al., 2005).  
Although skill acquisition is advanced through practice and feedback the provision for “critical 
feedback… in cognitively challenging skills” for triers of fact is not possible (Powell et al., 2010, 
p. 218; Powell, 2008).  In an actual trial the only scientific information that can aid the triers of fact 
in assessing witness demeanour can be adduced by expert evidence.  But as a matter of law and 
practice, this evidence does not and cannot involve giving jurors practice or feedback in 
distinguishing liars from truthtellers.  Rather, the provisions of expert advice or directions to jurors 
are the best mechanisms available within the constraints of a jury trial. 
In sum, there have been numerous attempts to train jurors in techniques to assess deception.  
However, these training models have no place with respect to jury decision-making during a trial.  
Despite their promise, models employing verbal-based techniques, practice and feedback 
approaches to training and pre-post control-group experimental conditions cannot be utilised within 
the constraints of a trial.  This is not to say that potential jurors couldn’t be trained in detecting 
deception before being empanelled albeit that logistics and cost implications suggest it is a remote 
prospect.  Of course, expert evidence could be introduced (i.e. reliable verbal techniques) but it 
would be vulnerable to rejection by the court on the grounds that such knowledge lies within the 
common sense of the jury. 
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Introducing expert evidence on indicators of deception to aid jurors in their assessment of 
witness credibility was investigated in a study conducted by Coyle and Thomson (2014).  Using a 
pre and post-test mixed design the authors investigated juror opinions on what factors (indicia of 
deception) were considered important when determining the truthfulness of a witness in court. 
Mock jurors were asked to score 31 items according to how much each factor would help them in 
determining the truthfulness of a witness in court.  Each of the items tested has been well-
established in the research to be diagnostic/not diagnostic of deception.  Mock jurors completed 
the questionnaire pre-intervention to gather their baseline knowledge on nonverbal indicia of 
deception and again post-intervention to measure any change from baseline.  The intervention took 
the form of expert advice on reliable indicia of deception.  Coyle and Thomson (2014) observed 
significant differences in the behavioural indicators relied upon by jurors following education by 
way of expert witness testimony and judicial direction.  With the provision of reliable information 
on nonverbal indicia, jurors shifted to relying on more valid behavioural indicators in assessing 
witness credibility.  Based on their results Coyle and Thomson (2014) suggest that well-entrenched 
misconceptions about deception indicia can be corrected by way of judicial direction or the 
proffering of expert testimony.  They also argue that providing advice on the right techniques can 
significantly shift perceptions on what cues discriminate lying from truth-telling. 
It is important to consider the strength of the evidence reported before arriving at any 
overall conclusions about the efficacy of promoting change in juror behaviour due to education on 
detection of deception.  This conclusion requires a careful assessment of the quality of the research 
design before it can be assumed that any shifts in indicia are a direct result of expert evidence on 
deception indicia.  Indeed, a strength of the design adopted by Coyle and Thomson (2014) was the 
random allocation of participants to the experimental groups to help to overcome problems 
associated with selection bias (Haynes, 1992), and the use of a pre/post-test design as recommended 
by Shadish and colleagues (2002) to facilitate baseline comparisons. 
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With respect to methodological deficiencies, Coyle and Thomson (2014) identify two 
aspects of their design that would benefit from revision.  Both modifications relate to experimental 
condition one whereby participants received a written judicial instruction on deception indicia.  The 
first deals with removing the opportunity for participants to copy answers when completing the 
follow-up questionnaire.  The authors note that although participants assigned to this condition 
were instructed to turn over the written direction after completing the baseline questionnaire they 
had the opportunity to crib when filling out the questionnaire the second time.  It is possible, they 
suggest, that some participants cribbed by checking their answers against the written judicial 
direction. The second shortcoming relates to the presentation modality used: they suggest that 
providing a written judicial direction may have had more impact than had the direction been 
provided orally.  They refer to related research into the efficacy of judicial directions that show 
written directions are twice as effective as oral ones (e.g., Thomas, 2010).  In the light of Coyle 
and Thomson’s (2014) unexpected results that judicial directions had the same effect as expert 
evidence in shifting factors relied upon by jurors, the analysis of presentation modality is worthy 
of further investigation. 
The evidence presented by Coyle and Thomson (2014) to indicate that advising jurors on 
indicia of deception can influence the factors relied upon were mean differences from pre to post-
test.  However, in doing so they only reported shifts on items indicative of deception (12 of a 
possible 31 items).   Although the mean differences shifted significantly on these items, any 
changes observed on items not indicative of deception were not reported and are therefore 
unknown: Coyle and Thomson (2014) predicted increased scores on items indicative of deception, 
but no prediction was made for items not indicative of deception.  Although changes on items not 
indicative of deception would not disturb the unique factor pattern identified by Coyle and 
Thomson (2014) this analysis may have provided a measure of validity for the intervention.  For 
the items missing from analysis, it could be argued that any change observed from pre-test to post-
test would be smaller with jurors relying less on unreliable indicia post-intervention.  Indeed, it 
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may be reasoned that an overall decrease in the weight attributed to non-diagnostic items by jurors 
may be possible and, if found, would provide strong evidence that advising jurors on indicia of 
deception aids in determinations of credit.  Had Coyle and Thomson (2014) reported on the nature 
of change for items not indicative of deception it may have provided greater insight into the value 
of presenting evidence on reliable/unreliable indicia of deception.  As it stands shifts to relying on 
valid indicia by jurors cannot be excluded as a generalised effect associated with presenting 
evidence and the long-term impact of providing advice to jurors on detecting deception remains 
unanswered. 
Indeed, if DDT is accurate – and the jury is still out on this – then knowledge gleaned about 
indicia of deception would not be applied by decision-makers in their final determinations of 
witness credibility (Coyle & Thomson, 2014).  If this holds true (as the theory predicts), then 
introducing expert evidence on detecting deception would be of little utility in an adversarial trial: 
by the time evidence on indicia of deception could be presented by the defence it would be too late 
– the triers of fact would have already formulated their impression and there would be no value in 
adducing evidence.  And, if this is found to be correct it would call into question the entire 
foundation on which jury trials operate.  These issues are the focus of the current research. 
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Chapter 3. Rationale and Contribution of Research 
The dialogue on science's replicability crisis contends that systematic reforms in scientific 
practice are paramount on the basis that science’s hallmark function of self-correction is 
undermined by deviations from the truth-seeking principle (Ioannidis, 2012; Pashler & Harris, 
2012).  Ioannidis (2012) purports that timely, objective replication mechanisms are critical for 
upholding high levels of scientific credibility.  His summation describes this predicament best:  
In the absence of replication efforts, one is left with unconfirmed (genuine) 
discoveries and unchallenged fallacies, where in many areas of psychological 
science, perpetuated and unchallenged fallacies may compromise the majority of 
the circulating evidence (p. 645). 
The ‘outpouring of concern’ that psychological science is facing a ‘replicability crisis’ 
suggests that science won’t necessarily correct itself unless direct (not just conceptual) replications 
are performed (Pashler & Harris, 2012).  In a series of papers published by Perspectives on 
Psychological Science, the prevalence of replication studies performed following ‘positive’ 
findings (true & false positives) across science is said to be very low, in the order of 1% - 5% 
(Ioannidis, 2012).  Until recently, replication rates in psychology were unknown with Makel and 
colleagues (2012) reporting the first systematic examination of prevalence rates for replications in 
psychology.  Their work examined papers on replications in psychology published since 1900 in 
the 100 most-cited psychology journals.  From this, they found 1.6% of psychological research 
included the term ‘replication’ but only 68% of those represented actual replications.  This results 
in an overall replication rate of 1.07% (n = 342) (Makel, Plucker, & Hegarty, 2012).  Nevertheless, 
this replication rate accounts for all types of replications.   
The distinction between a direct replication and a conceptual replication is an important 
one.  Direct replications refer to studies that repeat all relevant elements (i.e. conditions and 
method) of an original study and are adopted to test the validity and robustness of new findings 
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(Koole & Lakens, 2012; Schmidt, 2009).  On the other hand, conceptual replications employ 
different procedures to the original study to test the generality of findings purported thereby adding 
to our theoretical understanding of an effect (Nosek, 2014; Pashler & Harris, 2012).  However 
unlike direct replications, conceptual replications cannot disconfirm a study’s original findings 
(Koole & Lakens, 2012; Pashler & Harris, 2012).   Put simply, identifying false positives is unlikely 
without direct replications (Nosek & Lakens, 2014).  Despite this, conceptual replications account 
for the majority (81.9%) of all replications published in psychological science with only 14% of 
replications recognised as direct attempts (Makel et al., 2012).  Accordingly the vast majority of 
psychological science comprises discoveries that have no record of published replication efforts 
(Ioanndis, 2012). 
The value of direct replication has been at the forefront of debate with claims that 
behavioural science research is compromised by a culture of enquiry that promotes inflated effects 
and false-positive errors (Fiedler, Kutzner, & Krueger, 2012; Ioannidis, 2012).  Moreover, the 
attention attributed to false positives overshadows a subtler dilemma: the prospect of false 
negatives – neglecting to discover and confirm correct hypotheses (Coyle, Campbell, Thomson, & 
Woskett, 2016; Fiedler et al., 2012).  Given the demonstrated bias against publication of negative 
findings, science can’t self-correct against false negatives (Ferguson & Heene, 2012; Francis, 2012; 
Giner-Sorolla, 2012).  The omission of negative findings means that when a non-effect is concluded 
(incorrectly) the hypothesis is cast aside and the opportunity to generate alternative hypotheses is 
lost (Fiedler et al., 2012).  Fielder and his colleagues (2012) assert: “…overlooking alternative 
hypothesis [false negatives] renders all scrutiny intended to reduce α errors worthless.  False 
positives can be corrected through replication whereas false negatives are less likely to be detected, 
corrected, and understood” (p. 662). 
The contribution of the current research is twofold.  First, the aim to reproduce results 
previously observed by Coyle and Thomson (2014) will add to dearth of replications in 
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psychological science that have not only been at the forefront of debate in academic circles but that 
have more recently gained momentum and increasing attention in popular science forums (Luntz, 
2015; Wells, 2015).  Indeed, the reproducibility attempted by Study one is only a small component 
of the overall body of work accounting for a third of the entire experimental design.  Hence, the 
second focus of the current research is to expand the design and extend the interventions and 
reporting of measures under investigation.  In doing so the current research aims to resolve the 
putative methodological and reporting deficiencies identified within the Coyle and Thomson 
(2014) design, but also make a significant original contribution to what we know about the effects 
of delay on jurors’ determination of evidence presented at trial.  
The contribution of the current program of research is significant, from both a theoretical 
and applied perspective.  If it is demonstrated that providing information in the form of expert 
evidence and/or judicial directions to jurors causes a shift towards employing valid nonverbal 
indicia of deception, and that this shift is maintained over time, then aspects of DDT (that initial 
judgements are formed quickly and resistant to change) may be questioned.  With this would come 
profound implications for the presentation of expert evidence relating to the issue of witness 
credibility that may ultimately, have the potential to re-shape jury-trial proceedings to make safer 
decisions when witness credibility is at issue.  In the words of Granhag and Strömwall (2004) 
“professionals who need to assess veracity on a regular basis will, in the long run, make more 
correct veracity assessments and fewer mistakes if armed with scientifically based knowledge” 
(p.328). 
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Chapter 4. Aims and Hypotheses 
4.1 Aims 
In an attempt to replicate previous research conducted by Coyle and Thomson (2014), 
Study one aims to: 
1) Confirm/disconfirm that expert evidence and/or judicial direction on diagnostics of 
deception can influence mock jurors to rely on more valid indicia of deception when 
determining the truthfulness of a witness in court;  
 
2) Extend the replication by examining whether or not the impact of advice can correct 
jurors’ misconceptions of unreliable indicators of deception. 
 
4.2 Hypotheses 
For Study one, two directional hypotheses are proposed.  It is hypothesised that: 
1) Jurors’ perceptions of reliable nonverbal cues of deception will improve with the 
provision of advice; and 
 
2) Jurors’ perceptions of unreliable nonverbal cues (i.e. misconceptions) will be corrected 
with advice.  
 
To test these two hypotheses, increases will be expected in mean scores on perceptions of 
reliable cues (i.e. the reliable subscale), and decreases in mean scores on perceptions of unreliable 
cues (i.e. the unreliable subscale) are anticipated. 
Other variables that may be associated with influencing jurors’ opinions of nonverbal cues 
of deception are also explored. These include presentation modality of advice and participant 
confidence. Previous research suggests both written evidentiary judicial instructions (Coyle & 
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Thomson, 2014; Thomas, 2010) and oral evidentiary directions (Goodman-Delahunty et al., 2011; 
Ribbers & Henneberg, 2018) are effective in shaping jurors’ perceptions regarding scientific 
knowledge.  Accordingly, directional hypotheses (as noted above) are adopted for the modalities 
of advice under investigation.  Conversely, perceived confidence, although established in related 
research as a factor confounding detection deception accuracy (i.e. the “overconfidence effect”; 
DePaulo, Charlton, Cooper, Lindsay, & Muhlenbruck, 1997), and erroneously influencing jurors’ 
assessment of eyewitness identification evidence (Charman, Wells, & Joy, 2011; Deffenbacher, 
1980; Wells, Lindsay, & Ferguson, 1979),  it has not been studied with respect to advising jurors 
on deception detection. Accordingly, no a-priori hypotheses for the effect of advice on perceived 
confidence is proposed.  
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Chapter 5. Method 
The research methodology for Study one and Study two were similar in design.  To avoid 
duplication and repetition of content, a general method is described with differences in procedure 
highlighted between the two. 
5.1 Research Design 
The current research used a parallel group, pre-and post-test design. Two separate mixed-
models were adopted allowing for within-group and between-group comparisons.  Both repeated 
measures employed a three-way 5 x 2 x 2 model where the first factor, a between-subject factors 
was source of advice (with five levels: expert witness, written judicial direction, oral judicial 
direction, expert/judge combined, or no advice); the second factor, a within-subject factor, was type 
of deception cue (with two levels: reliable cues and unreliable cues); and the third factor, a within-
subject factor was time-to-assessment (pre-and post-test).   
The two studies differed with respect to the time-to-assessment factor.  In Study one there 
was no delay between the time participants received advice and their assessment of indicia, thereby 
representing ‘immediate advice’.  By contrast, Study two investigated the impact of a one-week 
delay between the time respondents received advice and their assessment of indicia thus resulting 
in ‘delayed advice’. The delay-to-assessment therefore was between the time of receiving the 
advice and participants’ ratings of nonverbal cues.   
The dependent variable was the mean importance of deception cues rated by mock jurors 
in determining the truthfulness of a witness in court.  Changes in importance ratings (e.g. mean 
difference) from pre- to post-test were investigated on both reliable and unreliable cues across both 
studies. 
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5.2 Participants 
The demographic particulars of Study one and Study two were remarkably alike. Although 
separate studies, for simplicity, the demographics of both studies are reported together.  Participants 
were recruited as mock jurors.  Throughout the thesis the terms jurors and mock jurors are used 
throughout.  For ease of reference it is noted that hereon in when the results of the thesis are reported 
and interpreted, jurors refers to mock jurors.  
A sample of 173 mock jurors was recruited for Study one and a pool of 177 mock jurors 
was collected for Study two.  The mean age of participants in Study one was 38.96 years (SD = 
9.79) and 39.56 years (SD = 10.67) in Study two.  Ages ranged from 18 to 70 years across both 
studies with females comprising the sample majority: 91.3% in Study one, and 76.7% in Study two.  
Level of education completed was predominantly tertiary with 78.6% (Study one) and 79.3% 
(Study two) having completed, or partially completed a tertiary qualification.  High school or TAFE 
was completed, or partially completed by 21.4% of participants in Study one and 20.7% in Study 
two. The likeness between samples are illustrated in Table 1 (Study one) and Table 2 (Study two). 
Participants were predominantly recruited within Victoria for Study one (93.1%, n = 161) 
and Study two (85.5%, n = 100).  Other States and Territories represented in Study one were: 
Queensland (1.73%, n = 3), South Australia (1.73%, n = 3), New South Wales (1.16%, n = 2), and 
the Australian Capital Territory (n = 1).  For Study two, the remainder of participants resided in: 
South Australia (6.0%, n = 7), New South Wales (5.1%, n = 6), and Queensland (3.4%, n =4).   
A small number of participants from Study one (3.5%, n = 6) had previous training in 
detecting deception compared to no participants from Study two.  Half of the participants who 
received training in Study one were in the control (n = 3) with the remaining three participants 
distributed across expert witness, oral judicial direction and combined expert/judge conditions. 
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The representativeness of the current samples with known statistics of Australian jurors 
was sought.  Given the prevalence of Victorians represented in the both samples, demographic 
profiles of Victorian jurors was preferred, however, no published data was found.  Nonetheless, 
statistics obtained from Juries Victoria (2019) revealed that mean age of jurors in Victoria was 
46.99 years with sex split 44.89% female and 55.11% male.  In a report published by the Victorian 
Law Reform Commission (2014), Victorian juries are considered to approximate the Victorian 
community in relation to age.  The mean age of the current samples was relatively consistent with 
the profile of Victorian jurors.  Not surprisingly, the breakdown of gender was not representative 
of members serving on juries in Victoria.  The level of education of Victorian jurors is unknown 
and so no conclusions can be inferred regarding the representativeness of the largely tertiary 
qualified samples obtained. 
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Table 1 
 
Study 1 Demographics.  
 
    Age 
 Sex  Education  Training 
 
n Mean SD  
Male 
% (n) 
Female 
% (n) 
 
High school/  
TAFE 
% (n) 
University 
% (n) 
 
Yes 
% (n) 
No 
% (n) 
Expert Witness 20 38.21 8.95 
 
10.0 (2) 90.0 (18) 
 
20.0 (4) 80.0 (16)  5.0 (1) 95.0 (19) 
Written Judicial Direction   32 41.06 12.45  6.3 (2) 93.8 (30)  28.1 (9) 71.9 (23)  0.0 (0) 100.0 (32) 
Oral Judicial Direction 34 37.68 10.54  17.6 (6) 82.4 (28)  14.7 (5) 85.3 (29)  2.9 (1) 97.1 (33) 
Expert/Judge Combined 22 40.00 8.63  13.6 (3) 86.4 (19)   40.9 (9) 59.1 (13)  4.5 (1) 95.5 (21) 
Control (no advice) 65 37.57 8.31  1.6 (1)  98.4 (63)  15.4 (10) 84.6 (55)  4.6 (3) 95.4 (62) 
Total 173 38.96 9.79  8.1 (14) 91.3 (158)  21.4 (37) 78.6 (136)  3.5 (6) 96.5 (167) 
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Table 2 
 
Study 2 Demographics. 
 
    Age 
 Sex  Education  Training  
 
n Mean SD 
 Male  
% (n) 
Female  
% (n)) 
 High school 
 /TAFE % (n) 
University  
% (n) 
 Yes  
% (n) 
No  
% (n) 
Expert Witness 19 40.89 10.42  31.6 (6) 68.4 (13)  26.3 (5) 73.7 (14)  0.0 (0) 100.0 (19) 
Written Judicial Direction 31 36.90 9.23  9.7 (3) 90.3 (28)  9.7 (3) 90.3 (28)  0.0 (0) 100.0 (31) 
Oral Judicial Direction 29 42.48 12.60  17.2 (5) 82.8 (24)  24.1 (7) 75.9 (22)  0.0 (0) 100.0 (29) 
Expert/Judge Combined  18 42.56 10.17  22.2 (4) 77.8 (14)  33.3 (6) 66.7 (12)  0.0 (0) 100.0 (18) 
Control (no advice) 20 35.26 8.63  47.4 (9) 52.6 (10)  15.8 (3) 84.2 (16)  0.0 (0) 100.0 (20) 
Total 117 39.56 10.67  23.3 (27) 76.7 (89)  20.7 (24) 79.3 (92)  0.0 (0) 100.0 (117) 
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5.3  Materials 
The four conditions of advice investigated by the current research (expert witness, written 
judicial direction, oral judicial direction, and expert witness and judicial direction combined) 
required three stimuli: two Digital Versatile Discs (DVDs) and one transcript.  The stimulus for 
each advice condition is detailed in turn and, for reference, copies are attached in Appendix C. 
5.3.1 Expert Witness DVD 
The expert witness DVD was an existing resource that was used in the original study by 
Coyle and Thomson (2014).  It presented evidence by an expert witness on indicia that have been 
shown to be reliable, to one extent or another, in detecting deception.  The expert witness was a 
full professor in forensic psychology with more than three decades of experience in proffering 
expert testimony. The duration of the expert’s evidence lasted 10 minutes and 54 seconds and was 
filmed in a mock courtroom.  
5.3.2 Written Judicial Direction 
The written transcript portrayed a judge’s direction to a jury that cited research on reliable 
and unreliable indicators of deception. The transcript was an existing resource developed by Coyle 
and Thomson (2014). 
5.3.3 Oral Judicial Direction DVD 
 The second DVD was developed for the current research.  It presented a male in his early 
sixties who portrayed a presiding judge directing a jury on reliable and unreliable cues of deception.  
The duration of the direction lasted 1 minute and 54 seconds and mirrored the content transcribed 
in the aforementioned transcript.   The presiding judge wore formal legal regalia including 
ceremonial robe and wig consistent with that of a Supreme Court Chief Justice.  The setting 
resembled a bench trial with a non-descript backdrop and judge’s gavel in the foreground. 
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5.3.4 Combined Expert Witness and Judicial Direction DVD 
The final stimulus was adapted for the current research by merging the evidence of the 
expert witness and judicial direction into one continuous film clip.  Each form of advice was 
introduced by way of a title page stating the role of the presenter such as “Sworn evidence of 
Emeritus Professor Donald Thomson.  Given by Videolink”.  The duration of advice in the 
combined intervention lasted 12 minutes and 54 seconds.  The combination of expert witness and 
judicial direction was chosen over other permutations on the basis that advice by an expert and a 
judge is the most likely of situations to occur in a court of law .   
5.4 Measures 
Two measures were assessed: number of reliable cues of deception and number of 
unreliable cues of deception that mock jurors rated important in evaluating the truthfulness of a 
witness in court.  The two measures investigated nonverbal deception cues that have been validated 
by empirical research and have been well established in the literature as diagnostic (reliable cues) 
and not diagnostic (unreliable cues) of deception.   
Participants were instructed to rate each cue according to how important they perceived it 
to be in determining the truthfulness of a witness giving evidence in court.  Both measures should 
provide evidence of the effect of advice to which participants were exposed (increases in the 
number of reliable cues and decreases in number of unreliable cues).  This expanded on the single 
measure reported by Coyle and Thomson (2014) who only reported reliable items indicative of 
deception.   
Both measures were continuous variables. Reliable cues reflected items indicative of 
deception and were represented by 12 of the 31 factors.  These were item numbers: 2, 3, 6, 11, 14, 
17, 19, 21, 25, 28, 29, and 30.  The reliable scale was created by calculating the summed mean 
score across the 12 items indicative of deception.   
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Unreliable cues reflected the 19 items not diagnostic of deception.  These were 
questionnaire items: 1, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 18, 20, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, and 31.  The 
unreliable scale was developed by calculating the summed mean score across the 19 factors not 
indicative of deception.  The 31 items rated in the questionnaire are listed in Table 3, with reliable 
cues highlighted grey.   
Table 3  
Nonverbal Deception Cues Assessed by Participants 
Participants were asked to rate the importance of each factor relied upon when determining the 
truthfulness of a witness giving evidence in court.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  The reliable indicia that comprise the reliable subscale are highlighted in grey and the 
factors that remain white reflect the unreliable subscale. 
5.5 Procedure 
 Participant Recruitment 
Participants were recruited via a snowballing, crowdsourcing technique.   Appropriate 
research portals available through the University and online, social media channels (i.e. Facebook) 
were implemented to recruit a convenient sample of the general public.  Research flyers were 
distributed throughout cafes, restaurants, movie theatres, domestic airports, sporting clubs, gaming 
1. Confidence 
2. Pauses 
3. High-pitched voice 
4. Fidgeting 
5. Restless behaviour 
6. Implausible responses 
7. Postural changes 
8. Speech disturbances/fillers (i.e., ‘ah’s’ and 
‘umms’) 
9. Anxious behaviour 
10. Self-manipulators (i.e., hand movements 
that involve relieving a bodily need like 
scratching) 
11. Short responses 
12. Mumbling 
13. Covering the mouth 
14. Body/hand/finger/leg/foot movements 
15. Stuttering 
16. Interrupting the questionnaire 
17. Reponses that lack logical structure 
18. Pressed lips 
19. Repetition of certain words and phrases 
20. Blinking 
21. Responses that contain very few details 
22. Tenseness 
23. Self-grooming 
24. Nervous behaviour 
25. Ambivalent responses 
26. Gaze aversion 
27. Crossed arms 
28. Illustrators (i.e. hand movements that 
accompany and illustrate the content of the 
speaker’s responses) 
29. Delayed responses 
30. Spontaneous responses 
31. Responses that contain a lot of detail 
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venues, supermarket and community noticeboards and retail stores.  The research flyers detailed 
the nature of the study and listed the research website (https://www.howtospotaliar.info).  Because 
the study was online, crowdsourcing facilitated distribution of the survey to large and varied 
audiences.   
Participants completed the survey using the online platform Qualtrics.  In line with jury-
duty requirements, participants had to satisfy three inclusion criteria.  Mock jurors had to be: 18 
years or older, fluent in English and an Australian citizen. Ethics approval for the two studies was 
obtained though Deakin University’s Human Research Ethics Committee, the details of which were 
reported for participants in the Plain Language Statement (PLS).  
Adopting Faul and colleagues (2007) a-priori calculation using G*Power 3 analysis, for 
one-tailed, matched pairs analyses with α set at .05 and power (1 – β) was determined at  .80, n 
was required to be 164 to detect a small effect (d = .20).  To detect a medium effect size (d = .50) 
an n of 28 was needed and to detect a large effect size (d = .80) a sample of n = 12 was 
recommended.  For more abundant caution a sample of 150 participants was sought for each study 
allowing for 30 participants per cell.  
 Questionnaire 
The survey comprised three questions.  Question one listed 31 items indicative of truth-
telling/deception.  Participants were asked to rate each item as to its importance in determining 
whether someone was truthful when giving evidence in court.  Respondents had to score each factor 
on a six-point rating scale.  The presentation order of factors was randomised to enhance internal 
validity and to protect against participants identifying those items that were or were not indicative 
of deception.  Question one was developed by Coyle and Thomson (2014) and replicated for the 
current project.  Two new questions were added to the current research extending the instrument 
to a 33-item survey.  The details of question two and three are outlined below. 
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Question two asked participants to rank five of 31 items that they considered the most 
important in determining the truthfulness of a witness.  Respondents had to score each factor in 
order of importance from most important (1) through to least important (5).  The third question 
asked participants to rate on a five-point Likert scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree how 
confident they were in their perceived ability to determine if someone was lying or not. Please see 
Appendix B for a copy of the questionnaire. 
Before participants commenced the survey, they were provided with a PLS that outlined 
the background, aim and research procedures.  The PLS explained to participants that they were 
recruited as members of a mock jury.  The PLS stipulated that participation was both voluntary and 
anonymous and that participants were free to withdraw at any point during the survey.   Anonymous 
participation removed any preconceived expectation or obligation to participate by those known to 
the researchers (i.e. social media networks).  Access to a computer or mobile device and Internet 
connection was required to complete the online survey.  Participants who consented to partake in 
the study selected the ‘continue’ button at the end of the PLS and were re-directed to a new page 
to start the survey.   
The purpose of the questionnaire was twofold.  First, it was to obtain mock jurors’ baseline 
perceptions of cues considered indicative of deception.  This was achieved by participants 
completing the first, pre-intervention questionnaire (Q1).  The second aim was to measure shifts in 
perceptions on cues considered important after jurors received advice on deception detection.  This 
was achieved by participants completing a second, post-intervention questionnaire (Q2).   
The pre-and post-intervention questionnaires completed by participants were one in the 
same: both Q1 and Q2 were identical in structure, content and instructions.  This allowed for 
changes to be assessed from pre-to post-test on the two measures: reliable cues and unreliable cues.  
To investigate the effect of advice on reliable and unreliable cues considered important by mock 
jurors the mean scores of importance were compared from pre-to post-test where pre-test scores 
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indicated baseline opinion and any shift in scores at post-test reflected change in opinion after 
exposure to advice. 
 Advice on Indicators of Deception: The experimental conditions 
After completing the pre-intervention questionnaire participants were randomly assigned 
to one of five experimental conditions where advice on reliable and unreliable indicators of 
deception was presented by a: (1) expert witness; (2) written judicial direction; (3) oral judicial 
direction; (4) expert/judge combined; or (5) no advice at all for those in the control.    
Advice conditions one (expert witness) and two (judicial transcript) replicated the 
experimental groups investigated by Coyle and Thomson (2014).  Conditions three, four and five 
extended upon the original design by comparing written and verbal judicial advice as well as the 
impact that repetitive information (expert witness and judicial advice combined) may have on 
influencing legal decision-making (Kovera, Borgida, Gresham, Gray, & Regan, 1997). 
Participants exposed to no advice on detecting deception formed the control group.   
Participants in the control group completed Q1 and then Q2 immediately thereafter under the guise 
that the study was testing the strength of their opinions about deceptive behaviour.  Participants in 
the control group took approximately 10 minutes to complete both questionnaires.   
Aside from the control (no advice), participants were randomly assigned to an advice 
condition and were instructed that, as members of a jury, they would be receive advice on reliable 
and unreliable indicators of deception.  For the three conditions in which advice was presented via 
DVD, participants were instructed to press play to watch the advice. Subjects exposed to the 
transcript of judicial advice were required to read the direction carefully before proceeding.  In-
built timers were incorporated into each advice group to prevent subjects from skipping ahead of 
the intervention before it finished. It took participants in the advice groups approximately 20 
minutes to complete the studies. 
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5.6 Data Analytic Strategy 
Data screening and recoding practices carried out on the research sample are described 
below.  An overview of the statistical analyses conducted and the internal consistency of the two 
measures (reliable and unreliable cues) are also defined. 
5.6.1 Data Screening and Cleaning 
A total of 636 pre-intervention questionnaires were commenced.  Participants were 
randomly allocated across the five advice conditions: n = 128 to expert witness; n = 121 to judicial 
transcript; n = 128 to judicial direction; n = 122 to expert and judicial advice combined; and n = 
137 to the controls.  Of these, 290 participants completed the post-intervention questionnaire (Study 
one and two combined), resulting in an overall response rate of 45.6%.   Figure 1 depicts the 
progress of all surveys undertaken with the corresponding response rates of both Study one and 
Study two reported. 
 
Figure 1.  Flow and Response Rates of Participants in Study 1 and Study 2 
Of the 338 participants randomly allocated to Study one, n = 165 surveys were invalid due 
to incomplete responses and so were removed from analysis.  This resulted in a 51.2% response 
rate for Study one.  In Study two, 298 participants completed the pre-intervention questionnaire.  
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After the seven-day delay, 164 participants (55%) returned to the post-intervention questionnaire 
and 134 did not.  After data cleaning, a total of 117 valid questionnaires were retained for analysis 
achieving a 39.3% response rate and a 60.7% attrition rate for Study two.  
Post-hoc power analyses were determine for the different effect sizes found across studies.   
Power was calculated at group-level using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang & Buchner, 2007).  
Whole of sample power for the respective studies was not appropriate because analyses were 
conducted at group level.  A summary of the post-hoc calculations follow.   
For Study one, post-hoc analyses for one-tailed, within-group comparisons revealed power 
(1 - β = .80) ranging from .21 to .40 for the small effects obtained.  Power was calculated at .61 to 
.82 for the medium effects and the large effect was obtained with power at .91.  For one-tailed, 
between-group analyses post-hoc analyses indicate that power ranged from .39 to .42 for small 
effects and .83 to .88 for the large effects found. 
Post-hoc analyses for Study two showed that for the one-tailed, within-group comparisons 
the small effects achieved minimal power (.18 to .20).  For the medium effects, power was 
determined at .63 and for the large effect power was calculated at .87. The one-tailed, between-
group analyses achieved power between .34 to .36 for the small effects and .57 to .58 for the 
medium effects obtained. 
5.6.2 New Variables  
Control group:  The introduction of a control group extended the current research design 
from the Coyle and Thomson (2014) study.  The control reported mock juror baseline perceptions 
of items indicative of deception as rated on the first survey (Q1) and again on the second survey 
(Q2), with no intervening advice.  As such the control added a fifth level of advice; no advice.  
Controls were recruited for both Studies one and two.  Controls were sought with the aim to identify 
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potential retest effects as a consequence of simple questionnaire re-administration (Scharfen, 
2018). 
Mean importance: To facilitate comparisons of the mean for deception cues rated 
important, each reliable item of deception (12 items) was transformed into a summed mean score 
of importance, generating a new variable, reliable cues.  The same transformation was performed 
on unreliable items (19 cues) creating a new scale, unreliable cues.  The two new variables enabled 
the effect of advice, and delayed advice, to be summarised by a total mean difference for each 
participant.  
5.6.3 Statistical Techniques 
The research data was not continuous, but rather, ordinal in nature with categorical 
variables only collected for demographic information such as age, sex, education, and training.   
Five statistical techniques were undertaken to identify differences between the effect of 
immediate advice and delayed advice on cues of deception perceived important by mock jurors. 
The statistical analyses included crosstab frequency distributions, Wilcoxon-matched pair signed-
rank tests, independent paired-samples t-tests, Mann-Whitney two sample tests and Kruskal-Wallis 
for comparing multiple independent samples. 
Descriptive statistics were used to identify proportional differences and allowed for direct 
group comparisons.  Frequencies also provided for a comprehensive summary of demographic 
items and deception cues rated most important by jurors.  
Wilcoxon-matched pair signed-rank tests (Wilcoxon tests) were conducted for two reasons. 
First, non-parametric methods were necessitated by non-normal distributions identified across both 
samples (Bradley, 1978, 1982; Hubbard, 1978; Singer, 1979; Sprent & Smeeton, 1989; please see 
results for further details).  Second, the analyses reflected within-group repeated measures.  
Accordingly, Wilcoxon tests were selected to analyse differences on the dependent variable (mean 
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importance) across the three independent variables (time-to-assessment and cue-type), and was 
achieved by assessing whether the summed mean score of importance for cue type deviated from 
pre-intervention (Q1) to post-intervention (Q2).   
A comment regarding normality: it has been well established that provided the violations 
of normality are not excessive, parametric techniques can be adopted (Bradley, 1978, 1982; 
Hubbard, 1978; Singer, 1979; Sprent & Smeeton, 1989).  However, in the case of the current thesis, 
departures from normality occurred in a number of situations, not least sample size rendering 
parametric inferences problematic (Sprent & Smeeton, 1989).  Further, the sample sizes were 
inconsistent between conditions.  The alternative, to the transform data, was deemed inappropriate 
because the distributions included both skewed and kurtotic spreads that ranged from moderate to 
severe across all conditions (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  As such, comparing the results to the 
original study of Coyle and Thomson (2014) would have made for a more difficult, and potentially 
“misleading, interpretation” (Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2002, p.6; Sprent & Smeeton, 1989).  
Furthermore, given the small samples and non-normal distributions, the Wilcoxon test adopted has 
been established to be the most powerful test for those distributions (Imam, Mohammad & 
Abanyam, 2014).  Further to the above, it is pertinent to emphasis that the research data herein was 
not continuous but ordinal in nature necessitating the use of non-parametric techniques despite the 
violated assumptions of normality.  
Wilcoxon tests were reported in the Coyle and Thomson (2014) study.  Replicating the 
Coyle and Thomson study calls for consistency with respect to the analytic technique adopted 
(assumptions met herein), as well as for the statistical metrics reported to ensure potential 
differences in effects of advice on juror opinions are not a consequence of differing analyses.  
Accordingly, mean scores and mean differences are reported in the current studies. That said, it is 
acknowledged that non-parametric data, ordinarily, necessitates the reporting of medians and 
interquartile ranges in place of means and standard deviations (Field, 2013).  However, as 
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explained, to maintain a direct rather than conceptual replication (Nosek & Lakens, 2014), means 
were adopted and standard deviations were reported sparingly.  The use of paired-samples t-tests 
were limited to one analysis per study where the parametric equivalent to Wilcoxon tests was 
appropriate. 
Mann-Whitney two sample tests (Mann-Whitney test) and Kruskal-Wallis tests were 
required for non-parametric, between-group analyses for independent samples.  Mann-Whitney 
tests compared mean differences between the different levels of advice and the control group of no 
advice for both reliable and unreliable cue types. The Kruskal-Wallis tests was adopted when 
comparisons across multiple independent groups was required.   
One-tailed tests were fixed when directional differences were anticipated, and two tailed 
tests were set for exploratory analyses.  For all analyses, significant or not, effect sizes were 
calculated using Cohen’s d (Cohen, 1962; 1988).  Significance was determined at α = .05 with 
marginal significance noted where α > .05 but < .07. 
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Chapter 6. Study One:  Results 
For the purpose of the following analyses, the results of Study one is structured as follows.  
First, the effect of advice on mock jurors’ perceptions of cues considered indicative of deception 
are reported.  The within-group analyses are stated initially with the results of the replication of 
Coyle and Thomson’s (2014) study examined to determine whether advice can influence 
perceptions of reliable cues.  Following the replication of Coyle and Thomson (2014), the impact 
of advice on mock jurors’ perceptions of unreliable cues is investigated.  The within-group analyses 
conclude by comparing shifts in perception between reliable and unreliable cues at group level 
following advice.  Second, to establish whether source of advice influenced mock juror perceptions 
over and above no advice, between group analyses were conducted comparing shifts in opinion 
across each level of advice with the control. Third, the influence of advice on individual indicators 
of deception ranked most important to least important are assessed.  Lastly, the chapter concludes 
with an analysis of mock juror confidence to ascertain whether receipt of advice influences 
perceived confidence in detecting deception. 
Normality:  The distribution of data for each condition of advice was non-normal as 
indicated by skewness and kurtosis scores and histogram graphs (Field, 2013; Hubbard, 1978; 
Sprent & Smeeton, 1989; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Inspection of boxplots revealed outliers.  
Extreme values were determined using the rule: Interquartile Range x 1.5. At group level, 18 
extreme values were removed from analysis of reliable cues (expert witness n = 3; written direction 
n = 3; oral direction n = 5; expert and judicial direction combined n = 1; control n = 6).  For 
unreliable cues 27 extreme cases were excluded (expert witness n = 4; written direction n = 3; oral 
direction n = 6; expert and judicial direction combined n = 2; control n =12).  As such, the cell 
counts and mean difference calculations differ across analyses of reliable and unreliable subscales. 
Internal consistency: The consistency of the two scales, reliable cues and unreliable cues, 
was assessed using Cronbach’s (1951) alpha.  Both the reliable deception scale (12 items α = .81) 
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and unreliable deception scale (19 items α = .91) were found to have good and excellent levels of 
internal consistency, respectively. 
6.1 Does Advice Impact Jurors’ Perceptions of Cues?  Assessing Shifts from Baseline: 
Analyses within-groups. 
6.1.1 Reliable Deception Cues 
Baseline comparisons of mean ratings of reliable cues were undertaken to identify whether 
perceptions differed between groups before exposure to instructions.  A Kruskal-Wallis test showed 
that differences in baseline scores of reliable cues between for all types of advice was non-
significant,  𝜒2  (4) =3.52 p =.48 (two-tailed), with a mean rank of reliable cues of 69.74 for expert 
witness, 75.33 for written direction, 91.21 for oral direction, 79.21 for expert/judge combined and 
74.77 for no advice.  
The following section of results comprises the replication.  To be consistent with the 
analysis performed by Coyle and Thomson (2014), within-group analyses (Wilcoxon tests) are 
stated first for reliable cues of deception for each condition of advice. 
Expert witness:  The mean score for reliable cues of deception increased from M = 3.18 at 
baseline to M = 3.54 after exposure to advice by expert witness.  A Wilcoxon test revealed that the 
mean increase from Q1 to Q2 (M difference = .36), was statistically significant: z = 2.05, p = .02, 
d = .58, one-tailed.   
Written judicial direction:  When mock jurors were exposed to a written direction, the 
mean importance of reliable cues shifted from M = 3.35 at pre-advice to M = 3.36 post-advice and 
the negligible increase (M difference = .01) was non-significant, z = .90, p = .45, d = .02, one-
tailed.  
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Oral judicial direction:  When advice was presented as an oral direction, mean scores 
shifted from M = 3.54 at baseline to M = 3.55 post advice.  The mean shift (M difference = .01) on 
reliable cues was non-significant: z = .27, p = .39, d = .02, one-tailed.  
Expert and judge combined:  The mean score of reliable cues rated by mock jurors was M 
= 3.37 prior to advice and M = 3.63 post advice.  A Wilcoxon test indicated that the mean increase 
on reliable cues (M difference = .26) following exposure to both expert testimony and oral direction 
was statistically significant, z = 2.30, p = .01, d = .60, one-tailed.   
No advice: The control group of no advice revealed that the mean rating of reliable cues 
was M = 3.35 on Q1 and M = 3.29 on Q2.  The shift in mean scores from Q1 to Q2 (M difference 
= -.06) was non-significant z = -1.09, p = .14, d =.18, one-tailed.   
For the two types of advice that significantly enhanced jurors’ perceptions of reliable 
indicia (expert witness and expert/judge), the effectiveness of each source of advice was compared 
to determine whether one was more successful than the other in improving opinion.  The results of 
a Mann-Whitney test revealed that the enhancment in perceptions of reliable indicia achieved with 
expert witness (M difference = .38) and expert/judge (M difference = .26), were non-significant, u 
= -3.53,  p = .73, d = .18, two-tailed. 
The pattern of mean scores for each source of advice at baseline, and again post advice, are 
shown in Figure 2.  The mean scores ratings for reliable cues for the two time-to-assessment 
periods, (Q1: baseline and Q2: post-advice) and associated parameters (e.g. means of the mean 
differences denoted ‘M Diff’ between Q1 and Q2) are reported in Table 4 for each level of advice. 
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Figure 2.  Mean Scores for Reliable Cues by Advice and Time-to-Assessment.  Depicted here are the mean ratings for the reliable subscale, measured at baseline (Q1) 
and again post advice (Q2) for each source of advice including the control: no advice
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The following section, 6.1.2, mirrors the same format as above however, the analysis offers 
an extension to the replication by examining the results for the subscale of unreliable cues as an 
additional, separate independent variable. 
6.1.2 Unreliable Deception Cues 
A Kruskal-Wallis independent samples test confirms that despite differing starting points 
observed between the conditions of advice, the differences between baseline scores for unreliable 
cues were non-significant,  𝜒2  (4) = 2.92, p =.57 (two-tailed), with a mean rank of unreliable cues 
of 72.00 for expert witness, 78.62 for written direction, 82.43 for oral direction, 65.28 for 
expert/judge and 69.54 for no advice.   
Expert witness:  There was a statistically significant mean decrease on unreliable cues (M 
difference = -.34) after mock jurors received advice by expert witness (Q2: M = 2.92), compared 
to before they received advice (Q1: M = 3.26), z = -2.69, p = .01, d = .85, one-tailed. 
Written judicial direction:  A mean decrease on unreliable cues (M difference = -.17) was 
found after mock jurors were presented with written judicial directions (Q2: M = 3.21) compared 
to before they received advice (Q1: M = 3.39).  The impact of written directions on shifting mock 
jurors’ perceptions of unreliable cues was significant, z = -2.24, p = .01, d =.45, one-tailed.   
Oral judicial direction: The mean score of unreliable cues at baseline was M = 3.44 and M 
= 3.52 after mock jurors received an oral direction.  Although exposure to oral judicial directions 
saw an increase in perceptions of unreliable cues, the shift in perceptions was non-significant (M 
difference = .08), z = .87, p = .19, d = .18, one-tailed.   
Expert and judge combined:  Mock jurors rated unreliable cues with a mean score of M = 
3.16 on Q1 and M = 3.01 on Q2.  The impact of combined advice via expert testimony and judicial 
direction (M difference = -0.16) was marginally significant, z = -1.53, p = .06, d = .32, one-tailed.   
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No advice: The control group of no advice indicated that the mean rating of unreliable cues 
on Q1 and Q2 was M = 3.26 and M = 3.18, respectively.  A Wilcoxon test found that the mean 
decrease (M difference = -.08) from baseline was significant; z = -2.74, p = .01, d = .37, one-tailed.  
To establish whether one type of advice was more effective than another in correcting 
misconceptions, the significant shifts in opinion achieved with expert evidence (the largest mean 
increase) was compared to shifts attained with written judicial instructions and expert/judge.  The 
findings indicate that all three forms of advice were equally effective in correcting jurors’ beliefs 
regarding non-diagnostics of deception: the difference in improvement achieved by expert witness 
(M difference = -.34) and written direction (M difference = -.17), were non-significant, u =1.40, p 
=.16, d = 41, two-tailed; and the differences in opinion obtained by the expert (M difference = -
.34) did not significantly differ from those of the expert/judge (M difference = -.16), u =-1.21, p = 
.23 d = .42, two-tailed. 
The mean scores of importance for unreliable cues by source of advice are illustrated in 
Figure 3 and reported in Table 4 along with the mean scores for reliable cues already outlined.   
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Figure 3.  Mean Scores for Unreliable Cues by Source of Advice and Time-to-Assessment.  
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Table 4 
Shifts in Mean Scores of Mock Juror Perceptions from Pre-Test (Q1) to Post-Test (Q2) by Cue-Type and Source of Advice  
 
p  calculated using Wilcoxon-matched-pair signed-rank tests (one-tailed); * Significance at .05; **Significance at .01.  
Note: Also calculated are the means of each mean difference (denoted ‘M diff’), the SD for the Wilcoxon test and effect sizes reported using Cohen’s d. 
 Reliable Cues Unreliable Cues 
   Q1     Q2     Q1 Q2     
Source of Advice N M M M diff SD p d N M M 
M 
diff  
SD p d 
Expert Witness 17 3.18 3.54 .36 .62 .02* .58 16 3.26 2.92 -.34 .40 .01** .85 
Judicial Written Direction  29 3.35 3.36 .01 .50 .45 .02 29 3.39 3.21 -.17 .40 .01** .45 
Judicial Oral Direction  29 3.54 3.55 .01 .51 .39  .02 28 3.44 3.52  .08 .45 .19 .18 
Expert & Judicial Direction  21 3.37 3.63 .26 .43 .01** .60 20 3.16 3.01 -.16 .47 .06 .32 
No Advice (control) 59 3.35 3.29 -.06 .33 .14 .18 53 3.26 3.18 -.08 .22 .01** .37 
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6.1.3 Reliable Cues versus Unreliable Cues 
Baseline differences in mock jurors’ perceptions between reliable cues and unreliable cues 
were investigated.  Comparisons between cue-type at baseline were undertaken to establish whether 
or not jurors perceived one type of cue to be any more indicative of deception, prior to advice, and 
whether perceptions deviated with advice and, if so, to what extent.   Although no directional 
hypothesis were specified between opinions of reliable and unreliable, hypotheses one and two 
predicted that both cue-types would improve with advice.  Consequently, increases in mean scores 
were expected for reliable cues and corresponding decreases in means scores were anticipated for 
unreliable cues.  Hence the directional nature of the existing predictions, one-tailed tests were 
adopted.  Although no directional hypotheses were made for baseline perceptions, one-tailed tests 
were considered appropriate in an attempt to avoid skewing interpretations of differences between 
cue-types from pre-to post-delay. 
To perform this analysis cases were paired where outliers were absent on both the reliable 
and unreliable subscale.  Accordingly, the cell sizes differ from those adopted for the independent 
analyses (i.e. 6.1.1 and 6.1.2).  The results are reported by advice type, and are also depicted in 
Figures 4 and 5 along with Table 5. 
Expert witness:  At baseline, the difference in mean scores between cue-type for those 
randomly assigned to expert witness were non-significant (reliable cues: M = 3.20; unreliable cues: 
M = 3.26; M difference = .06), z = -.62, p = .27, d = .45, one-tailed.  After receiving expert evidence, 
mock jurors rated reliable cues (M = 3.51) significantly higher than unreliable cues (M = 2.92; M 
difference = .59), z = 2.33, p = .01, d = .75, one-tailed.   
Written judicial direction: Prior to advice, differences in mean scores between reliable (M 
= 3.40) and unreliable cues (M = 3.36) were non-significant for participants assigned to written 
directions, (M difference = .04), z = .58, p = .28, d = .10, one-tailed.   Following receipt of written 
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instructions however, reliable cues (M = 3.37) were rated significantly higher than unreliable cues 
(M = 3.17; M difference = .20;), z = 1.92, p = .03, d = .52, one-tailed.  
Oral judicial direction:  Differences between reliable (M = 3.56) and unreliable mean 
scores (M = 3.51) at baseline were non-significant for mock jurors randomly assigned to advice by 
way of oral judicial instructions: M difference = .05; z = .88, p = .44, d = .15, one-tailed.  After 
advice, the difference in mock juror’s ratings of reliable cues (M = 3.58) and unreliable cues (M = 
3.56) remained non-significant: M difference = .02; z = .63, p = .26, d = .04, one-tailed. 
Expert and judge combined: At baseline, mock jurors rated reliable cues (M = 3.32) 
significantly greater than unreliable cues (M = 3.10; M difference = .22, z = 2.62, p = .001, d = .72, 
one-tailed.  Post advice, reliable cues (M = 3.59) remained significantly higher than unreliable cues 
(M = 2.95; M difference = .64), z = 2.80, p = .01, d = 1.46, one-tailed.   
Figure 4.  Mock Juror Perceptions at Baseline (Q1) and Post-Advice (Q2) by Cue-Type and Source of 
Advice. 
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No advice:  Mock jurors in the control group rated reliable (M = 3.32) and unreliable cues 
(M = 3.26) equally at baseline (M difference = .06) as confirmed by a Wilcoxon test, z = 1.12, p = 
.13, d = .15, one-tailed.  However, on follow-up the difference between reliable cues (M = 3.27) 
and unreliable cues (M = 3.18) was significant: M difference = .09; z = 1.83, p = .03, d = .21, one-
tailed.  The pattern of findings for no instruction are displayed in Figure 5 below and the statistical 
parameters are summarised in Table 5. 
Figure 5. Total Mean Scores for the Reliable and Unreliable Subscales at Baseline (Q1) and Post-
Advice (Q2) for Mock Jurors Who Received No Advice (Control). 
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Table 5 
Post-Test Mean Scores of Mock Juror Perceptions of Reliable and Unreliable Cues by Source of Advice 
p  calculated using Wilcoxon-matched-pair signed-rank tests; * Significance at .05; **Significance at .01.  
                       Reliable Cue Unreliable Cue     
Source of Advice N M M  M diff  SD p d 
Expert Witness 16 3.51 2.92 .59 .79 .01** .75 
Judicial Written Direction  27 3.37 3.17 .20 .47 .03* .52 
Judicial Oral Direction  25 3.58 3.56 .02 .63 .26 .04 
Expert & Judicial Direction  19 3.59 2.95 .64 .79 .01** 1.46 
No Advice (control) 53 3.27 3.18 .09 .35 .03* .21 
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6.2 Does Advice Impact Jurors’ Perceptions of Cues?  Assessing Differences Between Advice 
and No Advice: Analyses between-groups. 
Shifts in mock jurors’ perceptions of reliable and unreliable cues were compared to the 
control.  This analysis differs from the previous analysis in that it makes a direct comparison of the 
effect of receiving advice (i.e. expert witness) against the effect of receiving no advice.  
Comparisons with the control were undertake to determine whether any potential retest effects such 
as the simple repetition of the questionnaire (Scharfen et al., 2018) had any confounding effect on 
the results obtained.  The analyses aimed to establish whether or not advice impacted shifts in 
opinion over and above no advice.  The results for reliable and unreliable cues are reported 
concurrently and the summary statistics for the between-group analyses can be found in Table 6. 
Expert witness: A between-group analysis revealed that the mean difference for reliable 
cues from Q1 to Q2 (M difference = .36) was significantly different when mock jurors were 
exposed to expert witness advice compared to mock jurors not exposed to advice (M difference = 
-.06), u = 2.45, p = .01, d = 1.02, one-tailed.  For unreliable cues, a Mann-Whitney test revealed 
that when compared against the control, the decrease in mean importance was significantly 
different for jurors who received expert witness advice (M difference = -.34) compared to those 
who received no advice (M difference = -.08), u = -2.80, p = .001, d = .96, one-tailed. 
Written judicial direction:  A comparison against the control also indicated that reliable 
cues were not rated significantly differently by jurors exposed to written directions (M difference 
= .01) compared to jurors who received no advice (M difference = -.06), u = .47, p = .32, d = .18, 
one-tailed.  A Mann-Whitney test showed that the difference in mean scores on unreliable cues was 
non-significant between jurors exposed to written instruction (M difference = -.17) and mock jurors 
exposed to no advice (M difference = -.08), u = -.91, p = .18, d = .30, one-tailed. 
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Oral judicial direction:  Between-group analysis indicated that the mean difference on 
reliable cues for jurors exposed to advice by verbal direction (M difference = .01) compared to 
those who received no advice (M difference = -.06) was non-significant, u = .29, p = .15, d = .18, 
one-tailed.  A between-group comparison also suggests that unreliable cues were not rated 
significantly different by mock jurors who received advice by oral direction (M difference = .08) 
compared to those who received no advice (M difference = -.08), u = 1.15, p = .13, d = .50, one-
tailed.   
Expert and judge combined:  Compared against no advice, the change in mean scores on 
reliable cues from Q1 to Q2 (M difference = .26) for jurors exposed to combined expert/judge 
advice was statistically different from mock jurors who received no advice (M difference = -.06), 
u = 2.78, p = .01, d = .89, one-tailed.  A Mann-Whitney test found that the mean change score on 
unreliable cues did not differ significantly between mock jurors who received expert and judicial 
advice (M difference = -.16) from mock jurors who received no advice (M difference = -.08), u = 
-1.19, p = .12, d = .26, one-tailed.   
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Table 6 
Between-Group Comparisons of Mean Differences in Mock Juror Perceptions by Cue-Type and Source of Advice 
p  calculated using Mann-Whitney two-sample tests; **Significance at .01; ***Significance at .001  Note: The mean difference (M diff) reflects the change score 
from pre-to post advice (Q2 - Q1) for the reliable and unreliable subscales and was calculated to run between-group comparisons against the control. 
 
 
Reliable Cues  Unreliable Cues 
Source of Advice N M diff SD p d N M diff SD p d 
Expert Witness 17 .36 .62 .01** 1.02 16 -.34 .40 .001*** .96 
Judicial Written Direction  29 .01 .50 .32 .18 29 -.17 .40 .18 .30 
Judicial Oral Direction  29 .01 .51 .15 .18 28 .08 .45 .13 .50 
Expert & Judicial Direction 21 .26 .43 .01**  .89 20 -.16 .47 .12 .26 
Control (no advice) 59 -.06 .33 - - - - 53 -.08 .22 - - - - 
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6.3 What Combination of Nonverbal Cues are Considered Most Important?” 
The following analyses are presented as frequencies and percentages to best reflect the cues 
ranked most important by participants.  The top five cues rated most important by mock jurors are 
reported first followed by the five cues most commonly endorsed.  The deception cues considered 
most important before and after advice are described and compared.  For the cues most commonly 
preferred, total percentages exceed 100% with multiple rankings possible for each item.  
6.3.1 Top Five Most Important Cues  
Out of a possible 31 items, 19 cues were identified among the most important in 
determining truthfulness (see Figure 6 below).  Prior to advice, the five cues ranked most important 
by mock jurors in determining truthfulness was: confidence (22.9%); responses that contain a lot 
of detail (16.2%); implausible responses (10.6%); spontaneous corrections (10.5%), and gaze 
aversion (7.6%).  In total, these cues accounted for more than two thirds (67.6%, n = 71) of all 
items rated.   
Almost half of the cues ranked in the top five (46.6%, n = 49) were unreliable items of 
deception.  Both the first (confidence) and second most important cues (responses that contain a 
lot of detail) accounted for the majority of the unreliable items rated in the top five: 39%, n = 41 of 
the 49 responses.  Two reliable cues (spontaneous corrections and implausible responses) were 
ranked in the five most important cues accounting for 21% of all responses.   
After exposure to advice, mock jurors maintained that confidence (21.9%) and responses 
that contain a lot of detail (18.1%) were the two most important cues in detecting deception.  These 
two unreliable cues accounted for 40% of all responses after advice was received– almost an 
identical proportion of responses made prior to advice (39.1%).  The remaining three cues rated 
most important by mock jurors included reliable items: high pitched voice (10.5%); implausible 
responses (7.6%); and responses that contain very few details (7.6%).   
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Percentage change analysis revealed that the differences from pre-to post advice for the 
five most important cues (i.e. confidence, responses that are implausible, responses that contain a 
lot of detail, spontaneous corrections, and gaze aversion) were among the smallest.  For these items, 
percentage changes ranged from: -4% (n = - 1) for confidence to -75% (n = - 6) for gaze aversion.  
The greatest percentage change was observed for high pitch voice that increased 450% (n = 9) 
followed by: responses that contain very few details that increased 300% (n = 6); 
body/hand/finger/leg/foot movements that increased 300% (n =3, respectively); pauses that 
increased 150% (n = 3); and short responses and delayed responses that both increased 100% (n = 
1, respectively).  The percentage increase in responses that contain very few details saw the cue 
shift into the top five most important cues post advice. Figure 7 shows the percentage change 
rankings for all items ranked most important by mock jurors. 
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Figure 6. Nonverbal Cues Ranked Most Important Before and After Advice.  The grey dash line delineates the top five most important cues from all 
cues ranked most important.  Presentation order reflects cues ranked in order of importance at baseline 
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Figure 7.  Percentage Change in Nonverbal Cues Ranked Most Important After Advice.  The 
percentage change is delineated for the two measures: reliable cues are depicted in blue and 
unreliable cues are charted in orange.  Items are presented in order of percentage change from 
largest through smallest and positive through negative.
-200% -100% 0% 100% 200% 300% 400% 500%
High Pitch Voice
Body/hand/finger/leg/foot movements
Responses that contain very few details
Pauses
Short responses
Delayed responses
Speech disturbances/fillers
Interrupting the questioner
Responses a lot of detail
Fidgeting
Confidence
Implausible responses
Responses that lack logical structure
Anxious behaviour
Spontaneous corrections
Gaze aversion
Illustrators
Repitition of certain words or phrases
Self maniupulators
Covering the mouth
Restless behaviour
Postural changes
% change - unreliable cues % change - reliable cues
INSTRUCTING JURORS ON NONVERBAL CUES OF DECEPTION  
   
88 
6.3.2 Most Commonly Preferred Cues 
The five most commonly endorsed items of deception rated important by mock jurors were, 
in order of preference: confidence, (51.4%, n = 54); responses that contain a lot of detail (50.5%, 
n = 53); spontaneous corrections (30.5%, n = 32); responses that lack logical structure (26.7%, n = 
28); and repetition of certain words or phrases (25.7%, n = 27).  The top three most preferred items 
were unreliable cues.  The fourth and fifth most preferred items were reliable indicia of deception, 
however, the number of times these items were ranked was approximately half that of the first and 
second most preferred (unreliable) cues. 
Despite advice, mock jurors maintained that ‘responses that contain a lot of detail’ (48%, 
n = 50) and confidence (47%, n = 49) were the two most preferred cues.  Albeit, the order of 
preference swapped (see Figure 8). Illustrators (36%, n = 38); responses that contain very few 
details (30%, n = 32); and implausible responses (30%, n = 31) comprised the three remaining cues 
most frequently endorsed – all of which were newly cited, reliable cues. 
After exposure to advice, the largest percentage change was found for: high pitch voice that 
increased 222% (n = 20); responses that contain very few details that increased 113% (n = 17); and 
illustrators that increased 81% (n = 17).  All three items were reliable cues of deception.  Of all the 
unreliable cues, only self-grooming (75%, n = 3) demonstrated a percentage increase post advice.   
Of all cues, the largest percentage decrease following receipt of advice was found for the 
unreliable cue, gaze aversion (-80%, n = -12).  A percentage decrease was found across three 
reliable cues: repetition of certain words decreased by 44% (n = -3); ambivalent responses dropped 
38% (n = -16); and spontaneous corrections decreased 6% (n = -2).  Percentage changes for all 
items most frequently endorsed by mock jurors are shown in Figure 9.  
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Figure 8. Most Commonly Endorsed Nonverbal Cues Before and After Advice.  Items are presented in order of most preferred to least preferred 
measured from baseline. 
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Figure 9.  Percentage Change in Nonverbal Cues Most Commonly Endorsed After Advice.  The 
percentage change is delineated for the two measures: reliable cues depicted in blue and unreliable 
cues charted in orange.  Items are presented in order of percentage change from largest through 
smallest, and positive through negative. 
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6.4 Does Exposure to Advice Influence Juror Confidence in Detecting Deception? 
Perceived confidence was measured at baseline and again following exposure to advice.  
No directional hypotheses were predicated and so two tailed tests were adopted.  An equivalent 
control was not obtained for confidence so within-group analyses reflect shifts from baseline 
following exposure to advice. The sample used to test the effect of advice on perceptions of 
nonverbal cues (at 6.1.1 and 6.1.2) was adopted to examine the effect of advice on jurors’ perceived 
confidence.  Preliminary data cleaning indicated normally distributed data, and so, parametric 
paired-samples t tests were conducted. 
Expert witness:  Mock jurors’ level of confidence shifted from M = 3.25 (SD = 1.06) at 
baseline to M = 3.19 (SD = .98) following exposure advice by expert witness.  The mean decrease 
in confidence (M difference = -.06, SE = .17) for those who received expert testimony was non-
significant, t (15) = -.368, p = .72, d = .09, two-tailed. 
Written judicial direction:  Confidence mean scores for mock jurors who received written 
judicial instructions shifted from M = 3.62 (SD = .64) to M = 3.58 (SD = .70) following a delay 
but, the mean decrease was minimal: M difference = -.04, SE = .10; t (25) = -.372, p = .71, d = .08, 
two-tailed. 
Oral judicial direction: For those who received verbal directions, confidence increased by 
a mean difference of .08 (SE = .15) from M = 3.38 (SD = .88) at baseline to M = 3.46 (SD = .78) 
post-advice but the increase was non-significant, t (23) = .569, p = .58, d = .11, two-tailed. 
Expert and judge combined:  Levels of perceived confidence shifted for jurors exposed to 
advice by expert/judge but the mean increase was not significant (Q1: M = 3.18, SD = 1.19; Q2: 
M = 3.24, SD = .97; M difference = .06; SE = .20), t (16) = .29, p = .77, d = .07, two-tailed. 
In sum, shifts in perceived confidence for all types of advice were non-significant.  
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Chapter 7. Discussion 
The current study aimed to establish whether or not evidentiary instructions on indicia of 
deception by way of expert evidence, and/or judicial directions, may influence juror perceptions of 
nonverbal diagnostics of deception.  Specifically, the current study sought to replicate previous 
research to confirm/disconfirm whether instructions enhance juror perceptions of reliable cues of 
deception when determining the truthfulness/deception of a witness.  The second objective 
expanded upon the replication and investigated whether the provision of advice could correct 
misconceptions of behavioural indicia of deception by improving jurors’ opinions of unreliable 
cues.  
The format of the discussion mirrors that set out in the preceding chapter of results (chapter 
six).  First, the findings of the within-group analyses (i.e. comparisons from baseline) are discussed.  
The findings detail the effect of type of advice on perceptions of indicia, independent of one 
another, to establish whether source of advice is relevant in influencing perceptions.  A comparative 
analysis follows with discrepancies in opinion between reliable and unreliable cues investigated.  
Second, the impact of instructions on perceptions are compared to no instructions (i.e. the between-
group comparisons).  Third, a review of the combination of nonverbal cues considered most 
important by jurors in detecting deception is outlined.  The current chapter concludes with a 
summary of the effect of instructions on juror confidence in detecting deception. 
7.1 Does Advice Impact Jurors’ Perceptions of Nonverbal Cues of Deception? 
7.1.1 Assessing Shifts from Baseline: Analyses within-groups.  
The within-group analyses made comparisons from baseline, meaning that participants 
functioned as their own controls as was determined by baseline scores taken at time one, prior to 
instructions.  As such, each group was independent of one another and analysed accordingly.   
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Hypothesis 1:  Jurors’ perceptions of reliable cues of deception will improve with advice 
The current study provides mixed support for hypothesis one, that predicted jurors’ 
perceptions of reliable indicia of deception would improve with advice.  The current study found 
that when instructions were presented by an expert witness (moderate effect, d = .58), or when 
instructions were delivered via an expert witness together with a judicial direction (expert/judge; 
moderate effect, d = .60), jurors’ perceptions of reliable cues significantly improved.  The increase 
from baseline for advice by expert witness and expert/judge collectively, suggests that providing 
information on behavioural indicators of deception to jurors may enhance opinions of cues that 
reliably predict deception with jurors perceiving reliable cues to be more indicative of deception 
following instruction.  Accordingly, these provisional findings run counter to some elements of 
DDT (Porter & ten Brinke, 2009), that predicts initial perceptions of trustworthiness are so 
pervasive that they do not change when faced with conflicting evidence.  While it is acknowledged 
that this thesis did not ask mock jurors to make a judgement regarding a witness’ testimony nor 
judge the credibility of a witness, the findings of this thesis indicate, at least preliminarily, that 
perceptions of cues perceived indicative of trustworthiness can be manipulated when jurors are 
confronted with conflicting evidence.  
The current study also investigated whether or not the effectiveness of advice on shifting 
perceptions differed according to the type of instruction given.  That is, the study examined whether 
instructions introduced as expert testimony or by an expert/judge were more effective in improving 
opinion.  The findings revealed that the impact of advice did not differ significantly by type of 
instruction:  neither the expert witness nor the expert/judge was more or less effective in enhancing 
jurors’ opinions of reliable indicia of deception.  Although perceptions of reliable cues may be 
influenced with instruction, this finding suggests that the source of advice did not materially 
influence the degree of change in perceptions achieved. 
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The remaining sources of advice (written judicial directions, verbal judicial directions, and 
no advice), did not effect jurors’ perceptions of reliable cues.  For both judicial directives, opinions 
remained stable despite advice.  In fact, the shifts in perceptions of reliable indicia for both written 
and oral directions were negligible (d = .02, respectively).  This finding indicates that not only were 
evidentiary judicial instructions ineffective in shifting juror opinion, but also, presentation modality 
(i.e. written versus oral) appeared to have no influence on shifting opinions; both written and oral 
instructions demonstrated the same mean change and dispersion of opinion from pre-to post advice.   
In addition, variability in the baselines between advice types deserves attention.  By way 
of example, the mean increase in perceptions of reliable cues achieved by expert witness (+.36) 
represents the same difference between the baseline scores between expert witness (3.18) and oral 
judicial direction (3.54; where 3.54 - 3.18 = .36).  Also notable, is that the post-test mean score for 
expert witness (3.54) was the same as the starting point for judicial direction (3.54).  In this 
example, expert witness impacted perceptions significantly and oral directions did not.  Yet, the 
starting point for oral directions (3.54) is where expert witness shifted to with advice.  The point 
made, albeit crudely, is that while ceiling effects may be at issue, the variability in baselines 
between advice types may have confounded the effect of advice.  This issue is critical to the 
interpretations made herein.  Namely, the differing baseline perceptions may have undermine the 
opportunity for advice to impact perceptions equally, if much at all.  The degree of variability 
observed across conditions prior to advice, and the degree of change observed with advice, cannot 
be ignored and requires that the findings of this thesis be interpreted with caution.  As such, it is 
noted that the findings achieved with advice, as reported throughout, remain preliminary.  Without 
further replication, extrapolating the findings beyond this thesis would be ill-advised. 
An unexpected finding of the current study was the pattern found for the control.  From 
time one to time two, jurors who received no instruction perceived reliable cues to be less indicative 
of deception than at baseline.  Although non-significant, a change in perception and the direction 
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of the change was not anticipated.  Because the shift in perceptions from time one to time two was 
non-significant, no conclusion can be made as to cautioning against omitting advice when witness 
credibility is at issue.  However, what can be said, is that the directional nature of the change in 
opinion raises some concern and warrants future exploration. 
Hypothesis one addressed the replication of Coyle and Thomson (2014), and to reiterate 
predicted, that jurors’ perceptions of reliable nonverbal deception cues would improve with advice.  
As noted, partial support was demonstrated, with mixed results found for the two advice conditions 
replicated (expert witness and written judicial direction).  On the one hand, the effect of expert 
evidence on improving perceptions was replicated but the impact of written judicial directions was 
not.  Unfortunately, corresponding effect sizes were not reported by Coyle and Thomson (2014), 
and so, the magnitude of change between their study and those found herein could not be evaluated. 
Needless to say, that although a pattern of improvement (significant or not) was not observed when 
jurors received written evidentiary directions, the introduction of the expert/judge condition 
provided additional support as to the possible benefits of educating jurors with instructions on 
detecting deception. 
Notably, the baseline scores of reliable cues for jurors exposed to written instructions 
differed considerably between studies: Coyle and Thomson’s (2014) pre-test mean score was 3.03 
whereas the current study was 3.35.  It is noted that the discrepancies in baselines (i.e. +.32) may 
account for some of the difference found as to why there was a smaller mean increase achieved in 
the current study than the original one.  In fact, the inconsistencies in the baseline scores for written 
instructions between both studies is larger than then change score found herein (i.e. +.32 difference 
in baseline scores between studies compared to +.01).  Had the baseline score for written 
instructions corresponded with Coyle and Thomson’s (2014) study, then it is possible that the 
opportunity for perceptions to shift would have been greater and may have facilitated a different 
outcome.  If we consider the differences in starting points between the two studies (+.32) it must 
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be noted that the baseline differences are almost as large as the biggest difference from pre-to post-
advice found herein for expert witness (i.e. reliable cues mean increase was +.36).  Similarly, pre-
test scores suggest that jurors’ baseline knowledge of deception indicia were already at mid-point.   
Consequently, it is unknown whether or not potential floor and/or ceiling effects have restricted 
the degree to which opinions were, or were not, shifted within the current study.   
Given the stark contrast in the effect of written judicial instructions, it is of relevance that 
Coyle and Thomson (2014) proposed that their unexpected finding for the effectiveness of written 
instructions may have been down to participants cribbing answers from the transcript of advice as 
this was available to them while they completed the follow-up questionnaire.  Given that the 
opportunity to crib was minimised in the current study, this may explain some of the negligible 
difference found for written instructions herein.  Alternatively, the differences in the impact of 
advice on juror perceptions demonstrated between studies may be accounted for by differences in 
methodology.   
Although the replication utilised similar procedure and identical materials to those adopted 
by Coyle and Thomson (2014), key elements of the experimental settings differed: (1) the 
replication was conducted in an online environment compared to a in-situ, formal mock court 
setting; (2) participants had the opportunity to complete the study at home or work where 
interferences could not be controlled for; and (3) the current researchers were not on hand to qualify 
questions or provide helpful directives to participants in the online environment.  Regarding design, 
the sample representativeness and cell sizes were not replicated, and the smaller samples obtained 
may have undermined power in the current study.  Most notably, the impact that a formal, mock 
court setting had on juror engagement and attention cannot be underestimated.  Equally, the 
potential that a written direction was afforded more weight and/or credibility in a mock court setting 
compared to an online study cannot be overlooked.  It is likely, that the novel setting and presence 
of researchers encouraged participation.  Recent studies that have looked at training in detecting 
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deception and that have attempted to modify judicial instructions to encourage comprehension have 
illustrated the importance of motivation, effort and participating in novel experiences as factors 
influencing training outcomes (Dunbar et al., 2018; Baguley et al., 2017).  The mere social 
interaction between participants, researchers and materials afforded in a simulated jury setting may 
have, unwittingly, attributed more importance and seriousness to the advice presented, but also, to 
the task at hand compared to those who participated in the online experiment.  These factors may 
account for some of the differences in the success of education provided to jurors observed between 
studies.  
Hypothesis 2:  Jurors’ perceptions of unreliable cues of deception will improve with advice 
Partial support was found for hypothesis two that, predicted jurors’ misconceptions as to 
nonverbal cues of deception could be corrected with advice.  Specifically, the current study found 
that jurors’ false beliefs regarding unreliable deception cues may be corrected with instructions 
when evidence is adduced by an expert witness (large effect, d = .85), or delivered as a written 
judicial direction (approached a medium effect, d = .45).  This finding reveals that following 
instructions, jurors perceive unreliable cues to be less indicative of deception, suggesting that 
misconceptions of nonverbal cues not indicative of deception might be remedied with advice.   
The current study also examined whether the effectiveness of advice on correcting 
misconceptions differed by type of instruction.  The findings indicate that the impact of advice did 
not differ significantly between source of advice suggesting that jurors may benefit equally from 
the testimony of an expert or a written direction from a judge when it comes to correcting erroneous 
perceptions. 
Advising potential jurors via expert/judge combined was marginally significant (p = .06).  
As indicated by post-hoc power analyses, it is likely that the mean decrease achieved by 
expert/judge (M difference = -.16, SD = .47) did not reach significance due to a lack of power (n = 
21).  A lack of power is further substantiated by way of comparisons to: 1) the approximate mean 
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decrease and variability in responses found for written directions (M difference = -.17, SD = .40) 
that achieved significance with a larger sample (n = 29); and 2) significance obtained by the control 
for a notably smaller mean decrease (M difference = -.08, and SD = .22, p = .01) but much larger 
sample (n = 53).     
The impact of oral judicial directions however, was less effective with verbal directives 
demonstrating no effect on shifting opinions of unreliable cues.  In fact, although the shift in 
perceptions was non-significant, the direction of the shift is of note.  That is, jurors exposed to oral 
judicial instructions perceived non-diagnostic cues to be more indicative of deception than before 
they received advice.  While it is re-emphasised that the shift in perceptions was non-significant, 
the directional pattern warrants comment: jurors’ opinions trended in the opposite direction than 
desired and perhaps provides some cautionary suggestion that misconceptions may get worse not 
better.  That said, the increase in false beliefs following judicial directions occurred in isolation – 
all other conditions of advice showed a pattern of improvement with misconceptions decreasing 
with advice.   
From time one to time two, jurors exposed to no instructions perceived false, unreliable 
cues to be less indicative of deception than at baseline.  This finding was unexpected.  Although 
the shift was significant and the size of the effect was moderate, the mean decrease was the smallest 
of all sources of advice (excluding judicial directions that increased with advice).  The level of 
significance obtained most likely reflects a combination of increased power due to a larger sample 
(n = 53) together with compacted scores of responses that did not disperse far from the mean (SD 
= .22).  
Aside from measuring shifts from baseline, an additional analysis comparing jurors’ 
perceptions of reliable and unreliable cues after receipt of instruction was performed for each type 
of advice.  The comparison was a within-participant assessment and so, is detailed here with the 
within-group analyses.  
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Baseline differences between perceptions of reliable and unreliable cues did not differ 
across the five levels of advice.  That is, reliable cues and unreliable cues were perceived by jurors 
as equally indicative of deception prior to instruction.  This finding is in and of itself an interesting 
one.  Not only because it has not been explored despite the amass of studies on deception detection, 
but because it provides preliminary evidence to suggest that although people hold false beliefs 
about what deceptive behaviour looks like (i.e. Pinocchio’s nose), false beliefs appear to be no 
more dominant than valid stereotypes.  Nor do they appear mutually exclusive.  The equivalence 
found between reliable and unreliable opinions as to nonverbal cues perceived indicative of 
deception suggests that the focus of current deception literature that perpetuates that stereotypes of 
nonverbal behaviour are overwhelming wrong (Akehurst et al., 1996; Bogaard & Meijer, 2018; 
Bogaard et al., 2016) may be misdirected.   
Post-test comparative analysis revealed that following instruction, jurors perceived reliable 
cues to be significantly more indicative of deception than unreliable cues for three types of 
instruction: when advice was presented by expert witness; written judicial direction; and 
expert/judge combined.  A large effect was achieved when the advice of the expert and judge was 
combined (d = 1.46), the expert approached a large effect (d = .75), and the discrepancy in opinion 
between reliable and unreliable cues achieved with written instructions was moderate (d = .52).  
Only oral judicial directions had a negligible effect (d = .04) on differentiating opinion between 
reliable and unreliable diagnostics of deception.  The effect on perceptions of indicia when no 
instructions were given were small (d = .21).  Albeit, the difference in perceptions represented little 
practical significance. The finding highlights that while instructions might not uniformly effect 
shifts across perceptions of reliable and unreliable indicia when cue-types are evaluated 
independently, presenting advice to jurors may be effective in splitting opinion between reliable 
and unreliable cues in a desired direction.   
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Summary of Within-Group Findings 
The current study demonstrated that shifts in perception from baseline might be enhanced 
with instruction.  Overall, only the testimony of the expert witness simultaneously benefited jurors’ 
opinions of reliable and unreliable cues of deception.  Aside from the expert, instructions by 
expert/judge appeared to enhance perceptions of reliable indicia, and written instructions appeared 
to positively impact perceptions of unreliable cues.  Only instructions delivered as an oral judicial 
direction had no bearing on perceptions of reliable or unreliable indicators of deception.  The 
ineffectiveness of oral directions was highlighted when jurors’ perceptions between indicia were 
compared: perceptions of reliable and unreliable indicia remained all but stable despite advice.  For 
the three remaining types of advice, opinions between cue-types were successfully split. Moderate 
to large effects were achieved with reliable indicia perceived by jurors to be significantly more 
indicative of deception than unreliable cues following instructions.  This demonstrated a 
considerable shift from baseline where jurors perceived reliable and unreliable cues to be equally 
indicative of deception.   
The pattern of results for the control were unexpected: perceptions for both types of cues 
decreased from time one to time two, despite no intervention.  The findings from the control may 
indicate a retest effect where the simple repetition of the questionnaire alone influences a change 
from baseline on the reliable sale, and unreliable scale more so.  While the control demonstrated a 
negative trend, the trend observed for jurors who received advice diverged.  Namely, depending on 
type of advice, perceptions of reliable cues increased whereas perceptions of unreliable cues 
decreased.  Given that the direction of perceptions of unreliable cues were consistent for advice 
and no advice, the findings for perceptions of unreliable cues need to be interpreted with care.   
In sum, the findings indicate that the shifts in perceptions observed from baseline where 
each participant acted as their own control may be due to the type of advice received, differences 
in baselines, or both.  Similarly, the findings suggest that an inherent degree of change in 
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perceptions occur as a consequence of no instructions.  Needless to say, that the effect of advice 
(as evidenced by improvements in opinion from baseline) do not tell the whole story.  The 
subsequent section focuses on the findings pertaining to the effect of instructions compared to no 
instructions, controlling for potential confounding questionnaire retest effects that may have, 
unwittingly, impacted the findings outlined above. 
7.1.2 Assessing Differences Between Advice and No Advice: Analyses between-groups. 
Beyond the replication, the addition of a dedicated control group not only advanced the 
research design of this thesis but, allowed for alternative between-group comparisons.  The 
following section discusses the findings of the between-group analyses relative to the hypotheses, 
comparing jurors’ perceptions between those who received instructions and those who did not. 
Hypothesis 1 Continued: Jurors’ perceptions of reliable cues of deception will improve with advice 
When the control was included in the analyses (i.e. mediating for any effects such as 
repetition), the effect of advice held:  perceptions of reliable deception indicia appeared to be 
influenced by advice. Jurors’ perceptions of reliable indicia benefited from advice when it was 
presented by an expert witness and when advice was presented by an expert/judge collectively.  
The impact of written and oral judicial instructions had no effect on shifting perceptions when 
compared to those who received no instruction.  Analysing the effectiveness of advice type revealed 
that neither the expert nor expert/judge was any more or less successful than the other in enhancing 
perceptions of reliable cues with both types of advice attaining large effects (expert witness: d = 
1.02; expert/judge d = .89).   
The findings for jurors’ perceptions of reliable cues are consistent with those found in the 
within-group analyses noted above because, the pattern of mean scores for perceptions diverged 
from the control.  The improvement in opinions of reliable cues following advice can be interpreted 
with some promise because not only does the pattern of results follow the directions predicted ((and 
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as previously demonstrated by Coyle and Thomson, (2014)), but they are contrariwise to the 
control.  Despite these encouraging findings, the variability in baselines between advice types 
cannot be underestimated.  It remains unclear to what extent the differing starting points impeded 
the effect of advice on influencing opinion. 
Hypothesis 2 Continued:  Jurors’ perceptions of unreliable cues of deception will improve with 
advice 
When the effect of instructions was compared to no instruction, shifts in jurors’ perceptions 
of unreliable cues moderated.  Only one type of advice improved opinion of reliable indicia and 
that was when evidence was adduced thought expert testimony.  The effect the expert witness in 
shifting jurors’ opinion regarding reliable cues remained large (d = .96).   
The correction to false beliefs achieved via written judicial directions found in the within-
group analysis dissipated when the effect of written instructions was compared to no instruction.  
Although the pattern of results suggests an improvement in misconceptions (i.e. a mean decrease), 
the difference effected by written instructions was not big enough from the effect of no advice 
alone (mean difference = .09).  The same can be said for the pattern of improvement in false beliefs 
demonstrated with instructions by expert/judge (mean difference = .08).  Accordingly, these 
findings indicate that when the effects of advice are isolated from possible re-test effects, the 
improvements in perceptions of unreliable cues tends to dissipate when judicial instructions are 
provided in writing. 
Differences in opinion between cue-types achieved with instruction compared to no advice 
revealed a slightly different picture.  The effect of instructions in dispersing opinion between 
reliable and unreliable cues was maintained for expert evidence and expert/judge combined as 
found in the within-group comparisons.  Only differences in perceptions between reliable and 
unreliable cues contracted when the effect of written instructions were compared with no 
instructions.  The effects of advice by expert evidence and expert/judicial direction on separating 
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opinion were large (d = 1.02 and 1.10, respectively) with both types of advice influencing 
perceptions equally.  Given that the two types of advice involve the evidence of an expert, one 
could argue that there are no foreseeable advantages of instructing jurors by both types of advice 
over that of the expert alone.  
Summary of Between-Group Findings 
The present study provides preliminary indications that jurors might benefit from 
instructions on diagnostics of deception over no instruction.  The effect of expert evidence was 
upheld when the influence of advice was compared to no advice, with jurors’ perceptions of reliable 
indicia enhanced, and misconceptions corrected.  The only other type of advice that successfully 
enhanced perceptions of reliable cues was when the evidence of an expert was combined with a 
judge’s direction.  Aside from the expert, no other type of advice corrected jurors’ misconceptions 
of indicia of deception following immediate advice.    
A broader effect of advice was highlighted when differences in opinion between cue-types 
were compared.  The findings revealed that although advice by expert/judge did not modify 
perceptions of unreliable cues, the instruction influenced jurors’ opinion of reliable cues so much 
so that it was significant enough to spilt opinion with jurors perceiving reliable cues to be 
significantly more important than unreliable cues when determining the truthfulness/deception of 
a witness.  Given that the advice of the expert was effective in improving perceptions of both 
reliable and unreliable cues, the impact of the instruction resulted in jurors perceiving reliable cues 
to be significantly more indicative of deception and unreliable cues to be significantly less 
indicative of deception.  This was confirmed by the significant split in opinion found between type 
of cue.  
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7.1.3 Overall Conclusions 
The Effect of No Instruction on Perceptions of Deception 
The variability found within the control saw decreases in cues perceived indicative of 
deception (i.e. reliable cues) and decreases in cues perceived not indicative of deception (i.e. 
unreliable cues).  The shift in opinions was consistent for both types of cues indicating that reliable 
and unreliable indicia were considered equal by jurors not exposed to advice. 
The similar mean decreases across cue-type indicate an inherent level of variability in 
response from time one to time two:  the mere function of re-administering the questionnaire 
appears to have influenced opinions.  It is suggested that the degree of variability reflects 
participants’ inability to accurately remember the ratings of all 31 cues from a possible six-point 
scale (6 x 31 = 186 possible responses) rather than a true change in perceptions.  That said, the 
differences found within reliable and unreliable ratings indicates a standard level of variability 
inherent in completing the questionnaire and/ or participating in the study that cannot be 
discounted. 
The degree of change observed within the controls suggests that, at least for unreliable cues, 
caution is warranted when interpreting what type of advice successfully corrected misconceptions.  
That is, misconceptions appear to be corrected by a small degree on their own, over time.  
Therefore, to determine which type(s) of advice impacted misconceptions, it is necessary to 
consider shifts in opinion with respect to no advice.  To not do so may result in mistaken attributions 
of success.  By example, although opinions of unreliable cues decreased following written 
instructions and marginally following the advice of expert/judge combined, the reductions were no 
greater (statistically) than was found for jurors who received no advice. 
Taken together, the consistent mean decreases in perceptions of reliable cues and unreliable 
cues indicates that a retest effect was most likely.  It is possible that at time two, participants either 
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doubted themselves or could not remember their responses.  It is noted that the changes in mean 
scores for the control were small and while statistically significant the “significance” in real terms 
may be limited.  The order of differences observed were in terms of hundredths, with degrees of 
change down to two decimal places.  Nonetheless, the omission of a placebo within the control 
such as an intervening task cannot be overlooked as it may have inadvertently effected the outcome 
of the results.  Future research would be well placed to test an equivalent control to see what impact, 
if any, it has on the directionality of opinion when no advice is given. 
The Effect of Instruction on Perceptions of Deception 
 Jurors’ perceptions of nonverbal cues of deception appear to be enhanced with advice.  
Instructions appear effective in shifting perceptions regarding both reliable and unreliable indicia.  
This was established when shifts were measured from baseline (within-group), as well as when 
opinions were compared with those who received advice and those who did not (between-group).  
Notwithstanding these findings, as noted previously, the variability in pre-existing perceptions 
across conditions require that the differences found with advice be interpreted with caution. 
Only one type of instruction consistently benefited jurors and that was the testimony of the 
expert witness.  Improvements were gained with expert evidence across reliable cues perceived 
indicative of deception as well as corrections made to misconceptions regarding cues non-
diagnostic of deception.  Aside from the expert witness that successfully influenced jurors’ 
opinions of both reliable and unreliable cues, perceptions of reliable cues (on their own) were also 
enhanced when advice was presented via expert/judge and this carried across both analyses (within 
and between-group).  The effect of the two sources of advice were maintained because the pattern 
of results diverged from the control.  
When shifts from baseline were assessed, written judicial instructions were successful in 
correcting mock jurors’ misconceptions regarding non-diagnostic cues.  However, when the effect 
of the instruction was isolated from any potential confounding retest effects, the influence that the 
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written instruction had on improving opinions dissipated.  This may be attributed to the pattern 
found for the control that demonstrated a consistent decreasing trend with that of written 
instructions (i.e. they both decreased from time one to time two), and expert/judge combined. 
The control group of no advice demonstrated a decreasing trend on both reliable cues and 
unreliable cues from time one (Q1) to time two (Q2).  For reliable cues, the overall pattern observed 
across the levels of advice opposed the direction of the control.  However, for unreliable cues the 
pattern was consistent with the direction of the control indicating that the findings for unreliable 
cues needs to be interpreted with caution when comparing shifts from baseline for unreliable cues. 
Although large effects were found (expert witness d =1.02; expert/judge d = .89) both were 
equally effective in promoting opinions of reliable cues.  However, the advantage of the expert 
witness was with respect to its broader application in enhancing not only reliable opinions, but also 
in correcting false opinions of unreliable diagnostics of deception.   
When jurors’ opinions between types of cue were compared, the findings revealed that 
looking at the effect of instructions on reliable and unreliable cues irrespective of one another may 
oversimplify the effect of advice in successfully separating opinion between reliable and unreliable 
cues.  The findings suggest that while some types of advice (expert/judge) might only effect change 
on one cue-type, the effect is big enough to split opinion in a desired direction with reliable cues 
perceived to be significantly more important in detecting deception even when false cues remain 
stable.   
Regarding the replication, the impact of the expert witness on shifting opinions regarding 
reliable indicia was consistent with what Coyle and Thomson (2014) found.  However, the non-
effect observed for written judicial directions differed.  Possible explanations include:  differences 
in methodology (i.e. online study versus in situ experiment) that may account for the discrepancies 
in findings.  Furthermore, the written direction may have lacked perceived credibility and/ or 
authority in the current research compared to the original study because it was not considered by 
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participants in a moot court setting.  While the written direction did impact perceptions of unreliable 
cues it is possible that the effect would have been bigger if it had been conducted in a moot court.  
Hence, the importance of context regarding the power of the social interaction and formal setting 
cannot be discounted when it comes to interpreting the effect, or lack thereof for written judicial 
directions. 
In light of the control, the following observations are made.  First, that the simple effect of 
question repetition cannot be overlooked as the influence of advice by written directions diminished 
when this was controlled for.  So, although written instructions shifted opinions of unreliable cues 
from baseline these shifts did not hold when the effect of advice was isolated from any effects 
associated with repeating the survey.  To the contrary, what can be said is that expert witness 
replicated and that it held when retest effects were controlled for.  However, the same cannot be 
said for the effect of advice by written directions: the current study suggests that the results found 
for written directions in the Coyle and Thomson study should be interpreted with caution.  What 
remains unknown is whether or not the shifts in perception found in the previous research were due 
to type of advice, the design of the questionnaire, both, or some other extraneous variable(s) such 
as cribbing. 
Given the negligible effect that oral directions had on shifting perceptions, it is probable 
that the improvement achieved with advice by expert/judge was largely contributed by the effect 
of the expert testimony alone.  Some possible influencing factors include: 
1) The presentation order of instructions where the testimony of the expert witness was 
delivered first followed by the judicial direction.  It is possible that finishing the instruction 
with the less effective judicial direction had a weakening effect and may have contributed 
to a recency effect.  While the combined expert/judge instruction was significant, it is 
possible that the smaller mean increase observed for expert/judge was a consequence of 
jurors finishing with judicial direction.  Further, although perceptions significantly 
INSTRUCTING JURORS ON NONVERBAL CUES OF DECEPTION  
   
108 
improved with advice by expert/judge, the smaller standard deviation indicates less 
variability in responses post-advice suggesting that either less jurors changed their opinions 
or shifts in opinion were more consistent when advice was presented by expert/judge than 
expert alone.  Further research would be valuable to investigate whether the order of 
presentation had any bearing on the efficacy of instruction when more than one type of 
advice was considered.   
2) The duration of the instruction given by the expert in the combined expert/judge condition 
may have impacted the results.  That is, the evidence adduced by the expert was longer than 
the instruction delivered by the judge.  In fact, the instruction given by the expert was 10 
times longer than that of the judge and so it would be reasonable to suspect that it carried 
more weight than the judicial direction. 
3) The credentials of the expert witness may have had influence over that of the judge.  It is 
possible that the expert had higher face validity (and therefore ecological validity), given 
that they were a real expert.  Conversely, the judge was not an appointed member of the 
judiciary but rather was portrayed by a person known to the researcher.  Consequently, 
jurors may have been swayed by the valid credentials of the expert who was presented first 
(i.e. a primacy effect), enhancing the overall credibility of the combined condition more so 
than when judicial advice was presented on its own.   
4) The findings for expert/judge combined compared to judicial direction alone may indicate 
that the presentation of two independent forms of advice had a repetition effect (Bertelson, 
1963; Kovera et al., 1997; Smith, 1968).  The mechanisms of frequency (i.e. advice was 
duplicated) and exposure duration (i.e. the length of combined advice was longer than that 
of others; Hintzman, 1976), may provide some explanation as to why the effect of 
combined advice was greater than found for judicial directions.  Furthermore, the repetition 
and similarity of material presented in the combined expert/judge condition is consistent 
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with the property of proportionality (Hintzman, Curran & Oppy, 1992), and may have had 
the unintended consequence of strengthening short-term memory retention and recall.  
For the within-group analyses it is likely that change in perceptions of unreliable cues found 
for judicial instructions (oral and written) was a consequence of retest effects rather than advice 
alone.  This conclusion is substantiated by the fact that the oral and written instructions were 
identical in content, only the presentation modalities differed. So, unless reading the transcript was 
more advantageous than hearing a direction (i.e. quick readers could re-read and rehearse the 
material), the differences are unlikely to be due to the content of the advice.  More so, if the 
modality of written advice was superior to oral instructions one might expect opinions of reliable 
cues to have differed between oral and written instructions as did perceptions of unreliable cues 
but, they did not; they were consistent and neither improved with advice. 
The provision of judicial instructions, whether verbal or in writing, has been extensively 
debated.  The lack of effect found for judicial directions (written and oral) is consistent with extant 
research that concludes jurors’ comprehension of traditional judicial instructions are typically poor 
(Blankenship et al., 1997; Baguley, et.al., 2017; English & Sales, 1997; Luginbuhl, 1992; Ogloff, 
et al., 2011; Ogloff & Rose, 2005; Rose & Ogloff, 2001; Severance & Loftus, 1982; Spivak, et al., 
2018).  That said, the judicial directions tested herein were not formulated as traditional 
instructions.  Rather, they were evidentiary-based directives underpinned by psychological 
research (Ribbers & Henneberg, 2018), and had been simplified with scientific and legal jargon 
removed (Bagley et al., 2017).  Nevertheless, the effectiveness of evidentiary-based instructions 
reported in similarly conceptualised studies remains mixed.  Research that has explored the efficacy 
of evidentiary-based instructions on correcting jurors misconceptions regarding child sexual assault 
(Goodman-Delahunty et al. 2011) and warning jurors as to the limitations associated with some 
forensic sciences (Ribbers & Henneberg, 2018) have demonstrated positive effects for judicial 
instructions.  However other studies that have investigated the benefit of providing judicial aids 
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(such as visual props, the use of mnemonics and written instructions) and providing directions that 
are tailed to the facts of a case have been ineffective in educating and assist juror-decision making 
(Bagley et al., 2017; Jones et al., 2017).   
Similarly, discrepancies in the effect of written instructions have been found.  The 
ineffectiveness of written directions compared to no instruction found herein is in keeping with the 
results of Baguley and colleagues (2017) who found written instructions were of little assistance to 
triers of fact with the applicability of instructions undermined by low comprehension.  Conversely, 
Thomas (2010) found written directions were twice as effective as oral directions in shaping juror-
decision making.  However, Thomas’ (2010) finding may be explained by having presented jurors 
with a written transcript along with an oral direction.  The combined effect of an oral and written 
directions was not part of the current design and would need to be investigated to establish whether 
the same effects could be achieved when judicial directions are duplicated. 
Notwithstanding these observations, before the effect of judicial directions are discounted 
altogether, a simpler explanation for the lack of effect ought to be contemplated.  The judicial 
directions as an intervention may have been too short not giving jurors enough time to 1) absorb 
the material and/or 2) to have an impact on beliefs. That is, that the duration of the intervention 
was comparatively short.  In the oral condition the intervention lasted one minute and fifty-one 
seconds compared to the expert witness’s evidence that went for ten minutes and fifty-three 
seconds, and the combined expert/judge condition that took twelve minutes and forty-four seconds.  
In the written condition, a period of three minutes was allowed to read the brief instruction.  
Accordingly, the short duration of the intervention (both written and oral) presented by the judge 
may not have afforded participants enough time to focus on and attend to the information presented 
thereby inhibiting the overall effect of judicial direction.   
Additionally, for the oral direction, although the judicial officer was robed in formal legal 
regalia consistent with that of a Supreme Court Justice it was not delivered by an official judge and 
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may as a consequence lacked credibility, undermining the effectives of and weight attributed to the 
instruction on the whole.  Equally, the written instruction had little context.  Participants read the 
transcript in an informal setting (i.e. home) with no situational reference to the seriousness, 
importance or authority that would ordinarily accompany such a direction that might, at least, have 
been achieved in a moot court.  Additionally, for the written direction there was no memorable 
reference point or anchor that may have helped prompt recall. 
7.2 What Combination of Nonverbal Cues do Jurors Considered Most Important? 
Based on the findings herein, a handful of cues dominated juror opinion as to which cues 
were ranked important in detecting deception.  After exposure to advice, a small number of 
misconceptions prevailed with jurors maintaining that ‘confidence’ and ‘responses that contain a 
lot of detail’ were the two most important cues diagnostic of deception.  Seemingly, this finding 
implies support for Dangerous Decision Theory (Porter & Brinke, 2009), in that some 
misconceptions about deceptive behaviour are so entrenched (i.e. confidence and responses that 
contain a lot of detail) that they don’t change despite receiving evidence to the contrary.  However, 
post-hoc content analysis revealed that the two cues ranked most important by mock jurors – 
confidence and responses that lack a lot of detail – were not in fact referred to the advice proffered.  
Consequently, if jurors did not hear evidence to discredit the unreliable cues then it cannot, as a 
matter of logic, be expected that the misconceptions be corrected with advice.  Moreover, for cues 
apportioned such importance, it would be counterintuitive to expect jurors’ opinions to change 
without evidence to the contrary.  As such, the impact of advice on these two cues cannot be 
determined.   
As such, to conclude that misconceptions remain well-entrenched somewhat distorts the 
picture.  Although unreliable cues remain ranked among the most important by jurors, it is less 
misleading to look at the percentage changes to see if advice directly impacted those cues attended 
to.  The results appear promising.    By way of example, all sources of advice made specific 
INSTRUCTING JURORS ON NONVERBAL CUES OF DECEPTION  
   
112 
reference to the following indicia being indicative of lying: high-pitched voice; body movements; 
responses containing fewer details; and pauses.  Notably, each one of these cues directly correlated 
with the largest percentage increases in importance following advice: high-pitched voice increased 
450%; body movements and responses containing fewer details both increased 300%; and pauses 
increased 150%.  This outcome reflects an observable relationship between the cues specified in 
the advice given and those cues that increase in importance with advice.  At the individual level, 
these findings suggest that advice can effect considerable change on reliable cues.  Although 
impressive, reliable interpretation of cues such as high pitch and body movements requires some 
baseline knowledge of the individual.  Baseline knowledge is beneficial so that deviations from 
typical behaviours can be assessed against those exhibited when lying in order for reliable 
deductions to be made as to the credibility of a witness. The eventuality that the witness will be 
known to a member of the jury, let alone the entire jury pool, is unlikely to transpire.  Consequently, 
the value in improving jurors’ knowledge base of cues such as these is of little practical import.   
Improvements in juror opinion at the individual factor level can be directly linked to those 
specified by advice.  Then, advice that concentrates attention on the combinations of cues perceived 
by jurors as most important may have a greater effect in shifting juror opinion than advice that is 
less specific and does not target the handful of cues identified by jurors.  The combination of cues 
that remain stable over time as well as those that shifted with direct evidence present wider 
implications for the effect of advice in general.  A potential consequence of evaluating indicia not 
cited in advice given to jurors is that the collective analysis of behavioural indicia may have, 
unwittingly, diluted the overall effect of advice.   
7.3 Does Advice Influence Juror Confidence in Detecting Deception? 
Exploratory analyses demonstrated that perceived confidence in detecting deception was 
not influenced by advice and that source of advice appeared irrelevant.  This finding indicates that 
while advice may influence jurors’ opinions of reliable and unreliable diagnostics, these 
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enhancements do not inflate or degrade one’s confidence.  This finding indicates that confidence 
in detecting deception may not be associated with receipt of advice and/or shifts in opinion.   
Nonetheless, it is recognised that no context was provided in which jurors could apply or 
solidify the advice received, and this lack of opportunity to contextualise the knowledge acquired 
may have inadvertently moderated confidence.  It may be that jurors’ confidence remained stable 
because the opportunity to apply the information received was not tested.  However, because a 
control for confidence was not obtained, it cannot be determined whether or not advice, or lack of 
context, moderated confidence.  That is, it remains unknown whether perceived confidence would 
have significantly differed between jurors who received no instruction.  It would be of interest to 
examine a control for juror confidence against the impact of expert testimony to better 
confirm/disconfirm whether a relationship exists between the provision of advice and confidence 
in detecting deception.   
Based on DePaulo and colleagues (1997) “overconfidence effect” that concludes increased 
confidence is a poor predictor of accuracy in detecting deception, the indication that advice may 
not impact confidence might offer some reassurance.  If increased knowledge as to behavioural 
indicators of deception is not associated with increased confidence, then, according to the 
“overconfidence” principle (DePaulo et al., 1997), jurors’ accuracy in detecting deception should 
not be compromised.  Rather, increased knowledge as to cues indicative of deception with tempered 
confidence may countervail with increases in accuracy achieved.  That said, the relationship 
between confidence and detecting deception asserted by DePaulo and colleagues (1997), and that 
has been widely accepted for decades, may well be outmoded.  Emerging research by Smith & 
Leach (in press) purports that confidence can reliably discriminate between accurate and inaccurate 
assessments of deception.  Smith and Leach (in press) argue, unequivocally, that in line with Signal 
Detections Theory confidence and accuracy are positively related.  They conclude that assessments 
of truthfulness/deception are more accurate, more often, when decisions are high in confidence 
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compared to decisions low in confidence.  While accuracy was not examined in this thesis, should 
the emerging evidence declared by Smith and Leach (in press) hold, the ability for advice to 
enhance knowledge while also improving confidence may be advantageous other than just 
enhancing perceptions alone.  However, as it stands, the impact of expert and/or judicial advice on 
accuracy in detecting deception remains unknown and the interaction of advice and confidence 
found herein is no more than preliminary and cannot be generalised without replication.  As such, 
these relationships would be worthy of future investigation.  
7.4 Chapter Summary  
The current study evidenced partial support for the effect of advice on influencing juror 
perceptions of indicators of deception.  The enhancements gained with instructions suggest that it 
may be possible to change initial perceptions of trustworthiness/deception with advice.  Although 
the current study partially replicated the two conditions of advice investigated by Coyle and 
Thomson (2014) (expert witness replicated but written judicial direction did not), a consistent 
pattern to Coyle and Thomson (2014) was observed along with the addition of advice by 
expert/judge. 
Beyond the replication, the current study demonstrated strong evidence for the need to 
incorporate an independent control with the influence of advice varying when the effect of 
instruction was controlled for.  What is more, the current research revealed that jurors’ false beliefs 
of which nonverbal cues are indicative of deception may be corrected with advice. Important 
findings included uncovering that jurors appear to perceive reliable and unreliable cues to be 
equally indicative of deception prior to advice.  With instructions, opinions significantly departed 
with reliable indicia perceived more indicative of deception than unreliable indicia.  Moreover, 
when the effect of advice was compared with no instruction, only the testimony of the expert 
witness consistently improved jurors’ opinion of reliable cues while also correcting for false beliefs 
of nonverbal cues of deception.  
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Exploratory analyses revealed that jurors afforded more weight to some cues than others.  
Although juror opinion maintained that a handful of unreliable cues were important in detecting 
deception following advice, these cues were not stipulated in the advice given.  To the contrary, 
the reliable cues that were specified by advice, demonstrated marked increases which were not 
found on those unreliable cues initially preferenced.  The shifts in perception observed with advice 
suggests, albeit preliminarily, some evidence counter to the theory of Dangerous Decisions (Porter 
& ten Brinke, 2009) providing some encouragement that jurors may benefit from expert and/or 
judicial advice that targets the constellation of cues considered most important when detecting 
deception.  Should expert evidence or judicial directives focus on these combinations of cues, then 
the return on investment may be greater. 
Notwithstanding replication of these broader findings, the current study provides some 
preliminary empirical support for the potential benefit of adducing expert testimony to furnish 
jurors’ knowledge on diagnostics of deception so as to better equip their decision making when 
assessing witness credibility.  Before triers of fact are directed to consider demeanour evidence, 
the current findings suggest that perceptions of reliable and unreliable indicia are weighted equally.  
However, preliminary evidence demonstrated herein indicates that when jurors are invited to 
consider nonverbal indicators of deception to assess the credibility of a witness, the absence of 
instructions that sensitise jurors to the limitations of nonverbal indicia may have negative, 
unintended consequences.  Notwithstanding the need for replication, the evidence herein suggests 
that omitting or denying expert advice on detecting deception does not safeguard juror-decision 
making but rather may contribute to hazardous, erroneous decision-making. 
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Chapter 8. Study Two 
8.1 Introduction 
8.1.1 Delayed Presentation of Evidence: Only a matter of time? 
Given the contingencies of a trial, it is not uncommon for members of a jury to consider 
evidence adduced by an expert at a later stage in proceedings, requiring that triers of fact retain the 
testimony proffered. This aspect introduces decay and interference effects which can undermine 
the retention of information (Anderson, 1990; Sternberg, 2003), although these have not been 
investigated in this context. However, the broader issue of delay has been raised with respect to 
training in detecting deception. A common shortfall cited in deception research is that the lasting 
impact of education on gains in knowledge or skill acquisition in detecting deception remains 
unknown (Blanch-Hartigan, Andrzejewski, & Hill, 2012; Frank & Feeley, 2003; Hauch et al., 2016; 
Levine et al., 2005; Shaw, Porter & ten Brinke, 2013). 
Although short-term effects can be demonstrated (as evidenced in Study one), the question 
remains whether or not observed improvements are short-lived or persist over time (Blanch-
Hartigan et al., 2012; Levine, 2018). To verify that knowledge gains are genuine (i.e. post-test 
exceed those at pre-test), Frank and Feeley (2003) suggest that trained recipients should outperform 
a control group as well as their own baseline performance at a week, a month, or one year later 
(also see, Levine et al., 2005). Similarly, Hauch and her colleagues (2016) suggest that post-test 
follow-ups should investigate different delay intervals to measure training effects over time. 
Indeed, they recommend multiple exposure sessions for professionals such as “judges to ensure 
that the training content will be retained and refreshed” (p. 35). Without such comparison it cannot 
be concluded that the efficacy of education on deception indicia is maintained over time, or that 
newly developed skills in detecting deception translate into practice (Shaw et al., 2013). 
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Research on forensic investigative interviewing has reported similar issue with the long-
term impact of training on behaviour change. Powell (2002) notes that despite the provision of 
guidelines and intensive training programs on how to conduct effective investigative interviews, 
the long-term impacts on how interviews are carried out are negligible. Powell (2002) offers the 
conclusion that “while training programs may be effective in teaching interviewers what they 
should do when interviewing, the knowledge trainers acquire is having little impact on their 
practice” (p. 47). 
In addition to the effects of decay and interference, perceptions about deceptive behaviour 
may undermine the persistence of education on indicia of deception over time. Frank and Feely 
(2003) advise “stereotypes about deceptive behaviour may be so strong that they re-emerge with 
little provocation” (p.67). This proposition mirrors that of DDT that predicts jurors’ initial 
impressions of trustworthiness are so long lasting that they are unlikely to change over time or in 
the face of conflicting evidence (Porter & ten Brinke, 2009).  
In light of the findings from the replication of Coyle and Thomson’s (2014) findings (Study 
1), advice on behavioural indicia may positively influence what triers of fact consider when judging 
the truthfulness/deception of a witness.  However, the long-term effect of advising jurors about 
reliable/unreliable nonverbal indicia of deception remains unclear. The interval between the 
testimony of an expert and/or judicial direction and when jurors apply that evidence (e.g. 
determining the credibility of a witness,) may be a critical factor as to what influence that advice 
has on enhancing perceptions. Both the effluxion of time and subsequent events have the potential 
to undermine the retention and retrieval of jurors’ memory of the expert’s testimony or judge’s 
direction. However, the effect of delay between the testimony of the expert and jurors’ evaluation 
of that evidence is unknown. Simply put, the extent to which the provision of evidence improves 
the behavioural factors relied upon by jurors, over time, has not been previously investigated.  This 
knowledge gap is the focus of Study two.  
INSTRUCTING JURORS ON NONVERBAL CUES OF DECEPTION  
   
118 
Chapter 9. Aims and Hypotheses 
The second study seeks to investigate the effect of a delay between the presentation of advice 
and jurors’ consideration of that advice on perceptions of reliable and unreliable indicators of deception.  
This delayed consideration of advice could be expected to occur in a trial where earlier evidence 
presented by an expert and/or judge has to be relied upon later by jurors and applied to other 
evidence (i.e. determining the credibility of a factual or opinion witness). 
9.1 Aim 
Based on the findings from the Study one, Study two aims to provide a novel expansion to 
the research by exploring the influence of time on deception indicia considered important by jurors 
when determining the truthfulness/deception of a witness in court.  As such Study two aims to: 
1) Investigate whether the effect of expert evidence and/or judicial direction on improving 
jurors’ perceptions persist over time. 
9.2 Hypothesis 
Study two examines one directional hypothesis.  It is predicted that: 
2) The delayed consideration of advice will not improve jurors’ perceptions of nonverbal 
cues of deception.  To test this hypothesis no change on the reliable and unreliable 
subscales are predicted from pre-delay (Q1) to post-delay (Q2). 
Exploratory analyses will also examine the modality of presentation between written and 
verbal judicial directions and will investigate whether or not juror perceived confidence is 
influenced by advice following a one-week delay.  As in Study one, no a-priori prediction is made 
for the effect of delayed advice on juror perceived confidence.   
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Chapter 10. Results 
Study two investigated whether the delayed consideration of advice impacted cues of 
deception considered important by mock jurors in determining the truthfulness/deception of a 
witness in court. To answer this, within-in group (Wilcoxon tests) and between-group (Mann-
Whitney tests) analyses were conducted to establish whether changes in means scores of 
perceptions of cue-type held: (1) over time when advice was considered after a delay, and (2) 
whether changes in perceptions of cue-type differed between those exposed to advice with a delay 
from those exposed to delay without advice (control).  
As in Study one, reliable and unreliable cues are reported independently with each 
condition of advice outlined separately to establish whether type of advice is relevant in shifting 
perceptions over time.  The analyses of the within-group comparisons are reported first followed 
by the between-group comparisons.  The results conclude with the exploratory analyses that 
examined what combination of indicia mock jurors perceived most important in detecting 
deception, and whether or not advice influenced juror perceived confidence with the passage of 
time. 
Normality:  Assumption testing including skewness and kurtosis scores, Shapiro-Wilks 
tests, and inspection of histograms indicated that the distribution of mean perceptions scores were 
non-normal (Field, 2013; Hubbard, 1978; Sprent & Smeeton, 1989; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  
Visual inspection of boxplots revealed outliers at all levels of advice.  Extreme cases, determined 
by the IQR x 1.5 rule, were removed from analysis.  A total of 12 extreme values were excluded 
from the reliable subscale (expert witness n = 5; written direction n = 1 , oral direction  cues n = 3, 
expert/judge n = 1 and control n = 2).  For the unreliable subscale, nine extreme cases were removed 
(expert witness n = 1; written direction n = 1, oral direction n = 3, expert/judge n = 2 and control n 
= 2).  Consequently the cell counts for advice differ between cue-type. 
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Internal Consistency:  Using Cronbach’s (1951) Alpha, the internal consistency of the 
reliable scale was good (12 items, α = .80) and the internal consistency of the unreliable scale 
excellent (19 items, α = .91).  
10.1 Does Advice Impact Jurors’ Perceptions of Cues When Delay is a Factor?  Assessing 
Shifts from Baseline: Analyses within-groups. 
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests were undertaken to establish whether the mean score of 
importance for reliable and unreliable cues of deception diverged after delayed consideration of 
advice.  Four types of advice were examined: expert witness; written judicial direction; oral judicial 
direction; and expert/judge combined.  The mean scores of importance for reliable cues are reported 
followed by unreliable cues with each condition of advice described separately. Directional 
differences were predicted, and so one-tailed tests were adopted.   
10.1.1 Reliable Deception Cues 
Expert witness: The mean score of summed items indicative of deception on Q1 was M = 
3.46 and on Q2 was M = 3.69.  A Wilcoxon test demonstrates that the mean increase (M difference 
= .22) on reliable cues was statistically significant after seven days when advice was presented by 
expert witness, z = 2.45, p = .01, d = .90, one-tailed.     
Judicial written direction:  The mean of summed items for reliable cues on Q1 was M = 
3.21 and on Q2 was M = 3.29.  The shift in reliable cues (M difference = .08) after a one week 
delay for advice presented by written judicial direction was non-significant, z = .78, p = .22, d = 
.16, one-tailed.    
Judicial oral direction:  The mean score for reliable cues was M = 3.28 on Q1 and M = 
3.30 on Q2 respectively.  The shift on reliable cues (M difference = .02) following delayed advice 
by way of oral judicial direction was non-significant, z = .10, p = .46, d = .05, one-tailed.   
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Expert and judge combined:  The mean importance of reliable cues was M = 3.45 on Q1 
and M = 3.47 on Q2.  The mean difference increase from baseline (M difference = .02), when mock 
jurors considered expert/judge advice one week delayed was non- significant, z = .39, p = .34, d = 
.03, one-tailed.   
No advice:  The control for delay without advice reveals that the mean importance of 
reliable cues was M = 3.44 on Q1 and M = 3.61 on Q2, representing a non-significant mean increase 
from baseline (M difference = .17), z = 1.36, p = .09, d = .46, one-tailed. 
Baseline comparisons were undertaken to determine whether perceptions of reliable cues 
differed between levels of advice prior to instructions.  A Kruskal-Wallis independent samples test 
reports that baseline perceptions of reliable cues did not differ significantly between groups prior 
to advice,  𝜒2 (4) = 3.11 p = .54 (two-tailed), with a mean rank of reliable cues of 49.58 for expert 
witness, 46.30 for written direction, 52.15 for oral direction, 58.68 for expert/judge and 59.61 for 
no advice.  
The pattern of mean scores for each level of advice is illustrated in Figure 10 where Q1 
reflects mock jurors’ baseline score and Q2 represents mock jurors’ score after a one-week delay.  
The statistical parameters (e.g. cell size, means, mean differences, p values and effect sizes) are 
displayed in Table 7 for each condition of advice and can be found after the following section, 
Unreliable Deception Cues, 10.1.2. 
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Figure 10.  Mean Scores for the Reliable Subscale by Source of Advice at Baseline (Q1) and After a One-Week Delay (Q2) 
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10.1.2 Unreliable Deception Cues 
Perceptions of unreliable cues between advice groups did not differ at baseline as 
confirmed by an independent samples Kruskal-Wallis test,  𝜒2  (4) =1.17 p =.88 (two-tailed), with 
a mean rank of unreliable cues of 56.50 for expert witness, 50.67 for written direction, 53.81 for 
oral direction, 54.00 for expert/judge and 60.33 for no advice.    
Expert witness: The mean score rating for unreliable cues was M = 3.35 on Q1 and M = 
3.24 on Q2.  The decrease from baseline (M difference = -.11) was non-significant when expert 
witness advice was considered one-week delayed, z = -.73, p = .24, d = .19, one-tailed.   
Written judicial direction:   The mean score of importance for unreliable cues on Q1 and 
Q2 was M = 3.11 and M = 3.13 respectively.  The increase on unreliable cues from baseline (M 
difference = .02) was non-significant for delayed consideration of written judicial advice, z = .30, 
p = .38, d = .04, one-tailed.   
Oral judicial direction:  On Q1 and Q2 the mean score of importance for unreliable cues 
was M = 3.14 and M = 3.10 respectively.  The decrease in importance after delay when advice was 
presented as an oral direction (M difference = -.04; SE = 39.33) was non-significant, z = -.46, p = 
.32, d = .08, one-tailed.   
Expert and judge combined: The unreliable cue mean score on Q1 was M = 3.20 and M = 
3.07 on Q2.  The decrease in importance after delay for combined expert and judicial advice (M 
difference = -.13) was non-significant, z = -.1.06, p = .14, d = .25, one-tailed.   
No advice:  Unreliable cues on Q1 had a mean of M = 3.26 and a mean of M = 3.42 on Q2.  
The mean increase for unreliable cues (M difference = .17) after a one-week delay was marginally 
significant, z = 1.59, p =.06, d =.44, one-tailed.   
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The two types of instructions that significantly improved perceptions of unreliable cues 
(expert evidence and expert/judge) were compared to establish whether one form of instruction was 
more effective than the other.  The results indicate that both types of advice were equally effective 
in correcting misconceptions of unreliable cues of deception with shifts in opinion achieved 
between expert evidence (M difference = -.11) and expert/judge (-.13) not significantly different 
from one another, u = .00, p = 1.0 d = .04. 
Figure 11 displays the mean scores for unreliable cues across each advice condition before 
and after delay. Q1 represents the baseline assessment and Q2 represents the one-week time to 
assessment delay. The summary statistics arising from the between-group comparisons for 
unreliable cues are reported together with the statistics for reliable cues in Table 7. 
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Figure 11.  Mean Scores for the Unreliable Subscale by Source of Advice at Baseline (Q1) and After a One-Week Delay (Q2). 
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Table 7 
Shifts in Mean Scores of Mock Juror Perceptions From Baseline (Q1) to After a One-Week Delay (Q2) by Cue-Type and Source of Advice  
p calculated using Wilcoxon-matched-pair signed-rank tests (one-tailed); **Significance at .01 
 Reliable Cues Unreliable Cues 
    Q1    Q2      Q1 Q2     
Source of Advice N M M M diff SD p d N M M M diff  SD p d 
Expert Witness 14 3.46 3.69 .22 .27 .01** .90 18 3.35 3.24 -.11 .57 .24 .19 
Judicial Written Direction  30 3.21 3.29 .08 .51 .22 .16 30 3.11 3.13  .02  .55 .38 .04 
Judicial Oral Direction  26 3.28 3.30 .02 .58 .46 .05 26 3.14 3.10 -.04 .53 .32 .08 
Expert & Judicial Direction  17 3.45 3.47 .02 .81 .34 .03 16 3.20 3.07 -.13 .52 .14 .25 
No Advice (control) 18 3.44 3.61 .17 .39 .09 .46 18 3.26 3.42 .17 .37 .06 .44 
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10.1.3 Reliable versus Unreliable Cues When Delay is a Factor 
Baseline differences were compared between reliable and unreliable cues to determine 
whether potential jurors’ perceived one cue-type to be any more or less indicative of deception than 
the other.  Similarly, differences in opinions between cue-type were examined post-advice to 
identify the nature and extent to which cues deviated with advice.  As per Study one, although no 
directional hypothesis were predicted between opinions of reliable and unreliable cues at baseline 
or post-advice, one-tailed tests were employed given the directional nature of the existing 
hypotheses that predicted advice would enhance opinions of deception indicia.   
Expert witness:  Differences in mean scores at baseline (M difference = .08) between 
reliable cues (M = 3.44) and unreliable cues (M = 3.35) were non-significant within the expert 
witness condition, z = 1.47, p = .07, d = .27, one-tailed.  After mock jurors received expert evidence, 
reliable cues (M = 3.64) were rated significantly higher than unreliable cues (M = 3.21; M 
difference = .43), z = 2.27, p = .01, d = .35, one-tailed.   
Written judicial direction:  The mean difference at baseline (M difference = .10) between 
reliable (M = 3.21) and unreliable cues (M = 3.11) was significant for participants assigned to 
written judicial instructions, z = 1.66, p = .05, d = .37, one-tailed.   Following written instructions 
reliable cues (M = 3.29) were rated significantly higher than unreliable cues (M = 3.13; M 
difference = .16), z = 2.71, p = .05, d = .60, one-tailed.   
Oral judicial direction:  Prior to advice, the mean difference (M difference = .14) between 
reliable cues (M = 3.27) and unreliable cues (M = 3.13) was significant for judicial direction, z = -
1.66, p = .05, d = .37, one-tailed.  After advice reliable cues (M = 3.34) remained significantly 
greater than unreliable cues by mock jurors (M = 3.09), z = 3.71, p > .001, d = .95, one-tailed. 
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Expert and judge combined: At baseline, mock jurors rated reliable cues (M = 3.37) higher 
than unreliable cues (M = 3.19), however the mean increase was non-significant: M difference = 
.18, z = .88, p = .19, d = .40, one-tailed.  Post advice, reliable cues were rated significantly higher 
(M = 3.48) than unreliable cues (M = 3.07; M difference = .41), z = 2.07, p = .02, d = .55, one-
tailed.   The pattern for reliable and unreliable cues for mock jurors exposed to a one-week delay 
for each level of advice is illustrated in Figure 12. 
Figure 12.  Mock Juror Perceptions at Baseline (Q1) and After a One-Week Delay (Q2) by Cue-Type 
and Source of Advice. 
No advice:  Comparative analysis reveals that participant’s perceptions of reliable (M = 
3.44) and unreliable cues indicative of deception (M = 3.27) differed significantly at baseline (M 
difference = .18), z = 2.29, p =.01, d = .50, one-tailed.  Despite the one-week delay, the mean 
difference between reliable (M = 3.61) and unreliable cues (M = 3.42) remained constant over time 
(M difference = .19) however the difference post-test was non-significant, z = 1.46 p =.07, d = .45, 
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one-tailed.  The pattern of perceptions of reliable and unreliable cues for mock jurors exposed to 
delay without advice is shown in Figure 13. 
Figure 13. Total Mean Scores for the Reliable and Unreliable Subscales at Baseline (Q1) and After a 
One-Week Delay (Q2) for Mock Jurors Who Received No Advice (Control). 
A summary of the findings for the shifts between opinion of reliable and unreliable indicia 
follow in Table 8. 
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INSTRUCTING JURORS ON NONVERBAL CUES OF DECEPTION  
   
130 
Table 8 
Post-Test Mean Scores of Mock Juror Perceptions of Reliable and Unreliable Cues by Source of Advice 
p calculated using Mann-Whitney two-sample tests; * Significance at .05; **Significance at .01; **Significance at .001.   
Note:  The mean difference (M diff) reflects the difference between the reliable and unreliable subscales post-advice. 
 
         Reliable Cue Unreliable Cue     
Source of Advice N M M  M diff  SD p d 
Expert Witness 13 3.64 3.21 .43 .62 .01** .70 
Judicial Written Direction  30 3.29 3.13 .16 .46 .05* .35 
Judicial Oral Direction  25 3.34 3.09 .25 .27 < .001*** .95 
Expert & Judicial Direction  16 3.48 3.07 .41 .74 .01** .55 
No Advice (control) 18 3.61 3.42 .19 .45 .07 .43 
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10.2 Does Advice Impact Jurors’ Perceptions of Cues When Delay is a Factor?  Assessing 
Differences Between Advice and No Advice: Analyses between-groups. 
Changes in opinion of reliable and unreliable cues after a one-weeks’ delay were compared 
between mock jurors exposed to advice and mock jurors not exposed to advice.  Comparisons with 
the control were conducted to identify any potential effects associated with the passage of time 
other than the impact of advice that could not be discerned from the within-group analyses.  The 
analyses aimed to establish whether or not advice impacted shifts in opinion over and above the 
effect of time alone.  The results for reliable and unreliable cues are reported concurrently and the 
summary statistics for the between-group analyses can be found in Table 9. 
Expert witness: When compared to the control, a Mann-Whitney test reveals that the mean 
difference on reliable cues after a delay did not differ significantly between mock jurors exposed 
to expert advice (M difference = .22) compared to those exposed to a delay but no advice (M 
difference = .17), u = .53, p = .31, d = .15, one-tailed.  The mean change for unreliable cues 
following a delay differed significantly between mock jurors who received expert evidence (M 
difference = -.11) compared to those exposed to delay but who did not receive advice (M difference 
= .16), u = -1.63, p = .05, d = .56, one-tailed.   
Written judicial direction:  A between-group analysis found a non-significant difference 
between reliable cues rated by mock jurors presented with written directions (M difference = .08) 
compared to those who did not: M difference = .17; u = -.71, p = .24, d = .19, one-tailed.  For 
unreliable cues, a Mann-Whitney test also indicates that after a delay, unreliable cues were not 
rated significantly different between mock jurors who considered written instructions (M difference 
.02) from those exposed to delay but no advice (M difference = .16), u = -.85, p = .20, d = .29, one-
tailed.   
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Oral judicial direction:  A Mann-Whitney test confirms that after one-weeks’ delay, the 
mean difference for reliable cues between mock jurors exposed to judicial direction (M difference 
= .02), and those not exposed to advice (M difference = .17) was non-significant, u = -.84, p = .20, 
d = .29, one-tailed.  For unreliable cues, the mean difference between jurors who considered judicial 
directions following a delay (M difference = -.04) from those not exposed to advice was non-
significant: M difference = .16; u = -1.42, p = .08, d = .42, one-tailed.   
Expert and judge combined:  The mean difference for reliable cues between mock jurors 
exposed to delayed consideration of expert/judge advice (M difference = .02) from those exposed 
to delay without advice (M difference = .17) was non-significant, u = -.23, p = .28, d = .24, one-
tailed.  A Mann-Whitney test confirms however, that the mean difference for unreliable cues differs 
significantly between jurors exposed to delayed expert/judge advice (M difference = -.13) from 
those exposed to a delay but no advice: M difference = .16, u = -1.75, p = .04, d = .65, one-tailed.   
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Table 9 
Between-Group Comparisons of Mean Differences in Mock Juror Perceptions by Cue-Type and Source of Advice When Delay is a Factor 
p  calculated using Mann-Whitney two-sample tests (one-tailed); *Significance at .05   
Note: The mean difference (M diff) reflects the change score from pre-to post advice (Q2 - Q1) for the reliable and unreliable subscales and was calculated to run 
between-group comparisons against the control. 
 
Reliable Cues  Unreliable Cues 
Source of Advice N M diff SD p d N M diff SD p d 
Expert Witness 14 .22 .27 .31 .15 18 -.11 .57 .05* .56 
Judicial Written Direction  30 .08 .51 .24 .19 30 .02 .55 .20 .29 
Judicial Oral Direction  26 .02 .58 .20 .29 26 -.04 .53 .08 .42 
Expert & Judicial Direction    17 .02 .81 .28 .24 16 -.13 .52 .04* .65 
Control (no advice) 18 .17 .39 - - - - 18 .16 .37 - - - - 
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10.3 What Combination of Nonverbal Deception Cues are Considered Most Important Over 
Time? 
10.3.1 Top Five Most Important Cues  
Prior to advice, 26 indicators of deception were ranked the most important by mock jurors 
in determining the truthfulness of a witness in court.  The five cues considered most important 
were: confidence (23.7%); spontaneous corrections (15.5%); implausible responses (13.4%), 
responses that contain a lot of detail (12.4%), and responses that lack logical structure (9.3%).  The 
top five cues accounted for 74.2% of all cues ranked number one.  The proportion of reliable and 
unreliable cues that were deemed most important were relatively equal: 38.1% (n =37) and 36.1% 
(n =35) respectively. Figure 14 shows the rank order of all cues at pre- and post-delay. 
After seven days delay, the number of indicators ranked most important by mock jurors 
reduced by eight items from 26 cues (pre-delay) to 18 cues (post delay).  Over time, confidence 
(28.9%), implausible responses (14.4%), responses that contain a lot of detail (14.4%), spontaneous 
corrections (7.2%) and responses that contain very few details (5.2%) were ranked top five– four 
of which were also rated in the top five prior to delayed advice.  Confidence remained the most 
important cue over time where the least important cue – responses that logical structure (4.1%) – 
dropped one rank to 6th most important cue replaced by responses that contain very few details 
(5.2%).  The top five cues accounted for 70.1% (n = 68) of all items rated.  Unreliable cues 
accounted for the largest proportion of cues ranked in the top five (43.3%) compared to reliable 
cues (26.8%) with confidence accounting for the largest share of ratings (28.9%). Although three 
of the five cues ranked most important (implausible responses, spontaneous corrections and 
responses that contain very few details) were reliable cues, the frequency of importance assigned 
to them (and therefore order) fell at the lower end (26.8%; order of rankings: 3, 4 and 5).   
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In terms of percentage change, high pitch voice (300%, n =3), body/hand/finger/leg/foot 
movements (200%, n = 2), and responses that contain very few details (150% n = 3) showed the 
largest increase after consideration of delayed advice (see Figure 15).  All three items were reliable 
cues of deception.  Unreliable cues that increased following delayed advice included self-
manipulators (50%, n = 1), confidence (22%, n = 5), and responses that contain a lot of detail (17%, 
n = 2). 
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Figure 14. Nonverbal Cues Ranked Most Important Before and After Advice When Delay Was a Factor.  The grey dash line delineates the top five 
most important cues.  Presentation order reflects cues ranked most important through least important at baseline. 
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Figure 15.  Percentage Change in Nonverbal Cues Ranked Most Important After Advice When 
Delay Was a Factor.  The percentage change is differentiated for the two measures: reliable cues 
represented in blue and unreliable cues shown in orange.  Items are presented in order of percentage 
change from largest through smallest.
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10.3.2 Most Commonly Preferred Cues 
The cues most commonly endorsed by mock jurors were the same as the top five cues 
ranked most important: confidence (56.7%), responses that contain a lot of detail (50.5%), 
spontaneous corrections (37.1%), responses that lack logical structure (30.9%) and implausible 
responses (29.9%).  Aside from confidence, only the order of preference shifted. 
After delayed consideration of advice, the deception cues most commonly rated were: 
confidence (59.8%), responses that contain a lot of detail (52.6%), spontaneous corrections 
(37.1%), illustrators (37.1%); and implausible responses (35.1%).  When asked to rank cues by 
importance, illustrators fell at the lower end for first and second order preferences (2.1%, n =2; 
4.1%, n = 4).  However, when responses were considered overall, illustrators were rated equal 
third/fourth with spontaneous corrections as a preferred cue in determining truthfulness/deception.  
As a result, responses that lack logical structure dropped to sixth most preferred cue after delayed 
advice despite the proportion of responses remaining the same (30.9%).  Furthermore, the two 
unreliable cues were preferred by more participants after exposure to delayed advice than before. 
While spontaneous corrections remained stable over time, implausible responses increased from 
28.9% at baseline to 37.1% post delay.  Figure 16 charts the cues most commonly endorse before 
and after delayed advice. 
Self-grooming (333%, n = 10), high pitch voice (229%, n = 16), and blinking (117%, n = 
8) revealed the largest percentage increases after delayed advice (see Figure 17).  The largest 
percentage decreases were for ambivalent responses (-38%, n = -6), pauses (-28%, n =-7), speech 
disturbances and covering the mouth (-23%, n = -3, respectively) of which the split between number 
of reliable and unreliable cues was equal. 
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Figure 16.  Most Commonly Endorsed Nonverbal Cues Before and After Advice When Delay Was a Factor.  Cues from left to right are in order of most 
preferred to least preferred from baseline. 
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Figure 17.  Percentage Change in Nonverbal Cues Most Commonly Endorsed After Advice When 
Delay Was a Factor.  The percentage change is delineated for the two measures: reliable cues 
depicted in blue and unreliable cues charted in orange.  Items are presented in order of percentage 
change from largest through smallest.  
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10.4 Does Exposure to Advice Influence Jurors’ Confidence Over Time? 
Perceived confidence in detecting deception was measured at baseline and again over time 
to determine whether delayed consideration of advice influenced jurors’ perceived ability to detect 
deception.  Investigating the effect of delay on advice was exploratory and so no hypotheses were 
formulated.  Shifts from baseline (i.e. within-group) were evaluated because an equivalent control 
was not obtained for confidence. The aim of the current analyses was to determine whether the 
effect of instruction influenced perceived confidence.  Therefore, the sample that was used to 
investigate the impact of instructions on perceptions was also investigated here.  Data cleaning 
supported parametric analyses with paired-sample t-tests undertaken to compare shifts in 
confidence reported over time. 
Expert witness:  Mock jurors’ level of confidence shifted from M = 3.38 (SD = .77) at 
baseline to M = 3.69 (SD = .85) following exposure advice by expert witness.  The mean increase 
in confidence (M difference = .31, SE = .17) for those who received expert testimony was non-
significant, t (12) = 1.76, p = .10, d = .48, two-tailed. 
Written judicial direction:  Confidence mean scores for mock jurors who received written 
judicial instructions shifted from M= 3.50 (SD = .73) to M = 3.47 (SD = .94) following delay but 
the mean decrease was negligible: M difference = .03, SE = .12; t (29) = -.273, p =.79, d = .05, 
two-tailed. 
Oral judicial direction: For those who received judicial directions, confidence increased 
by a mean difference of .09 (SE = .11) from M = 3.50 (SD = .91) at baseline to M = 3.59 (SD = 
.73) post-advice, but the increase was non-significant: t (21) = .70, p =.43, d = .17, two-tailed. 
Expert and judge combined:  Confidence mean scores remained stable over time for mock 
jurors who received both expert and judicial advice combined (M = 3.25, SD = .85, 1.00, 
respectively) with no change observed from baseline.    
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Chapter 11. Discussion 
The current study aimed to test whether delayed consideration of advice would impact 
jurors’ perceptions of nonverbal cues of deception.  The current study extended on from Study one 
to establish whether changes in perceptions held over time.  The objective was to establish whether 
the effects of decay and interference would influence the efficacy of advice provided to jurors when 
delay was a factor.  In doing so, the current study tested the basic tenet of Dangerous Decision 
Theory (Porter & ten Brinke, 2009), that argues opinions of trustworthiness/ deception are so 
ingrained that despite evidence to the contrary (i.e. instructional advice) they don’t change. 
The structure of the discussion is as follows: the findings of the within-group analyses (e.g. 
changes from baseline) are discussed first followed the between-group comparisons (e.g. the effect 
of instruction compared to no instruction).  The discussion concludes with an analysis of the 
exploratory findings regarding the constellation of cues considered most important by jurors and 
whether or not juror perceived confidence in detecting deception shifts over time as a consequence 
of instructions. 
11.1 Does Advice Impact Jurors’ Perceptions of Cues When Delay is a Factor? 
11.1.1 Assessing Shifts from Baseline: Analyses within-groups.  
Initially, the effect of instruction on jurors’ perceptions of nonverbal indicia were compared 
from baseline opinion where each respondents’ initial perception served as their own control.  The 
findings are discussed below: first for perceptions of reliable indicia followed by unreliable indicia. 
Hypothesis 1:  Jurors’ perceptions of deception cues will not improve with advice over time. 
Partial support was found for hypothesis three that, predicted jurors’ perceptions of 
nonverbal deception indicia would not shift with advice when delay was a factor.  Mixed results 
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emerged: the current study found that, over time, instructions impacted opinion of reliable indicia 
but not unreliable indicia.   
Despite delay, jurors perceived reliable cues to be more indicative of deception after they 
received instructions from an expert witness on diagnostics of deception.  The finding indicates 
that not only do perceptions shift when advice is provided by an expert, but more so, that shifts in 
perception may hold over time.  The effect of expert evidence was large (d =. 90) and the shift in 
opinion remained centred around the mean compared to the other sources of advice.  The reduced 
spread of responses suggests that over time, the change in opinion that occurred with expert 
evidence was more similar among jurors than were shifts in opinion observed with other types of 
advice. 
Aside from the testimony of the expert, no other form of instruction significantly impacted 
jurors’ perceptions of reliable indicia.  While the pattern of results reflected general improvements 
over time (i.e. increases in mean differences), with the remaining types of advice, the increases 
were trivial as evidenced by negligible effect sizes (expert/judge: d = .03; oral judicial direction: d 
= .05; and written judicial direction: d = .16).  Equally, while the mean increase for written judicial 
directions was three-fold that found for oral directions and expert/judge, the difference was not 
meaningful. 
Variability between baseline perceptions were observed.  Although non-significant, the 
difference between the largest and smallest baseline perceptions of reliable cues (i.e. expert 
witness: 3.46 and written instruction: 3.21) were similar to that found for the effect of advice by 
expert witness (i.e. .25 versus .22, respectively).  Despite the baseline irregularities, ceiling effects 
are unlikely to have influenced the impact of advice for judicial directions (both written and verbal) 
or expert/judge combined as the scores obtained for expert witness and no instruction (the control) 
demonstrated larger increases in perception from relatively consistent baselines (i.e. expert: 3.46; 
expert/judge: 3.45; no advice: 3.44). 
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Regarding the control, jurors exposed to no instruction perceived reliable cues to be more 
indicative of deception over time than at baseline.  Although the increase was not statistically 
significant, time alone appeared to have a moderate effect (d = .46) on enhancing perceptions.  That 
is, the effect of measuring perceptions when delay is a factor indicates that opinions of reliable 
indicia improve on their own to some extent, without advice.   
Non-significant shifts in perceptions of unreliable indicia from baseline were found for all 
types of instruction indicating that when jurors considered advice after a one-week delay, 
instructions were unsuccessful in correcting misconceptions.  Aside from the anomaly found with 
written judicial directions, the remaining sources of advice demonstrated mean decreases in 
perceptions of unreliable indicia over time.   
The impact of written and oral judicial directions was negligible (d = .04 and .08, 
respectively).  While the pattern found for written directions was at odds with the other types of 
advice (the mean increase suggests unreliable indicia were perceived to be more indicative of 
deception following written instructions), the increase lacked any practical meaning – not only was 
the shift non-significant but more particularly, the increase was .02.  The negligible changes 
observed for written and oral directions may have been undermined by their respective baseline 
scores.  Both conditions had the lowest baseline perceptions of unreliable cues which may have 
impeded the opportunity for instructions to reduce perceptions further.  What remains unclear is 
whether or not there are maximum shifts (i.e. reductions) that can be realised when measuring 
changes in perception.  In the case of written and oral judicial directions, it is possible that 
perceptions could not be contracted more from already, relatively low baselines.  For example, 
initial perceptions for judicial directions (3.11 and 3.14, respectively) only differed in the order of 
.04 and .07 from the lowest mean perception (3.07) achieved following expert/judge advice. 
When jurors received no instruction, perceptions of unreliable cues increased with delay.  
This finding suggests that jurors perceived false cues to be more diagnostic of deception with the 
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passage of time when advice was omitted.  The difference from baseline perceptions was 
marginally significant and the effect of time appeared to have a moderate impact (d = .44) on 
shifting perceptions.  The level of significance and size of effect reflect the largest mean difference 
obtained from baseline notably, an increase, together with the smallest dispersion of scores around 
the mean.  Unexpectedly, the pattern for the control for perceptions of unreliable cues diverged 
from the pattern found for type of advice.  Specifically, the directional trends were opposing 
indicating that that over time, perceptions of unreliable indicia begin to contract with instructions, 
but when instructions were not provided, jurors attributed more importance to unreliable indicia 
perceiving false cues to be more indicative of deception over time. 
Baseline comparisons between perceptions of reliable and unreliable indicia were assessed 
as equivalent across two of the four types of advice suggesting that jurors may perceive reliable 
and unreliable cues to be of relative importance in detecting deception prior to receiving 
instructions.  Although written and verbal judicial instructions differed at baseline as determined 
by one-tailed tests (p = .05), the differences in opinion magnified with advice.  Following 
instruction analysis suggest that jurors perceived reliable cues to be significantly more important 
in detecting deception than unreliable diagnostics with the effect of instruction found for all types 
of advice.  
The largest split in opinion between perceptions of reliable and unreliable indicia was 
observed when jurors received advice by expert witness (+.43) and by expert/judge combined 
(+.41) with medium effects achieved for both (d = .70 and .55, respectively).  After jurors received 
advice by written instruction the difference in perceptions was significant (p = .05) however, the 
effect detected (a small effect: d = .35) was likely powered by the larger sample size: not only was 
the difference in perceptions post-advice the smallest of all instructions (including no advice), the 
spread of scores was equivalent to the control (that was non-significant), and the size of sample 
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was the largest.  Despite the statistical significance, the practical significance for written 
instructions was limited: a larger difference was found for jurors who received no instruction. 
Summary of Within-Group Findings 
The findings for the effect of instructions on opinions of reliable and unreliable cues were 
mixed demonstrating partial support for hypothesis three that, predicted advice would not impact 
jurors’ perceptions over time.  On the one hand, perceptions of reliable indicia were positively 
impacted by instructions despite the passage of time, whereas the provision of advice did not 
significantly correct misconceptions of unreliable indicia.   
Only one source of advice was effective in shifting jurors’ perceptions when instructions 
were considered over time:  only through the provision of an expert’s testimony did jurors 
perceptions of reliable indicia improve.  This finding suggests that opinions of reliable indicia may 
be enhanced when jurors are educated on diagnostics of deception but whether or not the provision 
of advice has long-lasting effects appears unlikely with enhancements achieved with advice 
dissipating over time.  
The within-group analyses revealed that in the absence of advice, jurors’ perceptions of 
deception indicia improve with time alone.  This was the case for perceptions of both reliable and 
unreliable factors of deception.  Therefore, the effect of instructions on jurors’ opinions of reliable 
cues needs to be interpreted with caution: the improvements observed with advice – significant or 
not – may be due to time, type of instruction (i.e. expert witness), an interaction of both, or other 
extraneous factor(s).  Furthermore, while the pattern of improvement for perceptions of unreliable 
cues observed with instructions counters that found for no instruction, the difference was not 
significant and cannot therefore, be explained by the effect of advice alone.  What is more, the 
pattern observed for no instruction warrants some concern: jurors’ false beliefs of nonverbal cues 
appear to increase over time when instructions are not provided.   
INSTRUCTING JURORS ON NONVERBAL CUES OF DECEPTION   147 
 
11.1.2 Assessing Differences Between Advice and No Advice: Analyses between-groups. 
Attempts to mitigate the limitations associated with comparing shifts in opinion from 
baseline were the focus of the between-groups analyses.  The findings for the between-group 
comparisons follow. 
Hypothesis 1 Continued: Jurors’ perceptions of deception cues will not improve with advice over 
time. 
When shifts in perceptions of reliable cues were compared between jurors who received 
instructions and those who did not, no form of advice was successful in influencing opinion beyond 
that achieved with no instruction.  The order of difference between the effect of expert evidence 
(that was significant when compared from baseline) and no advice in improving opinions of reliable 
cues was negligible (d = .15) as was evidenced by a minimal mean difference in opinion between 
conditions.  Specifically, the mean increase in opinions of reliable cues following expert evidence 
(.22) and no advice (.17) were similar, so much so, that the shift demonstrated by expert witness 
may be largely accounted for by time over and above any effect of instruction.  If in fact expert 
advice did have any influence on reliable perceptions – it was no more effective than no advice. 
The small effects found for judicial directives (written instructions d = .19 and oral 
instructions d = .29), and expert/judge combined (d = .24) appear to be due to greater discrepancies 
in means between no advice and type of advice. However, these small effects represent differences 
of limited practical significance (.02 to .08).  Based on the pattern found for reliable cues when 
jurors received no instruction, the smaller mean increases obtained for these types of advice 
suggest, that instructions may have moderated perceptions of reliable indicia – especially so for 
judicial direction and expert/judge combined where the mean increases were as minute as .02.   
The moderated perceptions found for reliable indicia when jurors were exposed to judicial 
directions (written and verbal) and expert/judge instructions may reflect a suspiciousness of advice 
INSTRUCTING JURORS ON NONVERBAL CUES OF DECEPTION   148 
 
given.  That is, the nature of the instructions may have warned jurors as to the difficulties faced 
when evaluating demeanour evidence.  It is possible that the instruction tempered jurors’ 
expectations and sensitised them to the challenges associated with reliably interpreting behavioural 
cues.  Thus, resulting in jurors perceiving reliable cues to be less indicative of deception when 
advice is considered over time.  Other studies have found similar outcomes when jurors receive 
instructions by way of judicial directions or expert evidence.  Coined the “scepticism effect” (Cutler 
et al., 1990), research has found that when advice cautions jurors to the limitations of scientific 
knowledge instructions can result in scepticism of the evidence impacting its effectiveness on 
decision-making (Jones et al., 2017; Ribbers & Henneberg, 2018).  Herein, a general sense of 
scepticism may have been a consequence of giving jurors time to reflect on the advice without 
providing a requisite understanding/knowledge of the factors that influence the reliability of 
nonverbal indicia when detecting deception.  Compared to the evidence presented by the expert 
who offered more context and explanation as to factors that influence accuracy (i.e. having a 
baseline knowledge of a witness’s behaviour) jurors exposed to judicial directions did not receive 
this.  Given that the impact of the expert witness differed when it was combined with a judicial 
direction, it is hypothesised that when advice was collapsed the factors referred to by the expert 
were lost with the passage of time with a recency effect resulting in the judicial direction having a 
lasting impact overriding jurors’ recollection of the evidence presented by the expert. 
Although both the written and oral judicial directions were short interventions, the duration 
of the evidence presented unlikely accounts for the total lack of effect found.  The combined advice 
by way of expert and judicial direction was the longest of all forms of instruction presented and yet 
it had no impact.  As noted, it is possible that the influence of the expert in the expert/judge 
condition was lost over time due to a recency effect: perhaps the negative effect of the direction 
stayed with people over time, countering any influence of the expert.   
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Regarding jurors’ opinions of false cues, when shifts in perception were compared between 
those who received advice and those who did not, some instructions influenced perceptions of 
unreliable indicia.  Jurors’ misconceptions of false cues were corrected over time when advice was 
delivered by an expert witness or when instructions were presented collectively by an expert/judge.  
Medium effects were found for both (expert witness d =.56 and d = .65 for expert/judge) with 
neither type of advice more or less effective in modifying false beliefs of nonverbal cues of 
deception. 
Consistent with shifts from baseline identified in the within-group analyses, written and 
oral judicial directions did not influence jurors’ misconceptions of false cues over and above that 
achieved by time alone.  Similarly, due to the degree of variability observed within the control, 
instructions appeared to have little impact on discriminating jurors’ opinion between reliable and 
unreliable cues.  Although there were differences in opinions over time of reliable and unreliable 
indicia, the discrepancies in opinion were no more or less than those found for no advice.   
Summary of Between-Group Findings 
Mixed findings resulted in partial support for hypothesis three that, predicted shifts in 
jurors’ perceptions of nonverbal indicia would not hold over time despite receipt of advice.  On the 
one hand, providing jurors with information on nonverbal diagnostics of deception did not enhance 
opinions of factors reliably associated with deception more so that omitting information.  Namely, 
aside from written directions, the pattern of improvement found with instructions mirrored the 
effect of no instruction: with the passage of time, jurors perceived reliable cues to be more 
indicative of deception irrespective of advice.  This finding suggest caution when interpreting the 
effect of advice when delay is a factor.  That is, gains observed (albeit non-significant) in opinion 
of reliable cues may be due to time alone.  Conversely, when jurors were cautioned of which cues 
are unreliable indicators of deception, the effect of advice was more successful than no instruction; 
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jurors’ false beliefs corrected – with equal success – by expert evidence and when combined with 
a judge’s verbal direction. 
11.2 Overall Conclusions 
11.2.1 Perceptions of Deception Over Time When No Instruction is Given 
The pattern of mean increases observed among jurors who received no advice was 
consistent across cue-type: the differences from time one to time two were marginally significant 
and the magnitudes of difference almost reached medium effects (d =.46 and .44 for reliable and 
unreliable cues respectively).  Notably, the difference in perceptions of reliable and unreliable cues 
remained constant over time suggesting that the effect of time alone may have influenced 
perceptions and that this effect was equal across both types of cues. 
No predictions were specified for the control.  However, the findings herein infer 
methodologically that delay, as a factor, may have had an inadvertent effect on cues perceived 
indicative of deception.  Differences, albeit marginal, at time one and time two between reliable 
and unreliable cues considered indicative of deception were not expected.  To the best of the 
author’s knowledge, baseline perceptions between reliable and unreliable cues have not been 
explored previously: that is, we don’t know whether initial perceptions of reliable/unreliable 
indicators are weighted differently.  Although existing research has established that false beliefs 
are commonplace (DePaulo et al., 1997; 2003; Porter & ten Brinke, 2009), the focus of the literature 
has been on what the stereotypes are and their prevalence (Bond & DePaulo, 2006) especially as 
they relate to undermining veracity judgements in detecting deception.  However, deception 
researchers have not presented the data in such a way that determinations can be made as to whether 
or not the prevalence of invalid and valid beliefs are equitable.  Notwithstanding the differences 
found between cue-type at baseline, it is unknown whether a larger sample may have seen the 
pattern converge more closely at pre-intervention like that found in Study one. 
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Regarding the direction of the control, it is hypothesised that in the intervening time (that 
was the delay) participants exercised the opportunity to reflect on the question asked as to what 
factors indicate deception.  On the one hand, this may have afforded participants the opportunity 
to rehearse the cues nominated at time one.  However, rehearsal would have been difficult: there 
were 31 cues assessed of which 6 ratings were possible resulting in 186 potential combinations.  
Alternatively, the increase in opinions over time may be due to participants reflecting on the cues 
they thought were indicative of deception, rightly or wrongly, and these perceptions solidified in 
the absence of advice and became more important and embedded over the course of the week.  Prior 
to the study, it is unlikely that participants had given much thought, if any, to what nonverbal cues 
are/are not indicative of deception, and that the research prompted them to reflect on and give 
consideration to those cues that they had initially identified.  Some confidence is gleaned from the 
fact that not one participant in the control (or experimental groups for that matter) had received 
training in detecting deception.  
The control highlights an important issue for consideration:  it is contended that the results 
of the control alone indicate that when jurors are encouraged to consider indicators of deception, 
as routinely happens in court when they are directed to consider demeanour evidence, the omission 
of advice as to reliable/unreliable indictors of deception may in fact have a deleterious, inverse 
effect on jurors’ perception of nonverbal cues of deception.  That is, without evidence to counter 
false beliefs, jurors’ misconceptions may not only prevail but magnify over the course of a trial, 
presenting egregious ramifications for jury decision-making. 
The current study highlights the importance of including a control.  Drawing conclusions 
based solely on in-built controls (as demonstrated by shifts from baseline) could be misleading.  
The findings derived from the control show that a degree of change in opinion occurs irrespective 
of advice. What remains unknown however, is to what degree perceptions shift as a result of other 
confounding factors not accounted for by the questionnaire, or time.  To better understand the shifts 
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in opinion associated with no instruction requires further investigation.  Future research could 
consider examining the impact of a control that employs a distraction, placebo task to enhance 
ecological validity while also ameliorating any confounding factors associated with participants 
predicting the purpose of the study. 
11.2.2 The Effect of Instruction on Perceptions of Deception Over Time 
When the influence of advice was measured in shifts from baseline the effect of expert 
evidence on enhancing perceptions of reliable cues appeared promising.  However, when the effect 
of instructions was isolated, and potential retest effects were controlled, the influence of the 
expert’s advice on enhancing jurors’ perceptions of reliable indicia dissolved.  Although expert 
evidence demonstrated improvements as indicated by the pattern of results, the shifts in opinion 
did not differ significantly from one another with the shift observed for expert witness no more 
than that achieved with time alone. 
An inverse relationship was observed for jurors’ perceptions of false, unreliable cues.  
When shifts in opinion were measured from baseline, no source of advice impacted opinions.  
While the pattern demonstrated improvements by way of mean decreases with instruction, the shifts 
were non-significant and the order of change was, at best, small (e.g. expert witness).  Conversely, 
when the effect of instruction was isolated from any potential consequences associated with the 
quick succession of the questionnaire, shifts in perception between those who received advice and 
those who did not, emerged.  Providing jurors with advice in the form of an expert witness or 
expert/judge appeared to correct misconceptions regarding unreliable indicia of deception with 
medium effect sizes obtained.  Interestingly, neither the expert alone nor combined as expert/judge 
was any better or worse at correcting misconceptions.   
The current study suggests that jurors’ perceptions of reliable indicia do not appear to 
change over time, but their false beliefs may.  The influence of expert advice on perceptions of 
reliable cues did not carry over when considered against jurors who received no advice, whereas, 
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the influence of expert evidence on perceptions of unreliable cues strengthened along with 
expert/judge advice combined.  The variability in the effect of instruction on opinions is shaped by 
the pattern of results found for the control.  Opinions of reliable indicia were not impacted by advice 
because they improved on their own account with time.  Similarly, opinions of unreliable indicia 
were impacted by advice because the decrease in opinions found over time (i.e. improvements) 
diverged from the effect of time.  The variability within the control extended to a lack of difference 
between opinions of reliable and unreliable indicia – while there was inherent discrepancy between 
cues perceived as reliable and unreliable indicators of deception found for advice, the differences 
could not be differentiated from the effect of time alone. 
The results herein suggest that the effect of advice on changing jurors’ perceptions over 
time, was somewhat limited.  On the one hand, it is possible that jurors were cautioned by advice 
(Bromby et al., 2007; Ribbers & Henneberg, 2018).  Meaning, the stability in perceptions of reliable 
cues together with the corrections made to perceptions of unreliable indicia may indicate that, over 
time, advice attenuated jurors to the problems associated with assessing nonverbal cues.  Indeed, it 
is possible that with time, the effect of advice moderated perceptions to the extent that reliable 
indicia were not perceived to be any more reliable than originally believed (which was already 
above mid-point), but also, that advice sensitised jurors to the difficulties associated with 
interpreting demeanour.  This proposition goes some way to explaining why opinions of reliable 
cues did not improve but perceptions of unreliable cues did.  It is hypothesised therefore, that in 
the intervening week, advice tempered perceptions of reliable indicia along with correcting false 
beliefs.   
An alternative explanation however, is that pre-existing perceptions of nonverbal indicia 
over-ride advice with time.  That is, over the course of a one-week period, the influence of advice 
on reformed perceptions depreciates, and what were once initial impressions re-materialise.  This 
explanation is consistent with the extant literature that attests beliefs about deceptive/truthful 
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behaviour are so deeply embedded that they resurface without provocation and irrespective of 
evidence that conflicts with opinion (Anderson et al., 1998; DePaulo, 1994; Feeley & Young, 2000; 
Frank & Feeley, 2003; Porter & ten Brinke, 2009, 2010; Porter et al., 2013; Zuckerman, Koestner, 
& Colella, 1985). 
Notwithstanding replication, the absence of advice appears to be more damaging to 
perceptions than introducing the evidence of an expert witness or expert/judge combined.  While 
the testimony of an expert and collective instruction of an expert/judge may only moderate 
perceptions of reliable cues they too correct misconceptions of false cues providing perhaps, a 
helpful adjunct to safeguarding juror-decision making.  Disconcertingly, the very absence of 
instructions may pose harmful consequences when witness credibility is at issue.  However, this 
supposition is just that, and cannot be extrapolated without further investigation.  
11.3 What Combination of Nonverbal Deception Cues do Jurors Considered Most Important? 
The current study found little evidence to suggest advice was effective at shifting individual 
cues perceived most important in detecting deception when delay was a factor.  Specifically, the 
findings revealed little change in the constellation of cues perceived most important.  Over time, 
mock jurors maintained that confidence, spontaneous corrections, implausible responses and 
responses that contain a lot of detail were the most important cues in detecting deception and that 
only the ranking order of these cues adjusted.  That said, the most important cue perceived 
indicative of deception (confidence) prior to advice was also maintained over time with its overall 
level of importance increasing with advice. 
While the split of reliable and unreliable cues ranked the most important did not change 
over time, no consistent pattern emerged for reliable and unreliable cues with both increasing and 
decreasing in response to advice and time.  What did emerge was that at the factor level, the results 
provide support for existing research that suggests stereotypes about deceptive behaviour may be 
so entrenched that they remerge without temptation (Frank & Feeley, 2003).  The stability 
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demonstrated among the top five most important cues goes one step further and provides support 
for Dangerous Decisions Theory (Porter & ten Brinke, 2009) that predicts perceptions not only 
prevail over time but do so in the face of conflicting evidence.   
At the factor level, a more detailed picture as to the effect of advice can be seen when the 
percentage change is analysed. Most notably, with delayed advice, although the combination of top 
five cues ranked most important does not shift, direct improvements can be seen on high-pitch 
voice that increased three-fold, body/hand/finger/leg/foot movements doubled and responses that 
contain very few details increased 150%.  That is, of all percentage changes both positive and 
negative, these three reliable factors represented on the whole the biggest percentage changes 
found. 
Given the consistency in combination of cues perceived most important as well in the 
percentage changes achieved with advice it might be reasonable to infer that the findings may 
reflect response bias as a consequence of the questionnaire design.  However, the order of factors 
listed in the survey do not explain the combination of results found and so response bias is unlikely. 
The only corresponding pattern that could be inferred was that the first item listed on the question 
that asked participants to rank cues from most important to least important was confidence.  This 
may account for why confidence was the predominant cue of choice at both baseline and post-test.  
Furthermore, its order of ranking in the factors listed may have unintentionally had a primacy effect 
attracting more attention compared to those factors in the middle of the survey.  This eventuality 
could be controlled for by randomly ordering the factors tested should future research wish to 
investigate the combination of cues perceived most indicative of deception.  For the three reliable 
cues identified across both studies, it is possible the items themselves conveyed high face validity 
and where chosen accordingly.   
Effect of advice aside, the nonverbal cues identified reveal important insight as to the 
combination of cues considered most important by mock jurors in detecting deception.  These being 
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spontaneous corrections, implausible responses, responses that lack logical structure or responses 
that contain very few details (after advice).  Distinct from the cues that demonstrated the largest 
percentage increases (high-pitch voice and body/hand/finger/leg/foot movements), the combination 
of cues perceived most important provide jurors with a greater opportunity to reliably evaluate the 
cues identified because they do not require a reference point or baseline knowledge from which the 
indicia needs to be compared.  By way of example a witness’ statement either contains spontaneous 
corrections or it does not, it appears implausible or does it not, and/or a statement lacks logical 
structure, or does not.  Although high-pitch and body movements are among the more reliable 
indicia of deception, accurately assessing these nonverbal cues are largely dependent on having a 
baseline knowledge of the witness’ behaviour from which deviations can be evaluated.   
The combination of reliable cues identified as most important herein offer promise for 
future research.  Should the effects of advice be investigated further it would be of interest to test 
the impact of advice on jurors’ ability to accurately detect deception if advice directly targeted the 
combination of cues perceived most important.  As found by Hartwig and Bond (2014), accuracy 
in detecting deception is enhanced when a constellation of cues are evaluated. That said, a small 
number of studies have found large discrepancies between the cues people identify as important in 
detecting deception and the cues they actually rely on when trying to detect deception (Hartwig & 
Granhag, 2014; Bogaard & Meijer, 2018).  Should advice concentrate on the handful of cues 
identified in current research, the ability to enhance reliable cues already considered important by 
mock juror may be more meaningful in the context of interpreting demeanour, assessing witness 
truthfulness and therefore overall credibility.   
11.4 Does Advice Influence Jurors’ Confidence Over Time?  
The effect of advice did not appear to influence perceived confidence when delay was a 
factor, with no significant shifts from baseline observed by source of advice.  This finding is 
inconsistent with Willis & Todorov (2006) who found confidence in baseline perceptions of 
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trustworthiness increased with time.  Although the shifts found herein were non-significant, it is 
noted that the largest mean increase (M difference = .31) in perceived confidence, despite delay, 
was obtained for expert evidence; the one condition of advice that successfully impacted jurors’ 
perceptions of reliable cues when assessed from baseline (as per the within-group analyses).  The 
magnitude of change in confidence observed for expert evidence, although non-significant, 
represented a medium effect (rounded,  d = .48) with the increase more than three-fold that of the 
next largest, oral judicial directions (M difference = .09), and ten times that of written judicial 
directions (M difference = -.03).  Some of the difference between shifts in confidence may be 
accounted for by the lower baseline perceptions reported by jurors assigned to the expert witness 
condition (M = 3.38) compared to those who received oral or written directions (M = 3.50, 
respectively).  That said, expert/judge advice had the lowest baseline confidence (M = 3.25) of all 
sources of advice, and yet, confidence remained stable over time, despite advice.  By contrast, it is 
possible that the size of the effects of advice on shifting perceptions were not large enough to 
translate into shifts in perceived confidence.  Namely, the largest shift in perceived confidence 
obtained by expert evidence also achieved a large effect (d = .90) on shifting perceptions.  Whereas, 
the marginal shifts in perceived confidence correspond with either less than small effects on shifting 
perceptions (written directions: d = .16), or negligible effects: verbal directions, d = .05; 
expert/judge, d = .03.  Of course, the simplest and most likely of explanations is that the provision 
of advice is not related to perceived confidence in detecting deception, and therefore, was not 
prejudiced by advice.     
11.5 Chapter Summary 
The current study investigated whether jurors’ consideration of advice over time impacted 
perceptions of nonverbal cues considered important in determining the truthfulness of a witness in 
court.  Partial support was found for hypothesis three, that predicated jurors’ opinions of deception 
indicia would not shift over time, despite advice.  The evidence was mixed depending on cue-type 
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but more so, was dependent on whether or not the effect of instructions was compared with no 
instruction.  The current design highlighted the importance of including an independent control to 
negate, where possible, potential confounding factors such as re-test effects and the influence of 
time alone. 
The control suggested that delay was a factor in its own right.  The pattern of mean increases 
observed within the control for both cue-types from pre-to post-delay present an interesting finding.  
Not only did jurors’ perceptions of reliable cues increase with time, but so too did their perceptions 
of unreliable cues.  Although the increase in opinion of reliable cues reflects an improvement over 
time, the increase in importance attributed to unreliable cues implied a worsening effect – with 
false, misleading cues possibly perceived to be more important in detecting deception over time.  
Added to this, two observations were made.  First, that the order of difference between reliable and 
unreliable cues remained constant over time with reliable cues remaining more important in 
detecting deception than unreliable cues, despite a weeks’ delay.  Second, that both cue-types 
increased over time reflecting that jurors perceived both reliable and unreliable cues to be more 
indicative of deception after a one week period.  This was despite no advice.  
The current study revealed limited support for the benefit of presenting advice to jurors in 
an effort of improve perceptions of reliable cues over time.  The effect of instructions revealed that 
when jurors’ perceptions of nonverbal indicia were compared between those who received advice 
and those who did not, opinions of reliable cues did not differentiate: the pattern of improvement 
observed with instructions was no more influential than the effect of no advice.  This conclusion is 
largely due to the consistent pattern of improvement found in perceptions of reliable cues achieved 
with instruction and with time alone.  Although the largest improvement in perceptions of reliable 
cues was achieved by expert witness it was no more significant than the effect of no instruction.  
This finding indicates that any education redressing misconceptions among jurors – be it in the 
form of expert testimony, judicial directives or a combination of both, may be dissolved by the 
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effects of decay and interference.  As such, the significant improvement in jurors’ opinions of 
reliable cues achieved from baseline with advice by an expert witness remains uncertain: the shift 
in perceptions cannot be solely accounted for by advice. 
Counter to the findings for perceptions of reliable cues, the current study demonstrated 
partial support for the effect of advice on correcting misconceptions when delay was a factor.   
While misconceptions of false cues amplified over time when no instruction was given, they 
appeared corrected when jurors considered advice over time.  Only expert evidence and 
expert/judge systematically impacted false beliefs of deception when delay was a factor with both 
types of advice equally effective in shifting perceptions.  That is, the effects of decay and 
interference did not appear to undermine the persistence of education when information was 
proffered as expert evidence or presented collectively with a judicial direction.   
Whether or not ceiling effects inhibit the degree to which perceptions of reliable cues 
changes and/or floor effects impeded the extent to which perceptions of unreliable cues improved 
remains uncertain.  On the one hand the findings herein might suggest that misconceptions are less 
resistant to change when faced with conflicting evidence than are opinions that are consistent with 
and supported by the evidence.  However, this is counter to what we know about confirmation bias.  
Rather, the findings of the current study may indicate that, with the passage of time, instructions 
sensitised jurors to the limitations inherent in relying on nonverbal cues; perceptions of reliable 
cues didn’t significantly enhance whereas perceptions of unreliable cues contracted with advice 
because the instruction served as a caution as to the difficulties faced in reliably assessing the 
demeanour of a witness.  Certainly, whether or not the effect of advice on perceptions was 
counteracted by the effect of time alone and/ or undermined by the persistence of perceptions 
cannot be resolved entirely.  What can be said, however, is that given the limited effect of 
instructions on shifting perceptions, it would  appear more likely that initial beliefs reinstate when 
time is a factor, thereby offsetting any benefits achieved with instructions.   
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As a consequence, the findings herein demonstrated mixed support for the theory of 
Dangerous Decision (Porter & ten Brinke, 2009).  While it is not discounted that perceptions were 
impacted with advice (at least, false beliefs were corrected by way of expert evidence and 
expert/judge instructions), the changes were in the minority, and were not uniform across cue-type 
or advice-type.  Consistent with the prevailing literature, the current findings suggest that per-
existing perceptions may be enduring (Blanch-Hartigan et al., 2012; Frank & Feely, 2003; Hauch 
et al, 2016; Shaw et al., 2013), and that while advice might shift some perceptions, its influence is 
limited with perceptions predominantly reverting back to baseline. 
Moreover, the results of the control highlight that in the absence of conflicting evidence, 
opinions as to deceptive behaviour not only prevailed over time but in fact became stronger with 
time when advice was not present.  That is, jurors in the control were asked to consider their 
opinions as to cues indicative of deception, rightly or wrongly.  When these participants did not 
hear any evidence or instruction to countervail their initial perceptions these opinions solidified 
and were perceived to be more indicative over time.  The increase in opinions of unreliable cues 
over time without advice highlights some cause for concern – if jurors are directed to consider 
demeanour but no advice is forthcoming, jurors may in fact consider false cues to be more 
indicative of deception over time relying on these erroneously when determining the credibility of 
a witness.  As the control suggests – without knowledge to counter ill-informed opinions, jurors 
are not just at risk of maintaining misconceptions, but rather, these misleading beliefs may 
exacerbate over time when advice is not omitted.  Notwithstanding replication, this finding infers 
serious implications for legal practice.  If just outcomes are to be protected the current study 
presents some precursory evidence to suggest that educating jurors about nonverbal cues of 
deception through expert testimony and expert/judge advice may be a useful adjunct to safeguard 
decision-making. 
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Chapter 12. General Discussion 
This thesis aimed to test components of Dangerous Decisions Theory (DDT; Porter & ten 
Brinke, 2009) that posits initial judgements of nonverbal behaviour relied upon in determining the 
trustworthiness/credibility of a witness not only form rapidly but are so deeply ingrained and 
pervasive that they are resistant to change even when presented with contradicting evidence.  To 
test the fundamental premise of DDT three broad aims were examined through two studies.  
The first study aimed to establish whether the provision of advice in the form of expert 
evidence and/or judicial directives, improved the nonverbal cues perceived indicative of deception 
by jurors when determining the truthfulness/deception of a witness in court.  The primary objective 
of Study one was to determine whether or not the findings of previous research could be replicated 
with the aim to confirm/disconfirm whether jurors’ perceptions of reliable indicia could be 
enhanced through the provision of advice.  The second aim of this thesis sought to establish whether 
or not juror misconceptions of unreliable indicia of deception could be corrected with advice. 
It has been well established in the literature that stereotypes of deceptive behaviour are 
wrong and that these false beliefs undermine the accuracy of assessing deception (Bond & DePaulo, 
2006; Levine & McCornack, 2014; Vrij et al., 2019).  Prior to this thesis, the effects of advice on 
shifting opinions of false, unreliable cues (i.e. misconceptions) had not been investigated.  While 
Coyle and Thomson (2014) concluded that the provision of expert and/or judicial advice “can 
correct jurors’ well-entrenched misconceptions of which behavioural indicia are indicative of 
deception” (p.10), they demonstrated that the impact of advice improved perceptions of reliable 
indicia of deception.  Whether they addressed misconceptions or not, remains unknown.   The 
current thesis begun to explore this gap in knowledge, examining to what extent false indicia are 
believed by jurors to indicate deception and tested the effect of advice on correcting 
misconceptions.  
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The second study extended on from Study one by investigating the effects of decay and 
interference on the provision of advice proffered to jurors.  The unique objective of examining 
delay was to establish whether improvements in juror opinion achieved with instructions, as 
demonstrated by Study one, held over time.  The delay between the introduction of evidence (i.e. 
the expert witness) and the subsequent consideration of that evidence are a reality of legal 
proceedings.  It is not uncommon for the admission of evidence to take several days, or for evidence 
to be admitted earlier in a trial and for members of a jury to consider that evidence at some later 
stage.  Equally, juries are often directed by judges at different periods during proceedings such as 
instructing juries on how they should weigh up evidence or when delivering their summations.  
Accordingly, the third aim of this thesis was to tests whether the delayed consideration of 
instructions by way of expert evidence and/or judicial directions would impact jurors’ opinions of 
nonverbal cues of deception.  The purpose was to establish whether or not the effects of advice as 
found in Study one, were transient with pre-existing perceptions over-riding the effects of advice 
or, whether changes in opinion were more enduring. 
The current design included a dedicated control group over and above that of using 
participants as their own control.  This allowed for between-group analyses in addition to within-
group analyses to be undertaken whereby shifts in perceptions could be compared between jurors 
who received advice and those who did not.  This facilitated a means by which the repetition of 
questions alone and the effect of time could be isolated from the effect of advice to see what effect, 
if any it had on perceptions at follow-up.  Shifts in in opinion from baseline where participants 
were their own control were discussed in the proceeding discussions.  However, the comparisons 
from baseline are not the focus of this chapter as the effect of advice could not be differentiated 
from potential retest effects or the effect of time alone.  Rather, the findings as they relate to the 
effect of instruction compared to no instruction are discussed.   
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The structure of the current chapter follows herein: the findings of Study one and Study 
two are briefly summarised with respect to the three aims.  Each aim is presented in chronological 
order.  To reiterate, aims one and two were explored in Study one and the third aim was investigated 
in Study two.  A review of each aim concludes with the findings of both studies considered together.  
The exploratory analyses are discussed in turn and the implications, strengths, and limitations of 
the current thesis are examined.  The chapter concludes with considerations for future research. 
12.1. Aim One: Does the Provision of Advice Influence Jurors’ Opinions of Reliable 
Indicia of Deception? 
Study one confirmed that advice may have the potential to successfully improve jurors’ 
opinions of which nonverbal cues reliably indicate deception.  The study demonstrated that through 
the provision of expert evidence and the collective advice of an expert and a judge’s direction, 
jurors might benefit equally from both instructions taking onboard more reliable cues to better 
inform their interpretations of witness credibility.  The findings partially supported previous 
research with the effect of expert evidence replicated but written judicial directions not (Coyle and 
Thomson, 2014).  Differences in research design including experimental settings most likely 
account for the differences in effects obtained for written instructions.  What remains unknow is 
whether or not the simple re-administration of the questionnaire had a retest effect on the 
improvement found by Coyle and Thomson (2014; Scharfen et al., 2018), albeit unintentionally, 
and if so, to what extent.  Nevertheless, the finding herein is consistent with a wider body of 
research that shows written directions appear ineffective in improving juror decision-making 
(Baguley et al., 2017; Essex & Goodman-Delahunty, 2014).  What is more, the difference in 
findings between the original study and this thesis is not dissimilar to the disagreement found in 
the literature (Cicchini & White, 2016; Ribbers & Henneberg, 2018; Spivak, Clough & Ogloff, 
2018). 
INSTRUCTING JURORS ON NONVERBAL CUES OF DECEPTION   165 
 
The negligible impact found for the influence of oral judicial directions was consistent with 
existing research that shows little benefit in improving juror comprehension with judicial directions 
(Blankenship et al., 1997; Baguley, et.al., 2017; English & Sales, 1997; Luginbuhl, 1992; Ogloff, 
et al., 2011; Ogloff & Rose, 2005; Rose & Ogloff, 2001; Severance & Loftus, 1982; Spivak, et al., 
2018).  An unexpected finding was the effect of no instruction.  Although the shift in opinion was 
non-significant, the variability and negative relationship was of interest:  jurors perceived reliable 
cues to be less indicative of deception from time one to time two when advice was withheld.  
Whether this variability reflects a decline in memory, doubt, or change in opinion could not be 
established.  It is possible that the shifts were so small that they merely represent a level of inherent 
discrepancy that comes with asking jurors to consider an extensive list of nonverbal factors. 
12.2. Aim Two: Does the Provision of Advice Correct Jurors’ Misconceptions of 
Nonverbal Indicia of Deception? 
Extending the replication to examine unreliable cues independent of reliable cues was a 
unique contribution of this thesis.  Study one demonstrated that instructions may successfully 
correct jurors’ misconceptions regarding false cues of deception.  Specifically, Study one 
established that perceptions of unreliable cues can be improved when evidence is adduced by an 
expert witness with jurors placing less importance on unreliable indicia when determining the 
truthfulness/deception of a witness after receipt of advice.  Aside from the testimony of the expert, 
no other type of advice influenced perceptions of unreliable cues more than could be achieved by 
no instruction.  
Although written judicial directions and the collective advice of the expert/judge were no 
more effective in influencing opinion than the effect of no advice, the trend of results are 
noteworthy.  That is, a pattern of improvement was observed (i.e. decreases from baseline) for 
jurors who received written directions or the combined advice of the expert/judge with perceptions 
of unreliable cues declining with advice albeit, not significant statistically.  By way of comparisons, 
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only the advice of the oral judicial direction presented an anomaly: again, although non-significant, 
the shift opposed the direction anticipated with jurors perceiving unreliable indicia to be more 
indicative of deception with advice. In light of these findings, it is possible that the lack of effect 
found for expert/judge on correcting misconceptions may have been unduly influenced by the 
negative contribution of the judicial direction.  While the effect of expert witness imparted similar 
shifts in opinion on both reliable and unreliable cues (i.e. +.36 and -.34, respectively), the shift in 
opinion on unreliable cues evidenced by expert/judge (-.16) may have achieved a similar impact to 
that found for reliable cues (+.26) had judicial direction not increased by .08 (i.e. -.16 - .08 = -.24).  
Nonetheless, the finding that only the instruction from an expert witness effectively corrected 
jurors’ misconceptions presents an original, albeit provisional finding.  Similarly, the lack of 
influence on jurors’ perceptions of unreliable indicia observed for judicial directions (both written 
and oral), or when combined with an expert (expert/judge) present new, preliminary findings.  
Despite these findings, and as noted throughout, the variability in baseline perceptions across 
advice groups warrants caution: the conclusions drawn in this thesis can provide no more than 
preliminary indications of the effect of instruction on enhancing perceptions of detecting deception.   
Nevertheless, an unexpected discovery was the significant impact found when jurors were 
asked to assess nonverbal cues of deception in the absence of evidence.  While the control from 
Study one cannot be generalised outside replication, the results implied, somewhat concerningly, 
that at follow-up jurors’ perceived false cues to be more indicative of deception when advice was 
not received. 
In sum, when the findings of aim one and two are taken together, the following conclusions 
can be made.  First, only the advice of the expert witness appears to successfully influence jurors’ 
perceptions with improvements in opinions achieved across both reliable and unreliable cues.  
Second, the collective effect of expert/judge on enhancing perceptions of reliable indicia did not 
transfer to correcting perceptions of unreliable indicia.  Third, inviting jurors to assess nonverbal 
INSTRUCTING JURORS ON NONVERBAL CUES OF DECEPTION   167 
 
cues in the absence of advice on reliable/unreliable diagnostics of deception may, notwithstanding 
replication, contribute to erroneous determinations of witness credibility with jurors’ false beliefs 
amplifying in the absence of evidentiary safeguards.  These findings substantiate earlier research 
and suggest that jurors’ perceptions of reliable diagnostics of deception may improve with 
instruction and provides some contrasting evidence (albeit, cautionary), that may counter the core 
principle of DDT.  As demonstrated, advice may effect changes in perceptions of nonverbal cues 
of deception in the immediacy.  The question as to whether or not the changes to pre-existing 
perceptions are transient, or more enduring, was the focus of aim three and was investigated in 
Study two. 
12.3. Aim three:  To Determine Whether the Effect of Advice on Improving Jurors’ 
Perceptions Persist Over Time. 
Study two expanded on from Study one that indicated perceptions of nonverbal deception 
cues may shift with advice and investigated whether these changes in opinion held over time.  Study 
two revealed mixed findings.  Regarding reliable cues, jurors’ perceptions did not improve over 
time, despite advice.  The findings indicated that when delay was a factor, not one type of advice 
was effective in enhancing opinions of reliable cues more than that achieved by time alone.  
Namely, over time, jurors’ perceptions of reliable indicia improved on their own, without advice.  
Although the shift within the control was non-significant, the changes in opinion observed across 
instructions did not differ enough from those found when jurors received no advice.  Indeed, the 
“positive” shifts observed with advice by way of oral direction or combined with an expert were 
trivial whereas the largest mean shift was for jurors exposed to expert evidence.  Despite the lack 
of statistical significance, the differences in magnitude of change between the mean increases were 
notable. What remains unresolved is whether or not these differences were due to the efficacy of 
advice, the design of the control, or an interaction of both.  Additionally, whether or not some types 
of advice result in a scepticism effect of the information presented, or were more or less memorable 
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than others remains to be seen.  All that can be said is that the effect of advice on enhancing 
perceptions of reliable indicia over time cannot be differentiated from the effect of time alone 
suggesting that for perceptions of reliable cues, at least, the effects of decay and interference 
impacted the efficacy of advice provided to jurors when delay was a factor. 
Regarding unreliable cues, the effect of instructions on jurors’ opinions differed to that 
found for unreliable cues.  When perceptions were compared between those who received advice 
and those who did not, half of the instructions corrected jurors’ false beliefs of which indicia are, 
and are not indicative of deception.  Jurors’ misconceptions regarding deceptive behaviour were 
corrected over time with expert evidence and when instructions of an expert witness and member 
of the judiciary were presented together.  Both types of advice achieved medium effects and were 
deemed equally effective in modifying false beliefs of nonverbal cues of deception.   
Interestingly, neither type of judicial direction – be it written or verbal – impacted jurors’ 
false beliefs with perceptions remaining relatively unchanged over time irrespective of advice.  The 
consistently negligible impact of judicial directions suggests that not only might evidentiary 
judicial instructions be ineffective in correcting opinion over time, but moreover, the presentation 
modality of the instruction appears immaterial.  Indeed, if the lack of effect observed for judicial 
directions is not due to the content of the advice given, or the source from which it comes, then the 
most likely alternative is that the duration of the intervention was too short to have an discernible 
effect on perceptions. 
The findings of Study two were unexpected.  Based on the literature that (1) people’s beliefs 
of which nonverbal cues indicate deception are fundamentally flawed (DePaulo et al., 2006), and 
that (2) these false beliefs are so entrenched they not only persist over time (Frank & Feely, 2003), 
but are maintained in the face of conflicting evidence (Porter & ten Brinke, 2009), it was not 
expected that advice might influence jurors’ opinions of deception. Mixed results demonstrated 
partial support for hypothesis three that, predicted shifts in jurors’ perceptions of nonverbal indicia 
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of deception would not hold over time irrespective of advice.  One the one hand no support was 
found for advice enhancing opinions of reliable cues over time, yet, some evidence was found for 
advice influencing opinions of unreliable cues over time. 
Presenting jurors with information on the difficulties associated with detecting deception 
based on nonverbal behaviour may have posed a risk of undue caution (Bromby et al., 2007; 
Ribbers & Henneberg, 2018).  The aim of adducing evidence is to furnish triers of fact with 
information as to reliable/unreliable indicators of deception to induce their sensitivity to cues that 
will and will not aid their assessments of credibility.  However, drawing attention to the problems 
and pitfalls associated with nonverbal cues may have had an unintended consequence of inducing 
juror scepticism.  Leverick (2014) defines juror scepticism as an overall mistrust of all evidence, 
even when caution is not warranted.  Consequently, it is possible that with the passage of time that 
was the delay, jurors had more opportunity to reflect on the content of the advice given whereby 
the impact of advice resulted in a scepticism effect (McAuliff and Duckworth, 2014; Ribbers & 
Henneberg, 2018, p. 266) and may account for why the influence of advice not only contracted 
with time but diminished.  Of course, the simplest, obvious alternative proposition can be gleaned 
from the deception literature (e.g. Blanch-Hartigan et al., 2012; Frank & Feely, 2003; Hauch et al, 
2016; Shaw et al., 2013) that pre-existing, initial beliefs are so deeply-embedded and pervasive that 
they re-instate without effort, over-taking newly acquire knowledge on nonverbal cues of deception 
sooner or later.  
In sum, the effect of providing information to jurors over time was mixed:  it did not 
enhance opinions of factors reliably associated with deception more so that omitting the 
information, but it appeared to caution triers of fact of which cues are unreliable indicators of 
deception.  The findings of the control and conclusions on the effect of advice extrapolated herein 
need to be considered cautiously.  The gains observed (albeit non-significant) in opinion of reliable 
cues may be due to time alone, and not instruction.  Furthermore, the degree of variability in 
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opinions observed for jurors who received no advice warrants attention.  Whether or not the 
variability in perceptions is due to the omission of advice, limitations of the research design or 
another extraneous factor(s) remains unknown.  Regarding the research design, it must be 
emphasised that the length of advice presented to participants is conflated with source of advice.  
Consequently, it is noted that gains in accuracy achieved with advice may have occurred as a 
consequence of the duration of the advice presented, the content itself, the source (i.e. people) 
presenting it, or a variation of the above.   The point herein, is that these conditions can be 
manipulated with a cumulative effect.  Nevertheless, until the directional pattern found for no 
advice is replicated in other studies using an independent, equivalent control, the generalisability 
of these findings need to be interpreted with care. 
12.4. Overarching Conclusions: Do Instructions to Jurors on Nonverbal Diagnostics of 
Deception Matter?  
Together, the findings from both studies suggest that jurors may benefit from instructions 
on reliable/unreliable diagnostics of deception.  The current thesis provides preliminary support for 
the effect of advice on influencing jurors’ perceptions across both reliable and unreliable indicia.  
While the results were mixed depending on type of advice, type of cue, and time-to assessment (i.e. 
immediate versus delayed), some broad conclusions can be made.  These are as follows. 
Jurors’ perceptions of reliable cues may be enhanced with advice in the immediate term 
when that advice is presented by an expert witness or an expert and judge.  On first glance, one 
might suspect that the accuracies gained in perceptions of reliable and unreliable cues of deception 
might be attributable to the duration of advice presented with the lengthier conditions of advice 
(i.e. expert witness and expert/judge) facilitating greater repetition of ideas and breadth of coverage.  
However, if the duration of advice alone was sufficient to effect change in opinions then jurors’ 
perceptions of unreliable cues ought to have improved when advice was presented by expert and 
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judge combined – which it did not.  Accordingly, the evidence of this thesis indicates that the 
duration of advice alone is unlikely responsible for shifts in perceptions of cues of deception.   
Further, one might infer that the improvements observed for those advice conditions that 
were greater in duration (i.e. expert witness and expert and judge combined), may be explained by 
the bigger delay between the times to assessment (i.e. pre-test to post-test), making jurors less likely 
to affix to their initial opinion.  However, this proposition is undermined by the results 
demonstrated in Study two that found delay, as a factor alone, does not improve perceptions as a 
function of length of advice.  If it did, then one would expect to have found improvements on 
reliable cues as well as unreliable cues for both advice by expert witness and expert/judge combined 
– which it did not.  Conversely, the benefit of instructions by expert witness and expert and judge 
combined, appear to abate with the passage of time.  Indeed, no type of advice appears effective in 
improving jurors’ knowledge of which cues are reliable diagnostics of deception when delay is a 
factor. 
On the contrary, when jurors consider advice over time, the effect of advice on correcting 
misconceptions might be maintained when advice is proffered by the expert witness. Notably, when 
jurors considered advice immediately after it was provided, expert/judge instructions had no impact 
on correcting false beliefs. However, when the instruction was considered over time, the potential 
benefit of the expert/judge emerged – improving perceptions of unreliable cues of deception.  Again, 
while it might be inferred that the bigger delay between times to assessment encouraged 
participants to reconsider and change their opinions this only occurred for false beliefs, not both.   
A noteworthy finding was the impact, or lack thereof, for both written and verbal judicial 
directions: the influence of judicial instructions on jurors’ opinion of reliable indicia appeared 
negligible, irrespective of whether advice was considered immediately after it was adduced, or over 
time.  Interestingly, this finding suggests that the mode of presentation (written versus oral) may 
be of little consequence.  Whether or not the ineffectiveness of judicial directions was due to: (1) 
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the short duration of the interventions; (2) a perceived lack of credibility and/or importance 
attributed to or imparted by the advice; (3) a consequence of a general sense of scepticism of the 
information provided or because the factors were not adequately explained; or (4) simply because 
the instructions were less memorable, could not be determined.   
Generally, when considered together, the impact of advice differs depending on type of 
advice tendered, type of cue assessed and the time-to-assessment.  When looking at the effect of 
time-to-assessment (given that it was the distinguishing factor between studies) on influencing juror 
opinion, in the immediate term, instructions appeared to enhance perceptions of reliable indicia yet 
over time, the benefit of the instruction diminished.  While the pattern of improvement for 
perceptions of reliable indicia improve with the passage of time, the effect of advice appeared to 
be no more than the effect of time alone.  The inverse was true for the effect of advice on jurors’ 
perceptions of unreliable indicia.  Namely, when jurors consider advice immediately after it is 
presented, only expert evidence successfully corrects misconceptions of cues not indicative of 
deception.  However, with the passage of time, not only was the benefit of the information proffered 
by the expert witness maintained, but also, instructions delivered by the expert/judge emerge as 
effective in shifting jurors’ perceptions regarding unreliable indicia. 
 Together, these findings suggest that the effect of instructions weaken with time for 
perceptions of reliable indicia but broaden for perceptions of unreliable indicia. This was evidenced 
by the expert witness and expert/judge having a significant impact on enhancing perceptions of 
reliable indicia in the immediate term but when the information presented by the expert or expert 
and judge was considered over time, the merit of the instruction dissipated.  This finding is further 
substantiated by the mean differences across advice types condensing, and reducing in magnitude 
with time.  Whether the benefit of advice, including the expert specifically, diminished over time 
because the efficacy of the advice weakened, because jurors’ opinions increased due to time alone, 
or simply because initial impressions over-ride instructions at some point in time could not be 
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resolved.  Equally, whether differences in perceptions were due to the effect of the source of the 
advice, the content of the advice, the length of the advice or an interaction of the above, cannot be 
determined.  What can be said, is that the mean increases achieved with expert evidence were the 
largest across type of advice in both the immediate and long-term.  The same cannot be said for the 
benefit of expert/judge advice: not only did the benefit of the instruction diminish over time but the 
shift in perceptions were negligible when delay was a factor with the mean increase among the 
smallest of all advice presented. 
This thesis highlights the importance of incorporating independent controls rather than 
drawing conclusions from in-built controls where the latter may overlook possible confounding 
factors such as retest effects.  Regarding the inconsistencies between the effect of advice in the 
immediate and longer-term on influencing perceptions on reliable and unreliable cues, the 
discrepancies between the controls cannot be discounted.  The opinions of jurors changed when 
instructions were withheld both in the immediate term and over time but the direction of these 
changes were contrariwise to one another.  By way of explanation, for Study one, perceptions on 
reliable and unreliable cues decreased from baseline for those who did not received advice.  Those 
who received advice in the immediate term demonstrated improvements on reliable cues (i.e. 
increases in mean scores) and improvements on unreliable cues (i.e. decreases in means scores).  
As such, the differences found on unreliable cues between those exposed to advice and those not, 
were not dissimilar enough to suggest immediate advice had a greater effect.  A similar divergence 
occurred when advice was delayed, albeit the direction was reversed.  For Study two, perceptions 
on reliable and unreliable cues increased from baseline with time for those who received no advice.  
Equivalent in pattern to those exposed to immediate advice, opinions over time demonstrated 
improvements on both reliable and unreliable factors with increases and decreases in mean scores 
achieved respectively.  Therefore, the differences found between those exposed to advice and those 
not for reliable cues were not distinct enough to suggest perceptions were influenced by advice 
more than time alone.   
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To summarise, in light of the controls incorporated herein, the findings indicate that the 
effect of no advice influenced jurors’ opinions differently in the short-term compared to the longer-
term.  When jurors were asked to consider which nonverbal cues were indicative of deception 
without instructional advice, in the immediate term, jurors perceived reliable cues to be less 
indicative of deception.  By contrast, when jurors had time to reflect on the task at hand, their 
opinions strengthened, with reliable indicia believed to be more indicative of deception than at 
baseline.  The same patterns were observed for perceptions of unreliable indicia.  In the short-term, 
jurors perceived unreliable cues to be less indicative of deception in the absence of advice but over 
time, false beliefs exacerbated in the absence of instructions.  Consequently, the effect of omitting 
instructions effected jurors’ perceptions differently depending on when they were asked to evaluate 
nonverbal cues.  Whether the variability in effects of no advice were due to differences in sample 
size (n = 53 in Study one; n = 18 in Study two), due to differences in time-to-assessment, or both 
cannot be said. 
Regarding reliable cues, both studies point to the benefit of instructing jurors on diagnostics 
of deception in the immediate term – not only do jurors’ perceptions appear to improve from the 
information proffered but doing so counteracts possible negative consequences that may be 
associated with neglecting to instruct jurors on nonverbal cues of deception.  Maximising the 
benefit of instructions is not conditional on the type of advice introduced, with both expert evidence 
and expert/judge equally effective in enhancing jurors’ perceptions in the immediate term.  
Practically however, there appears to be little advantage in adducing both the evidence of the expert 
and direction of the judge if the testimony of the expert is sufficient alone to assist juror decision-
making.  
Regarding jurors’ perceptions of unreliable cues the findings, taken together, indicate that 
the effect of expert evidence successfully corrects jurors’ misconceptions in both the immediate 
term and longer-term.  Although instructions by expert/judge were also found to improve opinions 
INSTRUCTING JURORS ON NONVERBAL CUES OF DECEPTION   175 
 
of unreliable indicia over time it is argued that it does not add any value to that achieved by expert 
witness.  Firstly, expert/judge is as effective as the expert alone in correcting for misconceptions 
when delay is a factor; second expert/judge does not correct for misconceptions in the immediate 
term whereas the expert does, and third, pragmatically presenting jurors with two independent 
forms of advice is unnecessary when the same impact may be achieved as effectively by one form 
of advice. 
When considered together, the current thesis demonstrates that a number of factors 
influence jurors’ perceptions of nonverbal diagnostics of deception.  These include whether 
perceptions pertain to reliable or unreliable indicia.  Shifts in perception also depend on the source 
of advice from which instructions are given and whether the instruction are considered immediately 
or over time.  While there is clearly an interaction between the three factors investigated (cue-type, 
advice, and time-to-assessment) the nature and extent of the interaction cannot be extrapolated 
without replication and should be treated with caution. 
Based on the findings of this thesis, what can be concluded is that perceptions of indicia of 
deception may shift, in both the immediate and longer term.  However, the extent to which opinions 
are influenced vary between reliable indicators and unreliable indicators and are impacted 
differently by the method in which advice is delivered.  There appears to be some advantage in 
introducing expert evidence as an adjunct to the court to educate jurors, bettering perceptions of 
diagnostics of deception.  Not only may the testimony of an expert witness enhance opinions of 
reliable indicia while at the same time reducing false beliefs of cues not indicative of deception, 
some improvements achieved with expert evidence may preserve over time.   
Notwithstanding the possible benefits demonstrated by the effect of expert advice in both 
the immediate and long-term, the findings of this thesis suggest that perceptions may benefit from 
instruction, however, the impact of advice on perceptions appears to be transient as demonstrated 
by changes in the immediate term (Study one) over those achieved in the longer-term (Study two).  
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Although enhancement in perceptions were observed in the long-term, these changes appear to be 
less enduring.  Consistent with the existing research (Blanch-Hartigan et al., 2012; Frank & Feely, 
2003; Hauch et al, 2016; Shaw et al., 2013), the findings of this thesis point to pre-existing 
perceptions over-riding advice either sooner or later.  While the benefit of advice by the expert 
appears to be broader than other forms of advice, the ability of instructions to effect permanent 
change to pre-existing beliefs appears unlikely.  That said, in the context of juror decision-making, 
effecting permanent change in juror opinion may not be the necessary threshold.  At least for the 
benefit of the court, jurors’ knowledge of deception indicia need only be enhanced to reliably 
inform their interpretations of witness credibility while they perform their duty to the court.  
Beyond their role as triers of fact, should perceptions revert back to baseline, all is not lost.  If 
changes in perception are only achievable in the short-term or at most, over the course of a one-
week period, this may suffice in providing some safeguard to otherwise erroneous interpretations 
based on false, misplaced beliefs of indicia of deception.  
12.5. What Combination of Nonverbal Cues are Considered Most Important in Deception 
Detection? 
The current thesis explored at factor level the combination of cues identified as the most 
important by jurors in their determinations of witness truthfulness/deception.  The exploratory 
analyses revealed a number of findings.  Before advice was received, jurors across both studies 
identified the same four factors as among the most important cues in determining the credibility of 
a witness.  These were: confidence; spontaneous corrections; implausible responses; and responses 
that contain a lot of detail of which two were diagnostic and two were not.  Only the rank order of 
importance differed between studies.  Of note, it was the fifth most important cue that differed 
between studies with responses that lack logical structure and gaze aversion nominated.  
Interestingly, the number one factor ranked most important was the same across studies.  This was 
the non-diagnostic cue, confidence.   
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While there is no universal cue akin to Pinocchio’s nose that enables us to detect deception, 
confidence despite its non-diagnostic quality, is routinely perceived conclusive of witness 
truthfulness and has been shown to account for the majority of variance in jurors’ determinations 
of eyewitness believability (McClellan, 2006).  More recently, Bogaard and colleagues (2016) 
found gaze aversion to be the first and second most identified cue to deceit among students and 
police officers respectively.  Aside from gaze aversion none of the cues identified in the current 
research overlapped with those identified in their study (Bogaard et al., 2016) even though the pool 
of nonverbal cues investigated were largely the same. 
An unexpected finding followed after jurors received advice.  Not only did the combination 
of cues deemed most important remain relatively unaffected with-in studies (i.e. three of five cues 
were maintained after immediate advice and four of five were retained after delayed advice) but 
the combination of cues remained largely stable regardless of whether advice was considered 
immediately or over time.  These were confidence, responses that contain a lot of detail, implausible 
responses, and responses that contain very few details: two diagnostic and two non-diagnostic. 
In terms of the influence of advice on shifting importance, both immediate advice and 
advice over time increased jurors’ levels of importance on a handful of deception cues with the 
largest percentage changes demonstrated across the same three indicia.  Not only did these changes 
reflect increases in importance on reliable cues but the gains apportioned remained in the same 
hierarchical order irrespective of time-to assessment (i.e. immediate or delayed advice).  The three 
cues reflecting the largest percentage change with advice were high pitch voice, body movements 
including hand, finger, leg and foot movement, and responses that contain very few details.   
The results summarised for cues ranked most important raise a few scenarios.  On the one 
hand, advice demonstrated little benefit in adjusting hierarchical rankings of importance for cues 
considered in the top five.  That said however, the “top  five” parameter set was an artificial one 
and is unlikely to bear any significance in practical terms when making determinations as to the 
INSTRUCTING JURORS ON NONVERBAL CUES OF DECEPTION   178 
 
credibility of a witness.  On the other hand, the results clearly illustrated that overall importance 
attributed to both reliable and unreliable cues can be shifted with advice.  The difficulty posed 
however is that with advice, some reliable cues decreased in importance and some unreliable cues 
increased in importance.  This finding may indicate a number of different possibilities.  First, that 
there may be a saturation effect for advice with only so much of the evidence presented to jurors 
retained and considered. A sum of 31 different cues – some similar, others not – may have exceeded 
the threshold of retention reasonably expected of jurors. 
An alternative hypothesis as outlined previously may be that the content of advice tendered 
to jurors lacked specificity as to the individual cues jurors were asked to evaluate.  While some 
indicia mirrored those in the questionnaire, some were discussed in more general terms.  As noted 
in chapter seven, content analysis revealed that neither confidence nor responses that contain a lot 
of detail were pinpointed in the advice presented.  That is, jurors did not hear evidence to discount 
these indicia as non-diagnostic of deception.  Therefore it’s not surprising that the two beliefs held 
paramount by jurors did not change post-intervention.  Moreover, the increase in importance 
observed for ‘responses that contain a lot of detail’ may have arisen for no reason other than 
common sense.  That is, the advice dealt specifically with the factor ‘responses that contain very 
few details’ and drew attention to the omission of spatial, temporal or perception details as helpful 
in evaluating the truthfulness of a witness.  As common sense would have it, the opposite ought to 
be true and therefore ‘responses that contain a lot of detail’ must be indicative of deception.  
However, this is not the case (DePaulo et al., 2003; Levine, 2018).  It is proposed that the label 
used to identify the cue may have had an inadvertent, prejudicial effect on responses in that it 
conveyed the opposite of what was presented in the advice and could have therefore reasonably 
been induced as indicative of deception. 
A further possibility that warrants consideration is that although the content of advice was 
similar across conditions – judicial transcript and judicial direction were identical – the content of 
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the evidence presented to jurors did not address all 31 cues equivalently with some types of advice 
deliberating more conscientiously on some factors at the expense of others.  As a consequence, 
including cues that had not been specified by advice, may have diluted the effect of advice. 
Furthermore, asking jurors to consider 31 cues may have exceeded the number of cues that could 
be realistically been dealt with by jurors.  Consequently, it is possible that the jurors’ assessment 
of advice for some cues but not others may have, albeit inadvertently, muddied the overall effect 
of advice found.  These considerations raise further questions as whether the provision of advice 
needs to strike a balance between adducing information on a smaller number of cues, and whether 
there is a utopian combination of cue types that would assist jurors the most.  Determining a 
practical threshold pertaining to juror comprehension would also be worthy of future research to 
establish how many cues (reliable and unreliable) would be optimal to instruct jurors on so that 
advice could achieve the maximum benefit on shaping jurors beliefs to better inform their 
assessments of witness credibility. 
The increase in importance observed on confidence and responses that contain a lot of 
detail, found across both Study one and Study two highlight an issue for consideration.  Namely, 
when the most salient of beliefs about deceptive behaviour are wrong, and those beliefs are not 
counteracted with tendered advice specifically, then oversight of that advice may correspond with 
that factor amplifying in importance.  This finding, as was demonstrated in the current research, 
lends support to the idea that not only should jurors hear from expert witnesses as to nonverbal 
diagnostics of deception, but that the content of that evidence should target the combination of cues 
perceived by jurors as most important.  As has been demonstrated herein preliminarily, if a small 
selection of unreliable cues are overlooked and not directly countervailed jurors may assign more 
importance to these behaviours in both the immediate term and over time.  Determinations as to 
witness credibility are a function held, unreservedly, by the jury.  However, without the aid of 
expert evidence as a mechanism to correct jurors most salient beliefs pertaining to non-diagnostic 
cues of deception the potentiality for damaging and unsafe decisions may continue unabated. 
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12.6. Did Advice Effect Juror Perceived Confidence in Detecting Deception? 
The effect of education on juror confidence was explored in this thesis.  To date, no research 
has examined whether or not the provision of advice influences perceived confidence among jurors. 
This thesis aimed to redress this gap in knowledge.  Given the exploratory nature of comparing the 
effect of instruction on confidence, no directional hypotheses were predicted.  The analysis was of 
interest with respect to the deception literature that suggests over confidence – aptly coined the 
“over-confidence effect” – has a negative relationship with accurately detecting deception 
(DePaulo et al., 1997).   
While veracity judgements were not the focus of this thesis, investigating whether 
instructions influenced confidence is of value.  In related literature, it has been well established (i.e. 
eyewitness testimony) that confidence in knowledge is a weak predictor of accurate knowledge 
(Brewer & Wells, 2006; Sporer, Penrod, Read & Cutler, 1995).  This relationship is an important 
one as it has been shown that jurors rely on perceived confidence when assessing eyewitness 
evidence (Charman, et al., 2011; Deffenbacher, 1980; Wells, Lindsay, & Ferguson, 1979).  
This thesis demonstrated, provisionally, that juror perceived confidence does not appear  
effected by the provision of advice.  Not only did the efficacy of advice not influence juror 
confidence (i.e. shifts in perceptions of nonverbal cues were not associated with shifts in 
confidence); but shifts in confidence were not influenced by type of advice (i.e. no type of advice, 
successful or otherwise, was associated with changes in perceived confidence), and shifts in 
confidence were not influenced by time-to-assessment (i.e. levels of confidence were not 
influenced by advice considered immediately or in the long-term).  Despite previous research to 
suggest confidence in initial judgements of trustworthiness increase with time (Willis & Todorov, 
2006), the current findings suggest no apparent relationship between the provision of advice, 
enhancement of perceptions of nonverbal cues of deception/trustworthiness and perceived 
confidence in detecting deception.  Overall, using instructions as a safeguard to educate jury 
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members on diagnostics of deception does not seemingly warrant caution because negative effects 
associated with over confidence (DePaulo et al., 1997), were not found when advice on nonverbal 
cues of deception was tendered. 
12.7. Implications  
A number of conclusions were derived from Study one and Study two.  Although 
aforementioned, these are considered with respect to implications for existing theory and 
implications for forensic practice.   
12.7.1. Implications for Existing Theory 
It has been widely established that beliefs about deceptive behaviour are so embedded that 
they reemerge without enticement (e.g., Anderson et al., 1998; DePaulo, 1994; Feeley & Young, 
2000; Frank & Feeley, 2003; Zuckerman, Koestner, & Colella, 1985).  This thesis set out to test 
the central tenants of DDT that posits jurors’ initial perceptions of trustworthiness are so entrenched 
that they are unlikely to change over time or in response to conflicting evidence (Porter and ten 
Brinke, 2009).   
At the outset of this thesis, the jury was out as to the legitimacy of DDT and its prediction 
that initial opinions are so steadfast that they cannot, and do not, change even when confronted 
with evidence to the contrary.  The findings herein provide mixed support for DDT.  Primarily, 
perceptions may benefit from advice.  However, the benefit appear to be short-lived with 
enhancements to perceptions largely obtained in the shorter-term.  Conversely, in the longer-term, 
the indications herein suggest that the education proffered to jurors is undermined by beliefs that 
are pervasive, to one extent or another, with the majority of juror opinion restoring to baseline.  
Only expert evidence and expert/judicial advice combined appeared to impact perceptions over 
time and the efficacy of the advice was limited to correcting misconceptions.  As such, this thesis 
proposes that the attestations made by DDT – that stereotypes about deceptive behaviour are 
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impervious to change – may be oversimplified and that rather, with advice, it may be possible to 
modify opinions in the short-term with changes in the longer-term, less so. 
Indeed, regarding the specifics of advice, the current thesis demonstrated that information 
on indicia of deception may benefit decision-makers in reshaping their initial impressions as to 
determinants of witness credibility.  This thesis showed that introducing expert evidence on 
detecting deception may have utility not only with respect to enhancing jurors’ opinions of reliable 
nonverbal cues of deception in the short-term but too may correct misconceptions of unreliable 
indicia in both the immediate and long term.  Although instructions by expert witness was the only 
type of advice that was uniformly successful across cue types, the current research also revealed 
that instructions by way of expert evidence and/or judicial directions may enhance opinion of 
reliable cues in the immediate term while correcting false beliefs in the longer-term. 
The findings arising from this thesis suggest that perceptions of deceptive behaviour may 
be more complex than first proposed by DDT.  The theory predicts that not only are initial 
impressions typically unreliable, but they too are so strongly contented that they negatively 
influence subsequent interpretation and assimilation of new information, especially when that 
information is contrary to belief (Porter & ten Brinke, 2009, 2010).  Based on the findings of this 
thesis the claim that initial perceptions are characteristically unreliable may be misplaced.  An 
unexpected finding of this research was that although people hold false beliefs regarding which 
behaviours infer deception they also hold stereotypes that are valid.  Further to this, the prevalence 
of false beliefs do not appear to outweigh reliable ones.  Rather, the studies herein revealed that 
perceptions of reliable and unreliable cues may in fact be perceived equally at baseline and that the 
weight afforded to cues are not mutually exclusive.  This finding provides some preliminary 
reassurance that perhaps the picture depicted in the extant literature is not as dire as first thought.  
Further, this finding may shed some light on why veracity judgements of detecting deception are 
no better than chance: the base rate of detection accuracy may well be accounted for by reliable 
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and unreliable cues being considered equal.  Research suggests that poor detection rates are a 
consequence of people relying on invalid nonverbal cues (Levine & McCornack, 2014; Vrij et al., 
2019) and/or because valid cues are faint (Hartwig & Bond, 2011; Strömwall, Granhag, & Hartwig, 
2004; Masip, 2017; Vrij et al., 2010; 2019; Vrij & Turgeon, 2018).  While this might be the case, 
the findings herein at least challenge the premise that people rely on invalid cues and instead 
suggest that veracity judgements may be more indicative of a case of odds: if in fact jurors perceive 
valid and invalid cues to be equal and nonverbal cues are expressed equally, then jurors have an 
even chance of getting it right or wrong.  Of course, this proposition remains no more than a 
hypothesis.  If additional support can be gleaned to show that nonverbal cues are weighted equally, 
then it would provide an alternative – and perhaps superior one – as to why people are poor at 
detecting deception. 
Moreover, the current thesis has been able to show that reliable perceptions may be 
encouraged with new information through expert testimony, but also, that unreliable perceptions 
may be corrected.  The studies also demonstrated tentative evidence for shifting initial perceptions 
regarding deceptive behaviour in both the immediate term and over time.  That said, however, 
based on the variability in effects of advice observed, the thesis provides some evidence in keeping 
with DDT that pre-existing perceptions endure with time, over-riding some forms advice either 
sooner or later. 
12.7.2. Implication for Forensic Practice 
In practical terms, a number of implications are identified for forensic practice, legal 
doctrine and jury trials more generally.  Firstly it can be concluded that through the admission of 
responsible expert testimony, jurors’ beliefs about deceptive behaviour may be positively 
influenced to better inform their determinations of witness credibility.  It can also be said that expert 
testimony that attends to reliable/unreliable diagnostics of deception appears to achieve its 
maximum effect in the immediate term.  It has also been established that the benefit of instructions 
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by an expert witness appears to diminish over time, with expert testimony only found to correct for 
mistaken beliefs about deceptive behaviour in the longer term whereas opinions of reliable indicia 
of deception do not appear sustainable.    
If jurors are to receive maximum benefit from expert testimony to aid in their evaluations 
of witness credibility then information as to reliable/unreliable diagnostics of deception would be 
best placed if it was adduced immediately before jurors hear from a witness.  Given the intricacies 
of a trial the ability to introduce expert testimony requires planning and forewarning to ensure all 
parties are available and in attendance.  When advocates for either the defense or prosecution 
consider witness credibility to be at issue consideration should be given, as much as is practical, to 
delivering the evidence of an expert within the immediacy of the witness in question.  When these 
machinations are not possible, and members of the jury find themselves considering the advice of 
an expert witness a week thereafter, then their assessments, as a result, may be weaker.  While 
decisions as to the credibility of a witness may be protected from false stereotypes, the benefit of 
instructions on jurors’ beliefs regarding reliable cues may have diminished and become less 
reliable.  While instructions may not directly benefit opinions concerning reliable indicia in the 
longer term, some comfort can be taken from jurors’ opinions of reliable cues improving on their 
own with time.  Further, although enhancements in opinion of reliable cues are unlikely to be 
maintained, at least and perhaps more importantly, advice may correct misconceptions that are 
more hazardous and at risk of misleading interpretations of witness credibility.   
The findings of this thesis present some potential opportunities for legal reform where jury 
trials are concerned.  This thesis evidences some benefit of adducing expert testimony as to the 
scientific basis of nonverbal cues as a worthy adjunct to protect against unsafe decisions when 
witness credibility is at issue. 
The current research has demonstrated that the effects of instruction on shifting and 
maintaining perceptions can be impacted depending on whether instructions are considered 
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immediately or after a delay.  What remains unknown is at what point does the influence of advice 
wear off.  Taken from the findings herein, the benefit of instructions on jurors’ perceptions of 
reliable cues drops off by one-week whereas the effect appears to maintain to some degree for 
perceptions of unreliable cues.  Therefore, it would be of value to establish whether there was an 
effective period of time in which to give jurors the necessary opportunity to reflect on advice 
tendered so that they can consider it while ensuring its effect is maximised.   
Although the findings from the effect of no advice (i.e. the controls) need to be considered 
cautiously, it is noted that the findings herein point to the following interpretations.  If jurors 
continue to be encouraged by the judiciary to consider demeanour evidence over the course of a 
trial, then such directions ought to be accompanied with advice.  That is to say, that the instruction 
to consider cues of deception without requisite advice may have an inadvertent, negative effect on 
perceptions of unreliable cues (people perceive unreliable cues to be more indicative of deception 
over time when they don’t receive advice).  If instruction by way of expert evidence cannot 
accompany jurors requirement to consider the demeanour of a witness then potentially no invitation 
to consider demeanour should be given.  Notwithstanding replication, it could be inferred 
(preliminarily and with caution) that failing to instruct jurors as to the reliable/unreliable cues of 
deception may have negative, unwanted consequences on perceptions independent of advice.   
All conclusions aside, it cannot be understated that although the findings herein 
demonstrated shifts in juror’s perceptions of nonverbal diagnostics of deception, what remains to 
be seen is whether or not shifts in opinion will apply to final assessments of credibility.  This is a 
salient point not only because assessing witness credibility is a fundamental role reserved for the 
jury but also because if the acquired knowledge cannot be applied, then the benefit of instructions 
becomes inconsequential.  Further to this, if the instructions taken onboard can be applied, what 
remains unknown is whether or not they can be applied correctly.  If the transfer of knowledge 
from instruction to application result in erroneous assessments of credibility, then adducing 
INSTRUCTING JURORS ON NONVERBAL CUES OF DECEPTION   186 
 
evidence as to reliable/unreliable diagnostics of deception not only invalidates the purpose of 
introducing the evidence but it would undermine the entire curial process.  These issues present 
logical steps for future consideration. 
Exploratory investigations revealed a small combination of cues commonly perceived by 
potential jurors as highly important in evaluating the truthfulness of a witness (e.g. confidence, 
implausible responses, responses that contain very few details and spontaneous corrections). While 
the findings are only precursory, instructions that focus on these cues could achieve greater returns 
than attained when an exhaustive list of empirically established cues are presented.  Jurors are more 
likely to be able to retain and recall a smaller number of factors than an extensive list of cues.  
Furthermore, the handful of factors identified as most important by jurors – both reliable and 
unreliable – may be used to improve credibility assessments because they do not require prior 
knowledge of a witness’s usual presentation of behaviour to interpret them.  Even though baseline 
knowledge of behaviour is not a prerequisite to accurate assessments of deception (Porter, et. al. 
2007; 2010), if jurors can evaluate cues that do not require relevant a-prior knowledge of 
behavioural mannerisms then it can be gleaned that assessments of credibility may be improved 
from developing jurors’ knowledge of these cues alone. 
12.8. Strengths of Thesis 
This thesis attempted to systematically replicate previous research to establish whether 
providing advice to jurors improved the behavioural cues relied upon when assessing the 
truthfulness/deception of a witness in court.  This body of work has not only contributed to a 
scarcity of replication studies, but also has attempted to expand current knowledge in what is a vast 
area of research on deception detection with specific contribution to the knowledge bank on 
nonverbal, behavioural cues of deception that are plagued by criticism and debate.  More broadly, 
the current body of work aids the field of forensic practice with its finding that the provision of 
evidence may influence deception cues relied upon by jurors, and so, has the potential to positively 
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shape jury reform with the evolution of demeanour evidence and role psychological evidence could 
have in enhancing the ability of triers of fact in their duty to evaluate witnesses credibility. 
Further to this, the thesis was the first to explore how delay impacts consideration of advice 
given to jurors.  Additionally, other original contributions of this thesis included the incorporation 
of independent controls that allowed for confounding factors such as retest effects and time to be 
extrapolated.  What is more, investigating the effect of instructions on perceptions of unreliable 
cues in addition to perceptions of reliable indicia was also significant.  Not only did this extension 
to the investigation uncover some unexpected findings but it also identified evidence that directly 
challenges existing assumptions regarding deception detection accuracy. 
12.9. Limitations 
Setting aside the strengths of the current work, the novel investigations conducted, and 
findings herein, a number of limitations are likely to have shaped the results and ought to be 
considered when interpreting the findings.  The limitations are outlined with respect to the project’s 
research design, the materials and stimuli employed, and the statistical analyses performed. 
12.9.1. The Research Design. 
Deficiencies in the design of the replication and subsequent extension were observed in the 
process of analysing and interpreting the results.  At issue for both studies was the design of the 
control groups.  Although the introduction of controls is a great asset of the thesis, elevating its 
experimental design compared to that of the original study that relied upon baseline responses as 
inbuilt controls for each group, the design of the controls was not sophisticated enough to rule out 
the potential for practice effects or rote learning/memory.  That is, the pre/post-test control for both 
studies was not equivalent; it omitted an interference, distractor task that may have benefited 
analysis by militating the risk of practice effects.  As it stands, the current researchers are unable 
to ascertain with certainty that the improvements in behavioural cues relied upon by jurors can be 
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attributed to the effect of advice alone, or alternatively reflect participant’s ability to perform a 
memory task.  As such, the possibility of other unknown confounding variables cannot be 
eliminated.  This perspective, although pessimistic, is also problematic for the study conducted by 
Coyle and Thomson (2014) whose quasi-experimental design did not include a dedicated, 
equivalent control.  Lastly, controls were not collected for perceived confidence and so the analysis 
of juror confidence was subject to the same limitations identified in the within-group analyses 
where baseline measures were adopted as in-built controls. 
A-prior power analyses indicated that a sample of 164 participants would be adequate to 
detect small effect sizes for within-group analyses.  A-prior analyses were not conducted for 
between-group comparisons as this was not identified prior to data collection.  However, given that 
the advice groups were smaller than anticipated (i.e. instead of 30 subjects per cell, some advice 
conditions were as small as 13 participants), post-hoc power analyses revealed power ranging from 
as low as .21 to .40 for Study one and .18 to .20 for Study two in order to detect small effects.  
Accordingly, the reduced power observed for both studies suggests the small cell sizes may have 
failed to detect true, small relationships for the within-group comparisons.  Equally, to detect small 
effects from the between-group comparisons that examined shifts in perceptions against the 
controls, post-hoc analyses indicated power ranging from .39 to. 42 for Study one and from .34 to 
.36 for Study two.  It is suggested therefore that the likelihood for Type 2 errors render caution 
when it comes to interpreting the findings of studies one and two for both the within and between-
group analyses. 
Sample representativeness presents a limitation for both studies.  The gender split across 
both samples was predominantly female and is not therefore reflective of the statistical profile of 
Victorian jurors obtained from Juries Victoria (2019).  That said however, the make-up of  juries 
empaneled in any given trial are unlikely to be split 50/50 due to numerous factors such as 
challenges for cause resulting in potential jurors being excused from service.  Nevertheless, the 
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impact of gender differences herein could not be investigated because of the limited number of 
male participants recruited.   
Social media platforms have great utility for recruitment because of the potential to reach 
large and specific audiences, however, the evidence base for the efficacy and validity of online 
recruitment in terms of recruitment success, sample representativeness and response rates is limited 
(Bennetts et al., 2019).  One unintended consequence of using online channels for recruitment has 
been shown to result in unrepresentative and unique samples relative to traditional approaches 
(Arigo et al., 2018).  Consistent with research into convenience sampling that found Facebook users 
are significantly more likely to be females (Well & Link, 2014), recruiting participants via online 
channels may explain the imbalance of gender found in studies one and two.  Similarly, the higher 
proportion of tertiary qualified participants found herein is consistent with a large-scale Australian 
study that found participants recruited via Facebook were more likely university educated (Bennett 
et al., 2019) compared to population-based sampling.  
The potential for selection bias in the current thesis warrants consideration.  The content of 
advertisements on Facebook has been shown to lead to different rates of recruitment and 
engagement (Basa-Martinez et al., 2018; Chio et al., 2017; Wozney et al., 2019) but also research 
has found that the content of promotional material used in recruiting participants has lead to 
selection bias directly impacting demographics and target measures under investigation (Teo et al., 
2018; Chio et al., 2017).  Consequently, the messaging content of the research flyer along with the 
online networks available to the author may have inadvertently impacted the external validity of 
the studies with the pool of participant recruited affecting the generalizability of findings to 
population-based samples and potentially the original study replicated. 
12.9.2. The Materials and Stimuli.   
Pertinent to this thesis was the aim to replicate the findings of Coyle and Thomson (2014).  
Accordingly, the materials and stimuli used in the original study were required herein, warts and 
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all.  Nevertheless, a number of shortcomings were observed.  First and foremost, is the research 
questionnaire that asked participants to rate each nonverbal cue on a six-point scale.  The 
questionnaire used the verbal anchors “extremely infrequently” for a scale score of 1 and 
“extremely frequently” for a corresponding score of 6.  On the face of it the verbal anchors appear 
appropriate.  However, direct feedback from participants suggests that the verbal anchors adopted 
in the survey were confusing to interpret and impacted participants’ ability to interpret the task at 
hand: “rate each factor that enables you to determine whether someone is truthful if they were 
giving evidence in a court case.” As corroborated by participant feedback, it is the opinion of the 
author that the verbal anchors may have muddied the instruction given.  As a consequence, it is 
probable that participants found the survey arduous and may have had some bearing on survey 
comprehension and completion thereby raising the issue of internal validity for the measures 
assessed.  The proposition that participants found rating behavioural cues in terms of frequency 
confusing and arduous is supported by a drop-out rate of 57% (n = 364) of the total research sample 
at this item.  By comparison, it is unknown whether the same questionnaire implemented in Coyle 
and Thomson’s study (2014) was accompanied by any verbal instructions or clarification on how 
to interpret the item.  Furthermore, it is unknown whether participants had the opportunity to seek 
clarity on how to interpret the question.  A pilot study testing the validity of the verbal anchors of 
the questionnaire may be warranted and future research would be well placed to investigate the 
most appropriate, intuitive verbal anchor for the task at hand.     
12.9.3. The Statistical Analyses. 
The potential for Type 1 error rates also needs to be considered given the multiple tests 
performed across the current studies.  However, confidence that genuine relationships were found 
is increased by the fact that the pattern of results are in the directions expected and the low power 
thresholds achieved with the samples recruited. 
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The prevalence of non-parametric methods used throughout the thesis could be perceived 
as a limitation because non-parametric methods are less powerful than parametric procedures 
(Field, 2013).  However, non-parametric tests were dictated by the fact that normality was violated, 
first and foremost, but also in purists’ terms, consistency commanded that the statistical methods 
replicate those performed in the original study thereby militating any confounding factors that may 
have arisen as a result of undertaking different statistical approaches. 
An unfortunate, missed opportunity for the thesis was that the two studies met criteria for 
randomized control trials (RCT) had the projects been registered.  Although not a limitation in the 
traditional sense, it is a shortcoming that has had a bearing on the potential standard of experimental 
design that could have been achieved as well as limiting the potential contribution to the field had 
the RCT not been overlooked. 
12.10. Future Directions 
Research into the potential benefits of educating jurors requires further exploration if we 
are to understand how best to improve jurors’ opinions of nonverbal cues of deception if they are 
to be aided in their determinations of witness credibility.  A number of opportunities for future 
investigation were identified throughout.  A next logical step would be to establish whether the 
instructions that shifted perceptions can be applied when making decisions as to the 
truthfulness/deception of a witness.  The ability to comprehend and apply instructions as to 
reliable/unreliable cues of deception engage distinct cognitive processes (Krathwohol, 2002).  As 
highlighted by Baguley and her co-authors (2017), jurors’ comprehension of instructions are not 
sufficient to ensure application occurs.  Consistent with McGuire’s model of persuasion (McGuire, 
1968, 1972),  the current research went as far as to show that jurors not only comprehended the 
instructions but they may remember them over-time.  What we don’t know, however, is whether 
or not they can apply the instructions as would be indicated by jurors acting in a way that is 
consistent with the instructions received.  If jurors’ ability to apply the instructions are not 
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confirmed or denied then the shifts in opinions found herein cannot be concluded to reflect 
acceptance and/or agreement with the information presented.  Establishing juror’s ability to apply 
the advice also requires that the information be applied correctly.  With nonverbal cues widely 
accepted as faint and difficult to detect (Masip, 2017; Vrij et al., 2010; 2019; Vrij & Turgeon, 
2018), jurors’ ability to apply the knowledge accurately may be limited. These considerations 
warrant further research. 
Assessments of witness credibility are fundamental to the role of jurors.    A gap in current 
knowledge is to what effect instructing jurors has on the accuracy of assessing witness truthfulness 
and further, what impact the provision of advice may have on the outcome of verdicts.  If it can be 
shown that the application of knowledge as to reliable/unreliable cues of deception not only 
enhances the veracity of jurors’ assessments of witness credibility but also promotes safe verdicts 
then the benefit of instructing jurors maybe strengthened.  To the contrary, if instructions by way 
of expert or judicial directions cannot be applied or are applied incorrectly then the ability of advice 
to shift perceptions becomes a moot point. 
As identified in the discussions of studies one and two, the impact of source of advice 
differed not only by type of cue but also over time.  An area worthy of further exploration would 
be to systematically analyse differences in presentation modalities across source of advice but also 
differences in the combinations of source of advice.  Herein the combined effect of expert evidence 
and judicial directions was investigated.  However, the impact of expert evidence followed by a 
written judicial instruction was not.  Neither were oral instructions followed by written instruction 
nor expert evidence followed by oral and written judicial directives combined.  With amendments 
to the Jury Directions Act (2015, 2017) facilitating both the use of written and oral directions to 
the jury to aid in assessing the reliability of a witness’s evidence or a witness’s motive to lie, 
members of the judiciary are delivering more written directions than before (Judicial College of 
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Victoria, 2019).  However, what remains to be seen is what impact oral and written instructions 
combined have on jurors’ decision-making when demeanour evidence is at issue. 
The current thesis raised the issue that the effect of advice may be due to a number of 
factors.  Given the lack of effect evidenced by judicial directions, it is probable that the benefit of 
instructions are influenced by the duration of the advice given with preliminary indications to 
suggest advice needs to strike a balance between length of advice given.  If too short and the advice 
does not provide sufficient explanation as to the research basis of the information presented then it 
is unlikely to have an impact.  Further research could consider exploring what duration of advice 
is optimal in order to maximise the benefit of the advice while balancing the needs to maintain 
motivation and attention. 
It was established that the benefit of instructions through expert testimony are effective in 
enhancing jurors’ perceptions of reliable cues in the immediate term but that these do not hold over 
time.  What we don’t know is at what point in the intervening week do instructions dissipate in 
effecting change on opinions of reliable cues of deception.  It is after one day, two days and so 
forth?  Equally, we don’t know at what point the benefit of expert testimony drops off altogether 
having no impact on shifting perceptions of reliable and unreliable cues of deception.  These factors 
are worthy of further exploration.  Future research could provide great insights into this unknown 
with considerable implications as to when expert testimony should be adduced to achieve 
maximum benefit. 
For the provision of advice to be effective jurors must be capable and motivated to follow 
the instructions given and ultimately, apply that knowledge.  Based on the findings herein, the 
results suggest that the impact of instruction on shifting perceptions is effective when it is presented 
before jurors are asked to evaluate nonverbal cues.  What remains to be seen is what effect, if any, 
advice has on educating jurors after they have heard from a witness and potentially evaluated 
demeanour evidence.  Therefore, research is yet to established whether or not the timing of 
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instructions influence the efficacy of advice, and if so, at what point does advice has the greatest 
effect or conversely whether or not the timing of the advice is of any import. 
Furthermore, despite the merits of adducing expert evidence on improving perceptions 
what has not been determined is what effect expert evidence would have on shifting perceptions 
when jurors were faced with competing expert testimony.  It has been well established that 
conflicting experts can have negative effects on juror decision-making (Jones et al., 2017; see 
Ribbers & Henneberg, 2018,p.265) yet the effects of confusion on shifting perceptions when jurors 
are faced with duelling experts remains unknown. 
The findings observed in both Study one and Study two, that showed shifts in perception 
in the immediate and long term when advice was withheld necessitates further research into what 
other factors may be driving jurors’ opinions of indicators of deception.  Namely, jurors who 
received no advice evidenced opposing trajectories depending on whether they evaluated deception 
cues immediately or over time and the current work could not isolate whether these differences 
were due to time alone or other extraneous factors.   
A shortcoming identified in the current thesis was the potentially inadvertent effect that 
measuring jurors’ opinions across 31 cues may have had in undermining the impact of advice when 
advice did not address each cue equally, and for some not at all.  It is suggested therefore that future 
research could examine the correlation between the cues specified in the instructions given with 
improvements in opinions achieved.  Following on from this, future investigations could identify 
whether or not there is a cut-off pertaining to jurors’ comprehension of instructions given and if so, 
how many cues (reliable and/or unreliable) would optimise jurors’ opinions as to indicators of 
deception.   
In the same vein, Study one and Study two highlighted that a small handful of factors are 
deemed by jurors to be most important in detecting deception.  This finding presents an opportunity 
for future research to explore what gains could be made in educating jurors as to reliable/unreliable 
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diagnostics of deception if these specific cues were targeted.  Given that the combination of 
nonverbal cues perceived by jurors as most important in detecting deception before and after advice 
was first explored herein, the findings are at best preliminary.  Although one other study has 
examined beliefs as to nonverbal cues these related specifically to law enforcement personal 
(Bogaard et al., 2016) and did not look beyond baseline perceptions.   
The value of any replication or ability to generalise findings cannot overlook the benefits 
of studying jurors who can deliberate on the demeanour of real witnesses in actual trials, or at the 
very least mock trials.  The ability to recruit jurors relinquished from service would likely reveal 
valuable insights that cannot be achieved through convenient sampling.  Further to this, future 
replication attempts could alleviate the issues faced with limited power by consolidating the 
number of advice conditions studied if sizeable samples were unlikely.  Last but not least, the 
anomalies observed between the control groups in this research would benefit from further 
investigation.  Future research would be well placed to redress the methodological shortcomings 
of the controls by ensuring, at least, that a placebo task is incorporated that mimics that of advice 
but without the value of the information instructed.   
12.11. Conclusion 
In their role as triers of fact, jurors are expected to rely on common sense when interpreting 
the demeanour of a witness to assist them in their determinations of credibility.  This venerated 
belief assumes that a commonsense approach is reliable.  It is not; relying on demeanour evidence 
to infer witness credibility ignores the fact that jurors typically perform at chance in accurately 
discriminating truthfulness from deception.  With the veracity of detecting deception undermined 
by invalid and unreliable perceptions pertaining to nonverbal indicators of deception, verdict 
deliberations may be egregiously flawed if jurors’ misconceptions are not redressed.   
It has been well established that judicial directions have limited efficacy in influencing 
juror-decision making.  Also, it cannot be overlooked that the judiciary are vulnerable to the same 
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thinking errors and misconceptions faced by jurors.  Hence, relying on judicial directions in their 
current form to guide jurors as to interpreting demeanour evidence is misdirected and may be 
contributing to and perpetuating erroneous deliberations.  Accordingly, educating jurors as to the 
scientific basis vis-à-vis nonverbal indicators of deception is of great import.  Given that 
introducing specialised knowledge to assist jurors in an actual trial can only be adduced through 
expert evidence or evidentiary-based instructions, this thesis investigated the impact of advice on 
benefiting jurors’ knowledge of nonverbal diagnostics of deception.   
In doing so, the thesis highlighted that jurors’ perceptions of nonverbal cues of deception 
may be influenced with advice by way of expert testimony and/ or when combined with oral 
evidentiary instructions.  The current research also demonstrated that advice impacts jurors’ 
opinions differently, over time.   The current research shows how best to assist jurors in interpreting 
demeanour evidence if assessments of witness credibility and their resultant deliberations are to be 
safeguarded from risky decisions.  Moreover, exploratory analyses revealed preliminary findings 
that suggest educating jurors through the provision of instructions does not effect perceived 
confidence in detecting deception.  Notwithstanding replication, the finding that advice does not 
influence confidence is encouraging suggesting that negative effects associated with over-
confidence are unlikely to undermine interpretations of nonverbal cues of deception.   
This thesis draws attention to the need to advance empirical knowledge on the benefits of 
educating jurors as to witness demeanour before a verdict can be returned that triers of fact cannot 
reliably and accurately identify nonverbal cues of deception.  To do so would be premature: the 
jury is still out as to the uniform benefits of advising jurors over the longer-term with the thesis 
suggesting that pre-existing beliefs may in fact prevail with initial opinions re-emerging with time, 
irrespective of advice.  That said however, this body of work has provided some indications that 
empirically-based education introduced responsibly through expert evidence may achieve both 
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immediate and longer-term effects on militating jurors’ biases and misconceptions around flawed 
stereotypes of deception. 
Considered as one body of research, this thesis demonstrates the importance of 
understanding deception in courtrooms.  In summary, the current thesis provides mixed support for 
DDT (Porter & ten Brinke, 2009).  Although the evidence suggests that pre-existing beliefs endure, 
sooner or later, well-established opinion that stereotypes of deceptive behaviour cannot be changed 
is not entirely correct – at least in the immediate term.  This outcome is a welcome one and provides 
some reassurance that the foundation on which jury trials operate are not undermined by flawed 
assessments of credibility based on fallible perceptions resistant to change.  The conclusions do 
however highlight the responsibility imparted on the legal fraternity to improve and safeguard 
decision-makers determinations of witness credibility by facilitating jurors’ education with 
empirical knowledge tendered correctly, responsibly and timely through expert testimony. 
Deception experts criticise the use of nonverbal behaviours in detecting deception, 
however, research on deception detection in courtrooms has remained relatively unexplored.  It is 
hoped that this thesis will stimulate research interest and future investigations that will explore how 
reliable, responsible and timely psychological evidence can protect against jurors relying on 
misplaced common sense when assessing witness demeanour and thereby removing the need for 
members of the judiciary to proffer psychology from the bench. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A:  Plain Language Statement 
 
PLAIN   LANGUAGE   STATEMENT 
 
Full Project Title:   Instructing Jurors on Nonverbal Indicia of Detecting Deception: Is the Jury Still Out? 
Student Researcher:  Jessica Woskett 
Principal Researcher:  Emeritus Professor Don Thomson 
Dear Participant 
You are invited to take part in this research project. This Plain Language Statement contains detailed 
information about the research project. Its purpose is to explain to you as openly and clearly as possible all of 
the procedures involved in this project so that you can make a fully informed decision about whether or not you 
would like to participate.  
 
Please read this Plain Language Statement carefully. Feel free to ask questions about any information in the 
document by emailing the student researcher, Jessica Woskett at jwoskett@deakin.edu.au or by emailing the 
principal researcher, Professor Don Thomson at donald.thomson@deakin.edu.au.  
Consent to collect your data for this study will be assumed once you have read this Plain Language Statement 
and have commenced the survey; please do not commence the questionnaire unless you understand the 
information provided regarding the study and you give your consent to participate in the research project.  You 
are encouraged to print a copy of this Plain Language Statement to keep as a record. 
 
In order to take part in this study you must:  
• Be over 18 years of age 
• Be an Australian resident 
Purpose and Background 
This is a research project being completed in partial fulfilment for the degree of Doctor of Psychology (Forensic) 
at Deakin University. The results of the study will be collated into an academic research thesis with the aim to 
be published in a peer reviewed psychology journal. 
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate mock juror perceptions about cues to deception and to determine 
whether false stereotypes about lying can be corrected with education. You are being recruited as a member of 
a mock jury.  We seek your perceptions regarding indicators of deception through an online questionnaire.  The 
results of this study will further inform research in the field of detecting deception and legal decision-making.  
Funding 
This research project is entirely funded by Deakin University.  
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Procedures 
Participation in this project will involve watching or reading a transcript of an expert witness or judicial officer 
presenting evidence on detecting deception.  You will be asked to complete a short questionnaire two times: 
once before receiving the evidence on detecting deception and again after.  There are no right or wrong 
answers: we only seek your perceptions.  You will either be asked to participate in the project in one sitting in 
which you will complete the second questionnaire immediately after receiving advice on detecting deception.  
Alternatively, you may be required to complete the second questionnaire a week later.  This will be determined 
randomly.  If you are asked to return to complete the study one week later, we will send you an email 
notification as a reminder. The email notification will have a link to take you back to the online survey. 
Participation in the study is estimated to take approximately 15 to 20 minutes. The video or transcript of 
evidence and questionnaire are in English and each question has a fixed-choice response scale.  Please answer 
each question carefully. The questionnaire will ask you to rate the importance of different behavioural 
indicators that you would rely upon when determining the truthfulness of a witness in court. 
Participation in this research project is entirely voluntary and anonymous. All personal information such as 
demographic details will be non-identifiable. You may withdraw from the study at any stage prior to submitting 
the survey. Should you close this window prior to submitting your completed survey, your responses will not be 
recorded.  
Possible Benefits 
Participation in this study may increase your knowledge of detecting deception, but there are no direct benefits 
for participation. Benefits to the community may arise from the results of this study in the form of increased 
understanding of detecting deception and legal-decision making. 
          
Possible Risks 
We do not anticipate that there are any serious risks associated with participating in this study. 
             
Privacy, Confidentiality and Disclosure of Information 
Any information obtained in connection with this project and that can identify you will remain confidential. The 
questionnaire you complete will remain entirely anonymous - you will not be asked for any possibly identifying 
information.  
 
The information obtained from this study will be kept in secure storage at Deakin University in digital form for 5 
years after the final publication, after which it will be destroyed.     
          
Results of Project 
Results of the project will be reported in a research thesis with the aim to be published in a peer-reviewed 
journal. It will not be possible to contact you regarding your individual results or regarding publications due to 
the anonymity of the study.  However, please enter your email address at the end of the survey or contact the 
researchers by email if you are interested in receiving an electronic copy of the final thesis. If this is the case, 
please take this opportunity to take note of the researchers’ contact details provided as they will not be 
available after this screen.  Alternatively visit the studies website www.howtospotaliar.info for the research 
team’s contact details.    
 
Ethical Guidelines 
This project will be carried out according to the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research 
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(2007) produced by the National Health and Medical Research Council of Australia. This statement has been 
developed to protect the interests of people who agree to participate in human research studies. The ethical 
aspects of this research project have been approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee of Deakin 
University.  
 
Complaints 
If you have any complaints about any aspect of the project, the way it is being conducted or any questions 
about your rights as a research participant, then you may contact: The Manager, Ethics and Biosafety, Deakin 
University, 221 Burwood Highway, Burwood Victoria 3125, Telephone: 9251 7129, research-
ethics@deakin.edu.au  
Please quote project number HEAG-H 152_2015. 
 
Further Information or Queries 
If you require further information, wish to withdraw your participation or if you have any problems concerning 
this project, you can contact the lead researcher via email at donal.thomson@deakin.edu.au, or the student 
research at jwoskett@ deakin.edu.au 
 
The researchers responsible for this project are: 
 
Ms Jessica Woskett, Professor Donald Thomson, Professor Ian Coyle and Professor Andrew Day  
Deakin University 
School of Psychology 
221 Burwood Hwy 
Burwood VIC 3125 
Email: jwoskett@deakin.edu.au  
 
CONSENT FORM 
    
• I have read and I understand the above Plain Language Statement.  
• I freely agree to participate in this project according to the conditions stated. 
• I have been the opportunity to print a copy of the Plain Language Statement to keep.  
• The researcher has agreed not to reveal my identity and personal details, including where information 
about this project is published, or presented in any public form.  
 
By choosing to proceed to the survey, you are agreeing that you are 18 years or older, and are an Australian 
citizen. 
 
(Survey will open in a new window)  
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Appendix B:  Questionnaire 
Note:  As displayed to participants online. 
Q1 
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Q1 Continued 
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Q2 
 
 
Q3 
 
 
 
 
End of Questionnaire. 
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Appendix C:  Experimental Stimuli 
1.  Judicial Written Direction  
 
 
2. Expert Witness Condition 
 
To view video link click HERE 
 
3. Judicial Oral  Direction Condition 
 
To view video link click HERE 
 
4. Expert Witness and Judicial Direction Condition 
 
To view video link click HERE 
